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This thesis investigates the implementation of food safety regulation within the UK and 
Germany. The aim of the research is to assess and explain the extent to which risk-based 
approaches that are manifest in EU General Food Law, have been applied in each country. 
Drawing on extensive documentary and interview material, the thesis charts the history of 
food safety regulation in the UK, Germany and the EU, focusing on food safety enforcement 
at both national and local levels.  
 
The thesis examines the factors shaping the way that ideas of risk have been operationalised 
within the enforcement of food safety regulation through three case studies. First, it uses the 
case study of food import controls to investigate the operationalisation of risk ideas at EU 
level, and in particular tensions between ideas of risk, hazard and safety. Second, the thesis 
examines how risk-based approaches to food safety enforcement are shaped by the concerns 
and interests of national and local authorities in Germany and the UK. Third, the thesis uses 
the case of food hygiene barometers to explore the key factors shaping and constraining the 
uptake of risk ideas in the UK and Germany. 
 
The thesis concludes that despite the universalising claims for risk-based approaches to 
regulation, the case of food safety regulation demonstrates the normative, political and 
economic drivers shaping the differential uptake and use of risk ideas in advanced EU 
member states, even when regulation has been harmonised under EU law. The thesis builds 
on that conclusion to reflect on the future of risk-based policymaking in the field of food 
safety as well as contributing to wider ongoing social scientific discussion about the role of 








































































































































































AALA – Adventure Activities Licensing Authority 
AFS – Assured Food Standards 
ALARP – As Low as Reasonably Practicable 
APHA – Animal and Plant Health Agency 
APRA – Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
BfR – The Federal Institute for Risk Assessment 
BIP – Border Inspection Post 
BLL – German Federation for Food Law and Food Science 
BMEL – The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
BPA – Bisphenol A 
BRC – British Retail Consortium 
BVL – The Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 
BVLK – Federal Association of Food Inspectors (Bundesverband der 
Lebensmittelkontrolleure) 
CAP – EU Common Agricultural Policy 
CBA – Cost Benefit Analysis 
CCP – Critical Control Point 
CIEH – Chartered Institute for Environmental Health 
CVED – Common Veterinary Entry Document 
CVUAS – Chemical and Veterinary Investigation Office, Stuttgart 
Defra – Department for Environment & Rural Affairs 
DG SANCO (now DG SANTE) – Directorate General Health and Consumer Affairs) 
ECJ – European Court of Justice 
EFSA – European Food Safety Authority 
EHO – Environmental Health Officer 
EU – European Union (previously EEC – European Economic Community) 
FBO – Food Business Operator 
FDR – Federal Republic of Germany 
FHRS – Food Hygiene Rating Scheme 
FSA – Food Standards Agency 
FVO – Food and Veterinary Office 
GDR – Democratic Republic of Germany 
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GFL – General Food Law 
HAACP – Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
IAB – Impact Assessment Board 
IHK – Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Industrie und Handelskammer) 
IMTA – International Meat Trade Association 
LAV – National Consumer Protection Consortium (Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft 
Verbraucherschutz) 
LFGB – Food and Feed Code 
LMBG – Food and Consumer Goods Act 
LÜKEX – Länderübergreifende Krisenmanagementübung Exercise (crisis management 
exercises) 
MAFF – Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
MHS – Meat Hygiene Service 
MRL – Maximum Residue Limit 
NHS – National Health Service 
NMG – National Law on Food and Commodities (Nahrungsmittelgesetz) 
NPM – New Public Management 
NPRM – New Public Risk Management 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFSA – Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
OIRA – Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
OMB – US Office of Management and Budget 
OSHA – Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PAS – Primary Authority Scheme 
PPA – Progressive Public Administration 
QMS – Quality Management System 
RASFF – Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed  
RIA – Regulatory Impact Assessment 
SEA – Single European Act 
SFBB – Safer Food, Better Business 
SME – Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
SPS – Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
SRA – Society for Risk Analysis 
TDI – Tolerable Daily Intake 
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VIG – Federal Consumer Information Law (Verbraucherinformationsgesetz) 
WKD – Economic police service (Wirtschaftskontrolldienst) 
WHO – World Health Organisation 
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It is better by noble boldness to run the risk of being subject to half the evils we 
anticipate than to remain in cowardly listlessness for fear of what might happen. 
Herodotus 
 
According to Herodotus, these were the words of Xerxes, the ruler of the Achaemenid 
Empire, after he was counselled against an invasion of Greece in 480 BC. There were grave 
concerns over how he would sustain his army, but Xerxes was determined to take a risk, one 
that ultimately led to the failure of his Greek campaign. However, even though it is presented 
within a context of eventual failure, the above quotation from Herodotus conveys a sentiment 
that has been echoed throughout history; a soundbite reworked so many times that you don't 
need to look far to find a modern rendition. In order to live life to the full we should take 
risks, rather than cower in inactivity or indecision. It would be very difficult if we were halted 
by every conceivable risk we face. For example, we would not fare well if the risk of being 
run over stopped us from ever crossing a street. But risk cannot be wholly associated with 
negative consequences. Indeed, risk-taking is the great enabler to many – entrepreneurship is 
now synonymous with the notion of taking risks, as many successful businessmen and 
women will tell you in their rags to riches stories. So, do we actively take risks to (hopefully) 
encounter future benefits? Or do we avoid risks to keep our persons and our property safe? 
Experientially, it is clear that risk is ubiquitous within our lives. Crossing roads, eating food, 
doing (or not doing) exercise, investing money, giving birth; there is an element of risk in 
every action we take. We hear fanciful statistics about the risk of being hit by an asteroid, 
falling down a manhole or being struck by lightning... twice. Risk is a term that is at once 
understood, yet so pervasive that to fix upon one universally accepted definition may amount 
to folly. In 1987, the Committee on Definitions, of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), 
released a rather defeatist statement via the SRA newsletter:  
 
After two years of work, in which its members were themselves unable to arrive at a 
single definition of risk, the Definitions Committee decided that it would recognize 
that different definitions are in use among the disciplines involved in risk analysis and 
risk management (SRA 1987).  
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To illustrate the point, the newsletter published thirteen definitions of risk.  
 
With this brief scene-setting, we have a concept that can lend itself to ideas of danger (the 
risk of crossing the road) and/or possible benefits (risks and benefits of investing money in 
the stock market) and will therefore incite people to either avoid risk or embrace it 
(depending on their own personal risk “appetite”). And as risk is so ubiquitous, we must deal 
with it on a societal level, whether that be by setting speed limits in residential areas, or 
regulating the stock market to deter unscrupulous activity. One of a government’s most 
important functions will invariably be to decide whether to regulate (or how much to 
regulate) against an array of risks that may affect its citizens.  
 
The tools of risk analysis have been central to the determination of risk. The development of 
statistical models for calculating the level of risk that the public may face has its roots in the 
scientific revolution of the 16th century, with the explosion of international trade and the 
establishment of precursors to modern insurance companies. Now, risk has increasingly 
become the defining characteristic of modern regulatory action, rather than a factor to be 
considered. Modern governance terminology reflects this, with “risk-based” approaches to 




The move from the regulation of risks, to the risk of regulation, is epitomised by risk-based 
regulation becoming an overarching logic of regulatory action. By applying the frameworks 
of probability and impact to ascertain risk, regulatory interventions can be optimised. 
Furthermore, risk-based regulation is predicated upon the principle that it is not possible to 
regulate down to zero harm. There has therefore been a move away from the simple 
dichotomy that a harm is either safe or not safe, as acceptable levels of risk are set. The 
overall goal of regulation is now the recognition of limited enforcement resources. These 
resources should be proportionally allocated to ensure the compliance of those regulated, to 
the standards set. 
 
With this increasingly critical role that risk plays within governance, risk-based regulation 
has been applied across a diverse set of policy domains, from financial services to health and 
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safety; food safety to flood defence. Governmental organisations that claim to rely on risk-
based regulation include the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD (OECD 2010). The European Union has also been championing the use of risk-based 
regulation, especially in the fields of food safety and health and safety at the workplace. The 
emerging use of risk-based regulation across supranational organisations suggests that it also 
plays an increasingly harmonising role across constituent member states. Whilst it has been 
mentioned that risk-based approaches have been utilised in dealing with societal risks, they 
have also been used in internal governance arrangements, dealing with institutional risks. The 
regulation of risk is no longer simply concerned with mitigating harms, but with internal 
organisational risks that come from regulatory interventions, such as the reputational risk 
incurred from attempting to regulate a harm over which there may be heightened public risk 
perceptions. Finally, it is not just public institutions that have been driving risk-based 
approaches. In fact, the drive for the application of risk-based thinking largely comes from 
the private sector.  
 1.2	Food	safety		
 
The policy domain of food safety provides a compelling choice for research into risk-based 
approaches. Food safety is a traditional public bad, in that it is an area of policy where public 
expectations point towards a standard of absolute safety. There can be few policy domains 
that demand such careful consideration of both existing and emerging risks as the domain of 
food safety. As Nestle (2003) asserts, “who could possibly not want food to be safe? 
Consumers do not want to worry about unsafe food and do not like getting sick”. Indeed, 
more often than not, we expect the food we consume to be safe and expect regulatory 
agencies to ensure such safety (Hawthorne 2005). When food safety incidents do occur, such 
as the BSE crisis that spanned from the 1980s to the turn of the 21st century, the 2008 
melamine milk scandal and the 2011 E. coli outbreak in Germany, they tend to make front-
page headlines and generate acute social amplifications of the risks (see Pidgeon, Kasperson 
et al. 2003). Past experiences of food safety incidents have led to deep regulatory changes, as 
entire institutions have either been closed down or radically altered in their approach to 
guarding against food hazards (Löfstedt & Vogel 2001). A diverse spectrum of powerful 
interest groups guarantees that the spotlight is firmly fixed upon every regulatory aspect of 
the control of food safety. Finally, the scale of global food business, which accounts for a 
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significant portion of global annual trade (total exports of global food products were valued at 
$1,456,682 million in 2013), ensures that industry not only takes an active role in the 
regulation of food safety, but in many instances, takes regulatory responsibility (Banati 2003, 
Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005). This enforced self-regulation by businesses is becoming 
increasingly prevalent (Fairman and Yapp 2005). Indeed, it can be seen as indicative of 
environmental health regulation generally, as regimes based upon strict enforcement and 
deterrence, usually referred to as command and control regimes, are increasingly being 
viewed sceptically by decision makers (Garcia Martinez, Fearne et al. 2007).  
 
These new regulatory approaches, which are centred on the risk of non-compliance by food 
businesses to standards set, are anchored by the principles of risk-based regulation. However, 
the heightened public perception of food safety, coupled with an all-encompassing EU 
General Food Law that states that no unsafe food shall be placed on the market, reveals 
important distinctions between approaches that rely on the regulation of a harm, or hazard, 
and approaches that first calculate the probability and impact of that harm, through risk-based 
decision making. Food safety therefore offers an intriguing case study, with the regulation of 
this policy domain effectively at the crossroads of regulating hazard, or regulating risk. 
 1.3	A	comparative	analysis	of	the	UK	and	Germany	within	a	European	context	
 
This thesis will compare the enforcement of food safety practices within the UK and 
Germany, to ascertain the extent to which food safety regulation is, or can be, risk-based. It 
could be expected that food safety regimes would be quite similar across the UK and 
Germany. Both are western, industrialised nations and long-term members of the EU. Both 
countries openly profess to a strong risk-based approach to food safety (for the UK see Hutter 
and Amodu 2008; for Germany see BfR 2011). The EU has championed the use of risk-based 
regulation across its Member States, and risk analysis is enshrined within the General Food 
Law (GFL). Conveniently, approximately 98-99% of the food law of both countries is 
founded upon EU food law. As such, both of these countries should exhibit food safety 
regimes that are consistent with EU legislation. Finally, due to the salience and perceived 
importance of the food safety domain within both countries, it is not expected that either 
would diminish the significance of ensuring the safety of its food supply, especially in the 
wake of recent high-profile food incidents (see Chapter 4). Neither would both countries wish 
to miss out on the economic incentives of the global food trade. However, research into these 
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two countries allows for investigation into the different ways in which risk-based regulation 
is applied in the UK and Germany, and what any differences mean for the application of risk-
based regulation more generally. 
 1.4	The	universality	of	risk-based	regulation		
While there is a regulatory drive at the European level to increase levels of harmonisation in 
food safety through risk-based approaches, there has been debate as to whether risk-based 
regulation does indeed offer universal and centralising approaches, which may negate a range 
of national and/or local political, cultural and historical contexts.  
 
While scholars have shown that risk-based approaches are becoming increasingly prevalent 
across a range of policy domains – from health and safety (Demeritt et al. 2015) to flooding 
(Krieger 2012), financial services (Black 2009) to higher education (Griffiths 2016) – there is 
debate over the extent to which risk-based approaches offer universal solutions to policy 
issues within different national contexts. To what extent does the “pervasiveness of risk-
based routines in practices of government and in most areas of life” (Krieger 2012) translate 
to harmonising pre-existing diverse regulatory arrangements?  
 
The idea behind the universal nature of risk-based regulation is a simple one that has gained 
increasing traction in recent years. The notion is that governments should direct their limited 
resources to the worst, most likely problems. Such a rationale can be applied across policy 
domains and local and national boundaries. This universalising rationale chimes with an 
ontological perspective of risk itself, as some authors have argued that globalized modern 
risks break down the barriers between different actors in society, as previously separate 
communities face the same risk. Beck (1992) defined this phenomenon as, “The end of the 
‘Other’, the end of all our carefully cultivated opportunities for distancing ourselves… with 
the end of nuclear and chemical contamination”. However, Lupton (1999) argues that 
investigation into how risk discourses operate within different contexts refutes the ‘otherness’ 
that Beck defined. Lupton argues that in focusing on the universalising language of risk, 
many academic discussions ignore how differing groups respond to risk, representing the risk 
actor as “lacking a gender, age, ethnicity, social class or sexual identity”. Indeed, the 
utilitarian framing of risk as probability multiplied by consequence can collide with national 
political philosophies of governance interventions.   
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This debate on the universality of risk is especially pertinent within the EU context, where 
Member State regulatory regimes can be heavily reliant on standard setting at EU level, as is 
the case with food safety. However, scholars have highlighted a range of factors that might 
contribute to national administrations filtering out or biasing responses to external regulatory 
pressures. Studies into national styles of administration within EU Member States show that 
on the one hand, policy divergence is caused by institutional contexts and developments. 
Whilst on the other hand, increasing supranational harmonisation does lead to policy 
convergence at a national level (Knill 2001). While the picture is far from clear, such studies 
have pointed to a diverse range of factors that might shape the extent to which there may be 
policy convergence or divergence across Member States. These include regulatory path 
dependencies, differences in regulatory and legal infrastructures, variances in norms, 
behaviours and local/national identities of different actors, and even the use of language. To 
take one important variable as an example, Katzenstein’s identification of 1980s West 
Germany as a semisovereign state is predicated upon different institutional arrangements 
from those within the UK and US (Katzenstein 1987). While 1980s Britain and America were 
embroiled in pronounced ideological shifts in policy, the corporatist arrangement and spread 
of power across institutions led to incremental policy approaches based on cooperation, rather 
than entrenched ideological opposition. 
 
Research into Europeanisation indicates that power does not purely reside either within the 
sovereignty of a Member State on the one hand, or that of the European Union on the other. 
Instead Member States pass policy functions onto EU institutions, while devolving others to 
either national or local administrations. As Katzenstein (1997) concludes, “power relations do 
not add to a fixed quantity that either resides in national states or gets transferred to a 
supranational center of decision making”. Such power relations between Member States and 
the EU are constantly evolving. With the development of the EU, and the creation of a single 
market, shared standards have become the bedrock for greater European integration and 
supranational governance (Borraz 2007). However, as was made clear in the UK’s 2016 
referendum on membership of the EU (Rozenberg 2016), sovereignty has become a highly 




Therefore, scholarly insight into Europeanisation indicates a fluid scale between the 
harmonising influence of European institutions, and the countervailing presence of local and 
national factors. However, the EU’s apparent drive towards implementing risk-based 
approaches within the highly centralised policy domain of food safety should help identity 
some key factors that may challenge the harmonising expectation of risk-based regulation 
across Member States. 
 1.5	Research	Questions		
  
This research aims to understand the extent to which risk-based regulation features within 
European regulatory regimes. As such, it is hoped that by selecting the UK and Germany, the 
challenges facing the implementation of risk-based regulation will be highlighted across 
differing social, cultural, legal and economic landscapes. An overview of the role that risk 
plays in the German, UK and EU food safety domains, coupled with the investigation of 
specific case studies, will allow for a detailed assessment of regulatory pathways, and will 
clarify the extent to which risk-based approaches are a feature of enforcement practices. To 
understand the pervasiveness of risk-based regulation in the food safety domain, the 
following research questions have been set:  
  
1) Does the implementation and enforcement of risk-based regulation differ across local, 
national and supranational domains?  
 
2) If differences exist, then why is this the case? 
  
3) What are the implications for developing a common understanding of what it means 
to be “risk-based” within the context of food safety? 
 
To answer the research questions set, this doctoral research aims to investigate the food 
safety regime within a supranational, national and local context. Specifically, the thesis will 
look at enforcement practices and cultures, as an indicator of the efficacy of implementation 
of risk-based approaches. To ensure the research is informed by the current literature, 
Chapter 2 will plot the rise of risk-based regulation in modern society, through its historical 
development, as well as present some of the key constraints and drivers to the application and 
enforcement of such a regulatory approach. With the complex nature of the EU’s food safety 
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regime, as well as the proliferation of sub-regimes at a supranational and national level, 
Chapter 3 provides a rationale for case study choice, as well as methodological framework 
for the research. Chapter 4 provides historical background to the regulation of food safety 
across the EU, Germany and the UK, to provide context to the differing cultures and practices 
that have existed within the countries under discussion. As the food safety domain is highly 
centralised within the EU, the thesis will then go on to investigate the EU’s approach to risk-
based regulation, and its attempt to champion developments within this area, signified by a 
sub-regime that is closely regulated by the EU – food imports (Chapter 5). The thesis will 
then analyse national and local approaches to enforcement practices UK and Germany, and 
investigate the extent to which these practices allow for the implementation of risk-based 
approaches (Chapter 6). Finally, the implementation of food hygiene barometers within the 
UK and Germany will be assessed, as these are publicly available risk scoring systems that 
aim to communicate the level of food hygiene risk found in local food businesses (Chapter 7). 
The control of food hygiene barometers is one of the few areas within food safety regulation 
that isn’t mandated by EU regulations, so will help to indicate national and local approaches 
to the management and communication of risk. Finally, an overarching discussion of the 
three empirical chapters will see how the flow of risk-based regulation is affected as it is 
applied from the EU standard setting level, to national and local enforcement within the two 
countries under investigation (Chapter 8), as well as concluding by offering an appraisal of 
the challenges faced by implementing harmonised and consistent risk-based regulation across 






Every man has a right to risk his own life in order to preserve it. Has it ever been said 
that a man who throws himself out of the window to escape from a fire is guilty of 
suicide? Has such a crime ever been laid to the charge of him who perishes in a storm 
because, when he went on board, he knew of the danger? Jean Jacques Rousseau 
 
The above quotation comes from Rousseau’s musings on the right of life and death in his 
collection of works, entitled The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Here 
Rousseau grapples with how an individual can confer the right to end his/her life to the 
Sovereign (Head of State), when that individual does not have such a right in the first place. 
The quotation in question forces the reader to consider that the concept of taking one’s own 
life may not be as straightforward an affair as it would seem. No doubt taking a journey by 
sea in Rousseau's lifetime, the 18th century, would have been a hazardous and even perilous 
endeavour. But should a sailor who perishes in a storm be seen to have taken his own life, 
because he was equipped with knowledge of the likelihood of such a storm occurring? Highly 
unlikely. Furthermore, should that same sailor take responsibility for his unfortunate demise? 
Perhaps the ship’s captain should take responsibility for setting course through a storm, or the 
shipping company for supporting and promoting such an endeavour? Or is this a fundamental 
issue for the State, enacting regulation to minimise the risk of perishing in a storm at sea? The 
State could require that all sailors are harnessed to the ship to prevent them from falling 
overboard. The State could posit that seafaring be too risky a business and should be stopped 
altogether. Or the State could do nothing.  
 
This inextricable link between the State and societal approaches to risk is one that has been 
borne out of the changing landscape of regulation throughout history. As Chapter 1 indicated, 
risk is a pervasive and constant feature of modern life. Risk is communicated on a constant 
basis, whether it be at the workplace or at home. And the communication of risk is indicative 
of a wider trend, as society becomes more interested (and more concerned) in how to deal 
with the increasing number of risks that affect our health and wellbeing. Public perception of 
risks has fundamentally altered in western, industrialised nations, as it is claimed that risk has 
displaced poverty as an overriding concern for many citizens (Beck 1992). Notions of risk 
have become so important that “In many respects risk has become a new lens through which 
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to view the world” (Hutter 2005). Democratic governments reacting to such public 
perceptions have put risk at the centre of their agenda. Indeed, it has been argued that there 
has been a move from the governance of risk to governance by risk (Rothstein, Irving et al. 
2006).  
 
Risk-based approaches are increasingly being implemented across various governance 
structures. Within the UK, several reports have indicated the importance of risk-based 
approaches (e.g. Cabinet Office 2002, Hampton 2005). The EU has also sanctioned such 
approaches as key to the application of its Better Regulation Agenda (Lofstedt 2004, Lofstedt 
2007, European Commission 2009, European Commission 2010). Within the USA, risk-
based approaches have formed a cornerstone of government action and these approaches have 
been championed by transnational organisations (e.g. OECD 2010) and international 
agreements, such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) (WTO 1995, Majone 
2012). 
 
However, risk-based regulation is more than just a mechanism for dealing with societal risks; 
it offers a formal set of guidelines and framework for both regulators and those being 
regulated. As Rothstein and Downer (2012) explain: 
 
The concept of ‘risk’ being advocated here far exceeds the word’s long association 
with harms to the environment and health and safety. Rather, it offers a formal 
language for framing a diverse set of potential adverse consequences from policy 
interventions; be it to individuals, organisations, the environment or even government 
itself.  
 
This chapter will trace the rise of risk-based regulation across a diverse set of policy domains 
and investigate the societal and institutional drivers and constraints of such an approach. As 
this thesis deals with regulatory regimes that implement risk-based regulation, a regime 
approach will be utilised. As such, this chapter will start with an investigation into the 
taxonomy of risk, before explaining regulatory regimes and regime function. Subsequently, 
the chapter will provide the historical context to the rise of risk in society and will then 





Even though risk-based approaches are becoming commonplace across many policy domains, 
there has been relatively little said about the definition of “risk-based” – specifically, the 
development of a common understanding of what it means to have a process or approach 
based upon risk. Some authors appear to accept that the epistemological debate concerning 
the definition has already been settled, instead choosing to focus on its application. For 
example, Adam M. Finkel, in introducing the volume, Worst Things First? The Debate over 
Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities, does not give any consideration to taxonomic 
uncertainties of “risk-based”. On the other hand, studies looking at the implementation of 
risk-based governance, such as Hutter and Amodu (2008) and Black and Baldwin (2010), 
indicate a great range of divergent implementations and contested definitions, each claiming 
to be the standard bearer of what is expected to be a risk-based approach (Hutter and Amodu 
2008, Black and Baldwin 2010). The proliferation of risk terminology has even led on 
occasion to the use of different meanings within the same institution (Black and Baldwin 
2011; Rothstein and Downer 2012). 
 
As more regulators turn to risk-based approaches, this author argues that there is a clear need 
to investigate why, and the extent to which, such contested definitions exist. Furthermore, it 
is important to understand the issues that surround such an approach, as well as to appreciate 
why risk-based regulation has been viewed as the answer to modern regulation. Finally, it is 
essential to know whether risk-based regulation marks a paradigmatic shift in regulatory 
approaches, or is a smaller piece in the regulatory jigsaw.  
 2.2	Risk	vs	hazard	
 
Before investigating what it means to implement risk-based governance, it is important to 
understand what exactly is meant by the term “risk”. Studies have shown that in institutions 
where risk is explicitly managed, interpretations of the term can vary wildly (Pablo 1999). In 
many cases, the terms “hazard” and “risk” end up being used fairly interchangeably. 
However, there is an important distinction between the two. “Hazard”, as defined by the 
Royal Society (1992) is “a situation that in particular circumstances could lead to harm”. It is 
important to note that there is no statement of the probability of harm being caused. “Risk”, 
on the other hand, is the likelihood of such a hazard occurring and the effect it would have 
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(Royal Society Study Group 1992, Health & Safety Executive 2012). As the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration services states, risk is the “product of the probability of a 
hazard resulting in an adverse event, times the severity of the event” (Schollmeyer et al. 
2013). Therefore, for a risk to be measured it must include the presence of a hazard, its 
likelihood, and the severity of its impact.  
 
With regard to governance, risk can be further categorised into societal risks and institutional 
risks as defined by Rothstein et al. (2006). Societal risks are defined as both traditional and 
novel risks to members of society and their environment. Institutional risks are risks to the 
(state or non-state) organisations that regulate societal risks, and risks to their legitimacy and 
associated rules and methods. It can be argued that increased implementation of risk-based 
regulation has come about as a consequence of the colonisation of risk through increased 
saliency of societal risks and the institutional risks faced by organisations tasked with dealing 
with societal risks. This chapter will seek to explain the increased salience of societal risks, as 
well as the qualitative shift towards the management of institutional risks and the 
implications this has for the application of risk-based regulation. 
 2.3	Risk	and	Regulatory	Regime	Function	
 
This PhD focuses on the regulatory regimes that deal with food safety risks. Hood, Rothstein 
and Baldwin (Hood et al. 2001), determine a regime to “denote the complex of institutional 
geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a 
particular risk or hazard”. Regimes in this context involve a diaspora of factors that can 
directly and indirectly shape how regulators come to deal with both hazards and risks. These 
factors could include technical determinants in characterising a hazard or risk, or the 
institutional and normative functions of setting and enforcing regulations. Hood, Rothstein 
and Baldwin’s model of a regulatory regime (see fig. 1) also indicates that a risk-based 
approach can occur across part, or all, of regulatory action. Namely, different regulatory 
approaches could be split across information gathering, standards setting and enforcement. 
By investigating these key components of an individual regime, in this case food safety, the 






The ways in which regulatory regimes can be affected vary from the wider political and 
social contexts of regulatory action, down to normative differences in the way different 
institutions might seek to regulate. With regard to the wider context, the way in which 
institutions perceive and react to hazards and risks (through constitutional arrangements, 
public perception etc.) will have an important bearing on the regulatory regimes employed to 
deal with such problems. For example, if an important stakeholder (e.g. an affected 
community) has a substantially risk-averse outlook to a set of hazards, it could be assumed to 
have a low tolerance of risks and expect regulators to produce and enforce strict regulations 
to try and lower the amount of risk that the community is exposed to. Conversely, if a 
government feels that business and industry is hampered by too many rules and regulations, 
there would be a political will to cut regulation and increasingly allow market forces to deal 
with risks in the hope of boosting growth.  
 
At first glance, the formulation of a basic assumption of what it means to be risk-based might 
not seem problematic. Essentially, risk-based approaches are founded upon a rational and 
objective system that reduces risks based upon their impact (Dahle, Dybvig et al. 2012). This 
is not a particularly precarious starting point. A rather distilled manifestation of this rule is 
that a fire department may prioritise dealing with a hospital that is burning down as opposed 
Information gathering – The collection of information about risks. This is achieved through a 
myriad of different ways such as regulators conducting their own research, imposing legal 
requirements for reports and research from organisations, and/or voluntary provision of 
information by individuals and organisations. 
 
Standard-setting – The setting of standards, goals, targets and guidelines. Standards can be set in 
a multitude of different ways, from applying measures from other domains or from existing 
technocratic expertise, to achieving standards as a compromise between two or more rival 
stakeholder groups. Standards can even be based upon numbers or guidelines drawn out of thin 
air. 
 
Behaviour-modification – The process of changing individual or organisational behaviour, to 
help mitigate risks through measures of compliance or deterrence. This component can be highly 
problematic depending on the organisational culture it applies to. Certain groups may accept rules 
laid down by regulators whilst others may flaunt them if regulations aren’t backed up sufficiently 
by detection and sanctions (opportunistic culture) or may even be drawn to products that have 
been deemed to be dangerous (defiance culture). 
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to a secluded garden shed, based on the supposition that a hospital on fire will present a 
greater impact (in the greater number of people exposed to fire) than the shed.  
 
However, clearly identifying risk-based approaches across regulatory regimes can prove 
challenging, even if a regulatory regime overtly states that it is risk-based. This is due to the 
diversity in the application and interpretation of risk-based regulation within both the same, 
and different, policy domains (Rothstein, Irving et al. 2006). Risk-based regulation does not 
lend itself to one clearly definable entity. As Bostock and Hutter (Lloyd-Bostock & Hutter 
2008) contend, “Risk-based regulation is best conceived of as a cluster of tools and 
characteristics rather than a clearly defined and coherent method”. And as Klinke and Renn 
admit, “Past experiences demonstrate that there is no simple recipe for evaluating and 
managing risks” (Klinke and Renn 2002). However, risk-based approaches do appear to have 
a common theme running through them. Black and Baldwin (2010) lay out five core threads 
that run through these approaches and these can be linked to the regime approach, as 





However, Black’s (2005) definition of risk-based regulation goes beyond more than just a 


















It has two distinct meanings, which are often conflated. The first refers to the 
regulation of risks to society: risks to health, safety, the environment, or less usually, 
financial well-being… The second, emergent meaning of risk-based regulation refers 
to regulatory or institutional risk: risks to the agency itself that it will not achieve its 
objectives. In this newer sense, risk-based regulation involves the development of 
decision-making frameworks and procedures to prioritise regulatory activities and 
the deployment of resources, principally inspection and enforcement activities, 
organised around an assessment of the risks that regulated firms pose to the 
regulator's objectives. (Black 2005)  
 
Risk-based systems therefore allow regulators to target the application of resources. Instead 
of attempting to implement and enforce a large set of rules within a certain policy domain, 
risk-based approaches prioritise action through the scoring and rating of risks. With limited 
resources, regulators can set their risk appetite so that higher rated risks receive more 
regulatory action than lower rated ones. However, it is important to note that risk-based 
regulation doesn’t just seek to manage and rank the risks faced by regulators. It also seeks to 
reveal the operating risks, or business risks, that regulators must deal with when regulating 
impacts. These are essentially the risks faced by the regulating organisations themselves. For 
example, the legitimacy of a regulator can be called into question due to a myriad of 
operational failings such as enforcement failures or liability issues (Rothstein and Downer 
2012). 
 
With respect to the makeup of regulatory regimes, risk-based approaches can be used along 
the key components of the regulatory pathway. Risk tools such as horizon scanning and risk 
assessments can be used in the information gathering stage to help identify regulatory goals. 
Risk management can be utilised for key parts of the standard setting stage, deciding upon the 
regulator’s risk appetite and targeting and setting the remit for regulatory action against 
specific hazards, providing a blueprint for how regulatory resources should be allocated. 
Effective and coherent risk communication at the behaviour-modification stage can also 
ensure that individuals and organisations understand and interpret a regulator’s message. 
Indeed, monitoring a hazard can also be based upon tools of risk analysis so that regulators 
can react to the change in a system they seek to regulate. 
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Risk-based approaches aren’t simply about identifying and acting upon clearly defined 
probabilities and impacts. As Black and Baldwin make clear, risk governance brings a range 
of factors into play, including “the simplicity or complexity of the causal chain between 
hazard and harm; the degree to which probability and/or impact are known or uncertain; the 
nature and distribution of the impacts (remediable or irremediable, concentrated or diffused); 
and the socio-political contestability of the risk” (Black and Baldwin 2011). Factors like these 
show that risk-based regulation isn’t as straightforward and clearly delineated a mode of 
governance as some hope or claim it to be. 
 
The next section will provide an historical context, explaining the prominent rise of risk in 
society and the associated reliance on the governance of societal risks, as well as the 
implementation of the governance by risk as a means of “good governance”, due to drivers 
and constraints inherent in the reflexive combination of societal and institutional risks.  
 2.4	The	Rise	of	Risk	in	Society	
 
Almost in parallel to the ways in which society views risk, there are advances in the 
utilisation of the probabilistic tools of risk. The scientific revolution of the 18th century 
brought into question scholastic teaching and the ancient worldviews on which it was based, 
as natural philosophers embarked on an increasingly ambitious set of scientific and 
philosophical enquiries (Broad 1959). Central to this was the increased employment of 
probabilistic statistical tools in research and across widening areas of governance. Commerce 
also employed probabilistic techniques to remain on top of the exponential increase in 
international trade, providing Lloyds of London with the means to underwrite international 
trade (Bernstein 2012). This trend continued unabated into the 19th century with statistical 
laws forming the cornerstone of government and commercial action (Hacking 1990). Thus, 
the probabilistic tools of risk were becoming increasingly relevant to modern society.   
 
We have always faced risks of different kinds. However, the nature of the risks that societies 
have faced, and the way in which risks have been perceived have fundamentally changed 
over time. The effect of these changes with regard to how society has decided to deal with 
risks, is profound. Sociologists have identified three core narratives that seek to explain these 
important changes and their implications (Mythen 2008). The first is Ulrich Beck’s greatly 
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debated work, The Risk Society, the second is Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, 
and the third is Mary Douglas’ cultural theory of risk.  
 
The first causal explanation centres on Beck’s assertion that western, industrialised society 
has replaced poverty with risk as its central imperative. As poverty has become less of a 
central driver for societal action, risk has stepped in to fill the vacuum. This change has been 
brought about through the progression of society from pre-industrial, through industrial 
(modernity) and finally to the current risk society (postmodernity). Beck argues that risks in 
pre-industrial societies tended to be the product of natural hazards, were often localised and 
could be mitigated by individuals (with sufficient access to resources and social standing) and 
by tried and tested institutional responses. A simplified example here is flooding – those 
affluent in society could afford to live on an elevated plain, which would not be affected by 
such a hazard, while governmental institutions could deny building on flood plains. Industrial 
societies, underpinned by great advances in science and technology, complemented these 
natural hazards with anthropogenic ones, which are characterised as diffuse and difficult for 
institutions to mitigate. Here, an example often used is nuclear fallout from a reactor 
meltdown. Such a fallout does not observe strict boundaries, so could affect wide-ranging 
areas. This in turn makes it very difficult for government institutions to assess potential 
impact and spreads its distribution more evenly across social hierarchies. In Japan, the 
Fukishima nuclear reactor meltdown in 2011 exposed such limitations as different national 
governments, having assessed the risk, and with a 20km evacuation zone in place, gave 
conflicting advice as to whether it was safe for their nationals to remain in the capital Tokyo, 
more than 200km away. 
 
It is this change in social imperative, from poverty to risk, coupled with an increasing failure 
to technically assess and manage risk, that leads to the risk society. Where the green shoots of 
modernity signalled the development of transformative technologies (such as nuclear power), 
postmodernity delivers a contrasting and dystopian account. Citizens begin to distrust both 
governments and experts’ ability to highlight and control emerging risks from new 
technologies. Indeed, with rapid advancements in science and technology, experts lack the 
tools to be able to control these risks. According to Beck, governments of industrial societies 
try to alleviate their citizen’s heightened risk perceptions by “exporting” risks to countries 
that require the subsequent inlay of capital in order to deal with poverty. As the Brazilian 
planning minister announced in 1972, “Brazil can still afford to import pollution” (Beck 
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1992). The 1984 Bhopal incident in India and the 1984 oil spill fire in Brazil can be 
interpreted as a consequence of developing countries accepting risks that industrialised 
countries shun. However, as discussed, the far-reaching effects of anthropogenic risks means 
that the risk can still return. 
 
Another expansive narrative centres on anthropological theories based upon the changing 
ways we have interpreted risk and the notions of blame that are inextricably attached to risk. 
Mary Douglas studied how different social groups perceived and dealt with risk and 
attributed differences to a person’s social standing (grid) and the amount of cohesion within a 
society (group). By ascribing four typologies, Douglas sought to explain how cultural bias 
affected different groups’ risk perceptions. Douglas’ work also closely linked risk with 
blame, looking at how indigenous cultures used “others” as a means of absolving themselves 
of blame and ensuring the dominance of their culture and practices. Douglas (2002) argued 
that before the scientific and industrial revolutions, risks were a product of God’s wrath, 
vengeful spirits or superstitions held by the general populace, rather than the actions of man 
or the forces of nature. Douglas argued that the notion of sin could be used as a construct for 
the ruling classes to pass on and even apportion blame. Risks befell people not because of 
factors such as insanitary living conditions, communicable diseases or simply being in the 
wrong place at the wrong time, but because of a lack of Christian virtue. “Before Christianity, 
the Bible is full of such interpretations: the defeats of the Israelites by foreign armies, 
destruction by earthquake, plague, and drought, were attributed to God’s anger for sins” 
(Douglas 2002). The concept of blame was therefore reasonably reflexive – the victim often 
culpable for not having suitably atoned for a previous sin. The idea that the victims were 
accountable for what befell them was actually enforced by societal pressures and hierarchies. 
The Great Plague of London, the last epidemic in England linked to the bubonic plague, 
which during the 14th century alone had killed approximately 200 million people in Europe 
and Asia, reinforced class boundaries:  
 
The danger of contagion was employed to justify the new social politics of the 
sixteenth century municipalities… the isolation procedures taken against the plague 
would not have been so savage if the poor had not presented a conspicuous target 
which was to attack for other reasons (Slack 1988) 
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As Douglas noted, “the English well-to-do saw the incidence of plague as the sign of God's 
judgement directed against the sins of the poor” (Douglas 2002). With the coming 
industrialisation of society in the 18th and 19th centuries and the greater freedom of movement 
and opening of communities, religious scepticism was on the rise and the language of risk 
was altered (Bernstein 2012). Risks were increasingly viewed less as a by-product of God’s 
action on Earth, and more as a result of the actions of man. Giddens (Giddens 1991; Giddens 
1999) argued that the weakening strength of the church, coupled with advances in scientific 
thought, led to the creation of new knowledge and institutions (such as the media) that put 
risk increasingly at the forefront of people’s minds. Notions of blame had now shifted from 
superstitious happenings and religious edicts to the creators (and the regulators) of 
anthropogenic risks that form the cornerstone of Beck’s risk society concept. From a risk 
society perspective, Douglas’ “others” have become the governmental institutions and expert 
bodies, trusted less and less by citizens concerned by the myriad of risks that are continuously 
identified. 
 
Although the risk society narrative presents governments and experts as increasingly 
mistrusted by their citizens due to their failure to deal with the plethora of man-made risks, 
Michel Foucault’s governmentality theory strikes a decidedly different tone. Central to this 
theory is the use of discourse, broadly defined by Mythen (2008) as “sets of ideas, beliefs and 
practices that present ways of representing knowledge”. Far from authorities shirking from 
dealing with risk, they use risk as a foundation for discourse that serves to exert influence 
over behaviours and practices. 
 
However, there are also more specific actor-driven explanations for the rise of risk in society. 
Public opinion, public interest groups and industry can be accredited with putting risk at the 
forefront of society and the subsequent increase in regulation of risk. 
 
From a public opinion perspective, public reaction to accidents can lead to increased 
regulation of risk. This effect can be prominent after major accidents or disasters and the 
subsequent “tombstoning” regulation that is created is a regulatory response to public 
outrage. Public outrage has led to the specific establishment of new regulators, such as the 
(now defunct) UK Adventure Activities Licensing Authority (AALA) following the death of 
four teenagers in a canoeing accident in 1993, or the reorganisation of regulators, such as the 
break-up of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Farming in the aftermath of the BSE crisis 
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(see Flynn et al. 2003). Public interest groups can also be an important driver, providing a 
focused platform for change in regulatory action. The emergence of new social movements in 
the USA in and around the 1970s in response to environmental injustices and the publishing 
of influential publications such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (see Murphy, P.C. 2007) led 
to the creation of many such groups. The creation of the American superfund in response to 
the Love Canal incident (see Colten & Skinner 1996) can be seen as testament to the political 
influence of public interest groups. Finally, industry may push for the regulation of risk as it 
can portray itself as socially responsible in dealing with the larger risks to society (Stigler 
1971). At the same time, “trading up” (Vogel 1997) can occur as larger industries gain a 
better foothold in the market, complying with more stringent regulations that smaller 
competitors can’t afford, or lack the expertise, to comply with. 
 
The increased saliency of risk at a societal level therefore brought with it a greater desire to 
confront such risks. Such need for action was complemented (and in part instigated) by a 
change in governance structures that increasingly put the framing of regulatory problems as 
risks at the forefront of “good governance”. This theory of “risk colonisation” posits that by 
framing regulatory problems as risks, increased control of said risks increases its salience 
(Rothstein et al. 2006). This is in stark contrast to Beck, who suggests that increased salience 
of risk is due to a lack of control (Beck 1992). 
 
However, an increased emphasis on the governance of risk does not necessarily equate to 
governance by risk. In order to fully assess the implementation of risk-based regulation, it is 
necessary to investigate the institutional drivers and constraints that shape risk-based 
approaches to societal risks. The following section will investigate the regulatory context in 
which risk-based regulation is applied and the societal and institutional factors that drive and 
constrain its application.  
 2.5	From	Regulation	of	Risk	to	Regulation	by	Risk	
 
At the same time as the tools of risk analysis were being promoted, fundamental changes to 
governance structures were changing, and continue to do so. Risk increasingly appears to 
form the foundation of “good” governance, indicating through evidence-based inquiry the 
remits of regulation and demarcating the limits of governance. It allows regulators to state 
clearly what falls within the realms of regulation and what does not (whether that be for cost-
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benefit, risk-risk considerations, scientific certainty etc.). Accompanying the apparent 
increase of the term “risk” in governance, we find the implementation of “risk-based” 
approaches (risk-based regulation). However, even though risk-based approaches are now 
increasingly applied across a more diverse range of policy domains, application is in no way 
consistent across different domains and even between regulatory institutions within the same 
domain.  
 
Regulatory agencies are constrained by a significant number of institutional factors. For 
example, Rothstein et al. (2006) provide a list of potential constraints, “regulatory decision-
making and implementation are characterized inter alia by constrained resources, competing 
priorities, cognitive uncertainties, bounded rationalities, conflicting interests, ungovernable 
actors, and unintended consequences”. These institutional risks can undermine the 
effectiveness of regulatory action and even the validity of the regulatory organisation itself. 
Risk-based regulation is an original regulatory approach as it not only accounts for societal 
risks, but also manages the institutional risks affecting regulatory agencies. 
 
Risk-based approaches are not new; regulators have been using probabilistic calculations of 
risk to inform standard setting and enforcement for some time. Examples include the health 
and safety regime in the UK, based upon a “tolerability of risk” guidance first published in 
1988 (HSE 1992), whereas in the US, Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) has been a cornerstone of 
regulatory action since the Nixon administration. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
probabilistic determination of risks was present in the insurance industry of 18th century 
England. However, the implementation of risk-based regulation as a central dynamic of 
regulatory action can be connected to the rise of neo-liberalism after the Second World War. 
The neo-liberal approach was critical of the pre-war years, marked by inefficient government 
action with expensive and heavy-handed regulation which stifled economic growth by 
weighing down business and innovation (see Hayek 2012). This contrasted with the 
Keynesian welfare state, which advocated the proactive intervention of the state in order to 
prevent economic malaise. Keynes himself was highly critical of the probabilistic role of 
statistics, citing that probabilistic determination ignores the fundamental uncertainty of 
economic action (Bernstein 2012).  
 
A neo-liberal doctrine, however, sought to draw back state intervention and rely on the 
internal balance of market forces. Regulators were not only performing in an inefficient way, 
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they were also restricting business with a plethora of regulations that were hampering growth. 
However, as a first attempt at creating more effective regulatory action, Progressive Public 
Administration (PPA) sought to separate institutional organisation of the public sector from 
that of the private sector, in order to guarantee that the public sector produced a class of 
regulators who were not tempted by the high risk/high reward nature of their private 
counterparts (Hood 1995). Also, central to PPA was a reliance on implementing an 
exhaustive process of checks within regulators to ensure distance between regulator and 
regulated, avoiding favouritism and corruption (Hood 1995). 
 
But in the face of an increasingly prominent neo-liberal perspective, PPA was to all intents 
and purposes disposed of in favour of a regulatory dynamic that would seek to bring 
government and industry closer together, rather than keep them apart. “New Public 
Management” (NPM) in many ways reversed the key pillars on which PPA was based upon. 
The private sector had turned from being the embodiment of corruption and indulgence to the 
benchmark by which regulators were now set. Efficiency drives demanded that regulators 
remain competitive and were able to legitimise their work (Hutter 2005). Regulators had to 
exhibit strict discipline in relation to utilising their resources (Hood 1995). Auditing became a 
necessity as a system of checks and balances became the de facto norm, leading to Power’s 
assertion of an “audit society” (Power 1997).  Just as pivotal, regulators had to show due care 
not to impede business with a complex structure of procedural rules and regulations (Hutter 
2005). The overarching dynamic here was that government should not get in the way of 
commerce and industry, allowing market forces to dictate and businesses to grow. This 
dynamic was clearly evident throughout the 1980s and 1990s within many governments. For 
example, in the UK, deregulation had become the guiding policy of British administrations, 
“During the mid 1980s Britain witnessed waves of deregulatory initiatives concerned with the 
costs of compliance, the over-regulation of business and institutional reforms to control this” 
(Hutter 2005). A similar focus on cost benefit was evident within both Europe (Majone 1990) 
and the USA (Breyer, Stewart et al. 1999) during a similar period.  
 
The post-war years have also been defined by the rise of the “regulatory state”. Due to the 
perceived high economic cost of the welfare state, the regulatory state sought to transfer a 
significant portion of the cost of regulation onto the regulated entity, with specialist 
government agencies tasked with overseeing self-regulation practices (Majone 1997). 
Government action was therefore fundamentally changing from a provider within a welfare 
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state to a regulator in the regulatory state. However, with the rising saliency of societal risks 
and the non-majoritarian status of many regulatory agencies, there has been greater pressure 
to indicate validity of regulatory action through increased accountability and transparency. 
Power’s “audit society”, whereby “waste watchers, quality police and sleaze-busters” (Hood 
et al. 1999) are inspecting public-sector organisations, coupled with new means of 
investigating regulatory action (e.g. through internet searches, freedom of information etc.), 
ensure that regulators face increasingly high institutional risks. Rothstein et al. (2006) argue 
that the increased saliency of risk ensures that regulation is subject to its own regulation – if 
there wasn’t an increased need for transparency and accountability, institutional risks for 
regulators would be lower.  
 2.6	Drivers	of	Risk-based	Regulation	
 
Risk-based regulation helps reinforce organisational validity in the face of requirements for 
increased accountability and transparency. Risk-based regulation falls in line with Power’s 
“audit society” as it exhibits an organised approach to managing problems through clearly 
indicating a risk governance approach to management (risk assessment, risk management, 
risk communication). Risk-based approaches clearly reveal which dangers are being managed 
and who is managing them. Clarke illustrates that even when there are dangers that are 
impossible to manage (e.g. no historical incidence from which to learn from, lack of 
regulatory resources), regulators still implement fantasy documents, in order to satisfy 
transparency and accountability demands (Clarke 1999). Indeed, a risk-based approach can 
be seen as a strategy of “protocolisation”, using economic and numeric rationales to cement 
organisational validity, “risk assessment can be seen as a way of formalizing organizational 
operations in order to provide bureaucratically rational ‘due diligence’ defences in the face of 
increased accountability pressures” (Rothstein et al. 2006).  
 
Risk serves as a means to legitimise regulation through not only showing to what extent 
something should be regulated, but also in giving justification and legitimacy to the extent 
that regulators enforce. Risk-based regulation therefore accounts for failure and stipulates that 
failure is a plausible outcome of risk-based approaches. Risk-based approaches only offer 
probabilities, not certainty (Rothstein et al. 2006). As a result, risk-based regulation becomes 
a useful blame deflection tool, offering justification for when something goes wrong 
(Rothstein et al. 201). Related to regulatory remit within risk-based regulation is the notion of 
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“acceptable risk” (Fischhoff, Slovic et al. 1977, Heyvaert 2011, Rothstein and Downer 2012), 
which essentially indicates that a smaller risk doesn’t require the resources or the attention 
that a larger risk does. 
 
Furthermore, risk-based approaches tend to be more nuanced than standard regulatory action, 
as they provide a range of different options for compliance and enforcement. As Rothstein 
and Downer explain, “Modern, risk-based regulatory regimes are typically characterised by 
the use of a broad suite of tools encompassing voluntary agreements, trading schemes, 
environmental management systems and taxes in place of, or in concert with, the traditional 
regulatory model (authorise, check, enforce)” (Rothstein and Downer 2012). As such, risk-
based regulation tends to be seen as more malleable and responsive than the more 
conservative “command and control” approaches, where regulation “is pragmatic and 
replaces the choice between compliance or deterrence approaches with a highly flexible, 
situationally specific, and adaptable approach” (Dahle, Dybvig et al. 2012). 
 
What also makes risk-based regulation different from previous forms of regulation is that a 
decision-maker’s first port of call is identifying and evaluating risks within his/her domain, 
rather than simply enforcing an unmanageable list of rules. As Black and Baldwin explain, 
“Risk-based frameworks require regulators to begin by identifying the risks they are seeking 
to manage, not the rules they have to enforce” (Black and Baldwin 2010). Therefore, risk-
based regulation tends to be highly outcome-focused. Indeed, the need to apply a robust and 
explicit framework for dealing with risks is seen as a requirement for a risk-based approach 
(Adil 2008): 
 
The main difference between those who claim to be risk-based and those who do not, 
is the extent to which they attempt to apply an explicit, consistent, strategic and 
operational framework to these decisions, and the level of proactive work 
(intelligence gathering and its appropriate interpretation) undertaken to deal with 
emergent risks and prevent harm occurring before the event. 
 
Hutter argues that risk-based approaches become more salient as governments become less 
direct and less visible (Hutter 2005). “Catch all” methods of regulation are being replaced 
with more target-orientated modes of action through risk-based approaches. It is this target-
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orientated approach that provides a solution to neo-liberal accusations of regulatory creep 
within governance.  
 
A targeted and economically rational approach not only combats regulatory inefficiency, but 
through numeric evidence-based rationalisation it also provides a legally defensible position. 
Risk-based regulation offers legitimate rationalisation for non-majoritarian regulatory 
agencies (Rothstein et al. 2006). This legitimacy is clearly seen in the implementation of 
quantitative risk assessment in the USA following the Supreme Court’s ruling on the benzene 
standard. In 1980, the OSHA had appealed against the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling 
against OSHA’s regulation stating that occupational exposure to benzene (a carcinogen) 
should be reduced from 10 ppm (parts per million) to the least-feasible-risk of 1 ppm 
(Thomas 1982). However, what came out of the Supreme Court’s ruling, in Industrial Union 
Department (AFL-CIO) v. American Petroleum Institute, was the need to show significant 
risk, rather than demand the lowest feasible risk. This was enshrined in the reliance on 
quantitative risk assessment as a means to calculate such significant risk (Callahan and 
Sexton 2007). As Majone described, “The Supreme Court not only confirmed the legitimacy 
of quantitative risk assessment; it effectively made reliance on the methodology obligatory 
for all American agencies engaged in risk regulation” (Majone 2012). 
 
Since the benzene case, the USA has been a major proponent of regulatory impact 
assessment. This is clearly evident in Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing 
the Process (NRC 1983), commonly known as the “Red Book” and the blueprint for the 
application of risk assessment by federal agencies. Furthermore, the US government set up 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to ensure that all new regulation 
that is implemented is subject to regulatory impact analysis (Morrall 1992, Graham 2008, 
Shapiro 2010). The impact of every regulation is assessed from the perspective of cost-
benefit and risk-risk trade-offs. In principle, it is therefore argued that only significant risks 
are regulated – those whose cost lead to greater benefit and whose regulation does not lead to 
the emergence of alternative, greater risks. 
 
The extent to which risk forms a part of governance differs between the US and EU. Within 
the USA, cost-benefit and risk-risk analyses take precedent when enacting regulation that is 
targeted at “significant risk”. With regard to the EU, some commentators have argued that its 
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approach has been more inclined to regulating towards the lowest-feasible-risk end of the 
spectrum rather than focusing on significant risk (Majone 2012).  
 
However, the EU’s subsequent introduction of the Better Regulation Agenda has swung the 
regulatory pendulum back towards a more risk-based approach (Lofstedt 2004, Lofstedt 
2007). This is because the Better Regulation Agenda advocates the reduction of regulatory 
burdens on business and the need for a more streamlined and targeted approach to risk. This 
is achieved through increased implementation of regulatory impact analysis, assessing 
various risk trade-offs in the implementation of regulation. The EU has set up the Impact 
Assessment Board (IAB) (Meuwese 2008), which is similar in essence to the USA’s OIRA. 
However, it does not have the institutional strength that OIRA exhibits, as it only operates in 
an advisory role and cannot “send back” regulations in the same way that OIRA can. 
 
Finally, the institutional risks associated with risk-based regulation can sensitize regulators to 
look at societal risks in different ways, potentially leading to better management of societal 
risks, as regulatory action isn’t fixed by bounded rationalities to quite the same extent. This 
can lead to numerous benefits such as “more research, greater professionalization, more 
robust evidence-based decision-making and associated regulation” (Rothstein et al. 2006). 
New societal risks can also lead to new institutional risks and therefore risk-based regulation 
can induce a feedback loop of risks. 
 
As mentioned, risk-based approaches are being increasingly implemented across a diverse 
range of policy domains. This has led to the “risk management of everything” (Power 2004) 
and the prominence of what Black terms the “New Public Risk Management” (NPRM) 
(Black 2005). NPRM builds upon the crosscutting of internal regulation that was exhibited 
between government and industry in the case of New Public Management (NPM). On the one 
hand NPRM is the “self-challenging” element of an organisation (Power 2004) that defines 
risk as the failure of a department to meets its objective (government), or the risk to 
profitability (industry). It is the implementation of an internal risk management structure to 
account for failure from either internal or external risks (Black 2005). The second important 
facet of NPRM is that it sets out how risk-based approaches are implemented and the way in 
which societal and institutional pressures affect these approaches. It is this second strand that 
forms the primary focus of this PhD; this strand challenges the assumption that risk-based 
approaches are equal and uniform.  
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Risk-based regulation therefore claims to offer a robust, targeted and scientific framework for 
prioritising risks and directing regulatory action. Furthermore, it allows for an intelligent 
allocation of resources at a time when regulatory budgets are being stretched and new risks 
are constantly being identified. However, risk-based approaches are not the panacea of risk 
regulation, and are afflicted by several key problems.  
 2.7	Constraints	on	Risk-based	Regulation	
 
As previously discussed, risk-based regulation is not applied in a universal manner and its 
diverse modes of implementation reveal it not to be the robust and straightforward regulatory 
framework that many governments and industry claim it is (MacGillivray, Alcock et al. 
2011). There are also issues regarding whether risk-based regulation is the fix to the 
regulatory problems that proponents of this approach argue it to be. 
 
Risk-based regulation is not seen simply as a straightforward antidote to the larger problems 
of regulation. As previously stated, it appears to be less about an all-encompassing 
philosophy and more about a collection of tools and characteristics. Indeed, part of the 
attraction of stating that they utilise risk-based approaches is that regulators can apply a rather 
vague label to a range of regulatory actions in order to guarantee procedural validity. 
 
Risk-based regulation does not resolve a variety of problems associated with regulation. 
Indeed, a regimented risk-based approach can highlight the procedural challenges that lie 
ahead for regulators. Black and Baldwin (2010) argue that even though risk-based systems 
are suited to providing a relatively clear means of defining which risks are tolerated during 
the information gathering phase (through the implementation of risk scoring systems and the 
subsequent prioritising of risks), risk-based approaches do not provide a mechanism for what 
should happen in response to the identification of a high prioritised risk. The criticism here is 
that risk-based approaches can only purport to solve some of the issues surrounding 
regulation. In order to move through all the stages outlined in the regime framework, risk-
based approaches need to be supplemented with other philosophies of regulation. A risk-
based approach may highlight that a company is producing a chemical that registers high on a 
risk scoring system. However, such an approach cannot indicate whether the company’s 
compliance should be increased through punitive measures (such as a fine) or a softer 
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approach (such as providing educational material). Indeed, one of the major appeals of risk-
based regulation – that by prioritising risks there is less reliance on rule-making – can be 
challenged. For example, if a regulator has found an intolerable risk and wishes to enforce 
punitive damages on a company responsible for that risk, rules must be in place to allow that 
enforcement action to legally take place. Risk-based approaches do not do away with rule 
making and in many ways are dependent upon the relevant rules to be in place, in order to be 
effective. 
 
The institutional risks faced by regulators can also divert resources intended to go into the 
management of societal risks, “For example, as regulatory frameworks have become 
established, accumulating case law, legal duties, and spending targets have placed duties on 
regulators that can conflict with the management of societal risks” (Rothstein et al. 2006). 
Institutional risks can deflect organisations away from their core business and leave 
regulators fighting a vicious circle of validity rather than actually dealing with the societal 
risks they were tasked to deal with. 
 
With regard to the objective approach to regulation that risk-based regulation endorses, under 
conditions of high scientific certainty, risk-based systems allow for an evidence-based 
assessment of the risk posed. However, the risk ranking required can be quite subjective in 
nature. How to determine the cut-off point between a tolerable and intolerable risk is in many 
ways down to the organisational culture of the regulator tasked with drawing the line. 
Organisational culture can dictate how good a specific regulator is at making the distinction 
between a tolerable and intolerable risk, and how well the risk-based system produced 
operates under stress during a crisis.   
 
Risk-based regulation has been put forward as a highly robust and objective approach to 
regulation. Through the application of intelligence-based scientific risk assessment, 
regulators should end up with highly objective results they are able to apply. However, no 
matter how objective the science provided has been, there is still a need to make highly 
political and possibly contentious decisions based upon the information. The outcome of risk-
based regulation will still be subjective in nature, even though the intervening process may 
have been objective. Such a fear of mixing the objective nature of scientific risk assessment 
with the subjective nature of risk management has previously led to government institutions 
keeping the two parts of risks analysis separate (NRC 2009). 
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The objective stance of regulators themselves can be further investigated by looking at 
capture theory and business risks. Capture theory states that regulators aren’t acting in the 
best interests of the public they serve, but instead are captured by specific stakeholders with 
specific interests (Stigler 1971, Chittenden, Ambler et al. 2007). This theory has been shown 
to be not entirely accurate. MacGillivray et al. argue that such claims of regulatory capture 
skew debate further from reasoned and objective discussion over the “considerations of 
science, values, and economics” (MacGillivray, Alcock et al. 2011). However, the effect of 
entrainment has shown that the objective basis to risk analysis can be ignored or tweaked. 
The theory of entrainment essentially denotes that a risk can be caught up in a broader 
political discourse where the end regulation is conducted as per the pre-existing regulatory 
approaches associated with the political issue rather than specifically to the risk at hand 
(MacGillivray, Alcock et al. 2011). 
 
It must also be noted from the discipline of psychology that decision-making is inherently a 
subjective endeavour. Tversky and Kahneman’s work into heuristics and biases shows that, 
especially under uncertainty, we are just as likely to apply “rules of thumb” judgements as we 
are to try and act in a purely objective manner (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Risks are 
subjectively perceived and acted upon. 
 
The perception of risk brings us to issues surrounding the public perception of risk, and the 
effect this may have on a risk-based approach. If we return to the previous discussion on 
“acceptable risk”, how is “acceptable” defined? (Hutter 2005) Within a risk-based approach 
there are frameworks to scientifically guide the regulator, through which risks are deemed 
less acceptable and therefore require more attention. However, the public may have a 
different perspective on what appears acceptable. The social amplification of risk literature 
highlights many instances where public and stakeholder perceptions of risk do not align with 
science-based reasoning achieved through risk-based approaches (Kasperson, Renn et al. 
1988, Pidgeon, Kasperson et al. 2003). Essentially, in the event of a risk impacting, it is very 
hard for a regulator to explain to those affected that the risk will continue to receive minimal 
levels of regulation because it is deemed as being within an acceptable range (Black and 
Baldwin 2011). Furthermore, will the public willingly utilise low risk priority services that 
have had less regulatory oversight, or services that are deemed to be higher risk? For 
example, would a patient feel comfortable being treated in a “high-risk” hospital? 
 42 
 
Public pressure (as seen with “tombstoning”, for example, enacting regulation in response to 
a crisis) can lead to the passing of regulation without first probabilistically calculating the 
risk. This assessment is based on the EU’s application of the precautionary principle 
(Pesendorfer 2012), which essentially stipulates that even within a climate of scientific 
uncertainty, hazards should be acted upon. This “better safe than sorry” approach claims to 
put safety as its paramount concern, ensuring that it isn’t a case of “too little, too late” when 
protecting against the potential impact of uncertain risks (Cameron and Abouchar 1991, 
Conko 2003, Stirling 2007). One could define this approach as hazard-based as opposed to 
risk-based, as hazards are regulated before there is time to calculate the risk of any impact 
occurring. The EU’s recent handling of Bisphenol A (BPA) in baby bottles for infants is an 
example of a hazard-based approach (see Löfstedt 2011).  
 
Differing risk perceptions are not only the domain of the public. Decision-makers themselves 
have biases. In many ways this returns to the objective versus subjective debate. The 
organisational culture of the regulator itself will dictate how its regulators perceive risk. A 
risk scoring system may look highly objective in that it provides numerical values based upon 
evidence-based discourse, but regulators are still making subjective calls on how good they 
may consider a company is at dealing with risks and how good a company’s safety system is 
at dealing with large amounts of stress. Furthermore, from a philosophical point of view, 
there is an assertion that expert estimates of risk are social constructs of the regulators who 
design the systems (Adams 1995, Luhmann 2005). “The constructive camp claims that risk 
assessments constitute mental constructions that can be checked at best against standards of 
consistency, cohesion, and internal conventions of logical deduction” (Klinke and Renn 
2002). This is in contrast to the realist philosophy that asserts that these risk estimates are 
both valid and a true observation of hazards, and therefore can be acted upon confidently. 
These are two extremes of the debate and a middle-ground appears to better reflect the 
objective base of scientific information, whilst recognising that expert knowledge is not and 
cannot be produced within a social vacuum. The exact concepts and methods that regulators 
employ within a risk-based system can lead to them producing different results and 
implementing different standards. This essentially leads to a Kuhnian incommensurability 
(see Kuhn 1996) where risk perceptions will vary between different experts looking at the 
same risk domain.  
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In addition, the intrinsic matter of business risks can force a regulator to abandon the 
objective approach afforded by risk assessment (Rothstein, Irving et al. 2006). If these 
institutional risks are perceived to be too great over a certain regulation, say that there is a 
groundswell of public feeling against it or the regulator is found to be liable for too much, 
then the regulator will be inclined to change or abandon the regulation.  
 
The increasing influence of perception on policymaking has led to a certain amount of 
frustration. In the USA, Justice Stephen Breyer, who advocates risk-based approaches to 
regulation, has written about the “vicious circle” whereby public perception shapes 
legislators, legislators shape public perception, and both end up shaping regulation (Breyer 
1993). As a result, Breyer argues for the depoliticizing of certain risks, so that public 
perception cannot unduly influence the risk-based approach: “A depoliticized regulatory 
process might produce better results, hence increased confidence, leading to more favourable 
public and Congressional reactions” (Breyer 1993). Breyer argues that risk-based regulation 
offers a situation to the “vicious circle” as it alleviates public pressure due to the robust and 
transparent evidence base that is central to risk-based approaches. 
 
However, doesn’t such “depoliticization” go against democratic values? As regulation in a 
democratic society is supposed to serve the interests of its citizens, surely precluding public 
interest in risk regulation is inherently undemocratic? Furthermore, the public understanding 
of science literature suggests that a contextual approach reveals underlying reasons and 
experiences that could potentially help in regulating a risk (Gregory and Miller 1998, Miller 
2001). Indeed, even the most unfounded view offered by public perception can hold 
information of potential use when regulating a risk (Midgley 2000). 
 
Another major issue with risk-based approaches is the role of uncertainty (Dakins, Toll et al. 
1994). When there is certainty in the scientific information provided when analysing risks, 
calculating probability and impact can be relatively straightforward. However, where the 
scientific information is contested or there are gaps in the information provided, regulating 
through risk-based approaches proves difficult. Uncertainty can greatly affect the regulation 
produced. This is because the scientific information underpinning the regulatory approaches 
could be wrong, subject to change, and arguments over the science itself can lead to 
regulation being viewed suspiciously by legislators and the public alike. However, 
uncertainty is not measured on the two integers of certain and uncertain; it exists along a 
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continuum of different levels (Majone 2012). Therefore, risk-based calculations can still be 
made even within certain levels of uncertainty; the approach is not entirely hamstrung in such 
a climate. Indeed, a significant amount of regulation takes place within areas of uncertainty. 
Finally, Wynne’s distinction of known unknowns (that we know we have gaps in our 
knowledge) and unknown unknowns (that we don’t know there are gaps in our knowledge), 
reveals further consequences for risk-based approaches (Wynne 1992). To act in the 
knowledge that uncertainty exists is quite different to acting without knowing such 
uncertainty exists. Unknown unknowns could lead to risks being categorised at a lower level 
than necessary. 
 
Issues of complexity, not only regarding a risk-based approach itself but also the risks 
themselves, can affect such regulation (Black 2010). Research has shown that risk-based 
approaches are applied in a variety of different ways. It is claimed that no two approaches are 
the same (Black and Baldwin 2010). This bodes well in the sense that such approaches are 
flexible and can be used in a diverse range of regulatory problems. However, it questions the 
logic of risk-based approaches providing a robust regulatory framework. This brings us back 
to the issue of differing ideas of risk and what it is to be “risk-based”. With the terminology 
blurred, it is difficult to consider risk-based approaches as a distinct method of regulation.  
 
Finally, as for the risks themselves, their complexity is not only defined by inherent levels of 
uncertainty but also by the changing nature of many risks. A risk is not necessarily a static 
phenomenon but can be prone to change. Black and Baldwin make this point when 
considering regulation of low risks (Black and Baldwin 2011). In order to keep changing 
risks in check, constant surveillance and the recalculation of risk factors are required. This is 
expensive and time consuming and goes against the mantra that low risks should require 
fewer resources. The perception of risk-based approaches as effective and less costly is 
somewhat dispelled. Furthermore, in order to address a changing risk, resources need to be 
pulled away from other risks, thereby causing secondary consequences for the risks that have 
been downgraded to accommodate the fluctuating risk.  
 2.8	An	overview	of	studies	into	risk-based	regulatory	regimes	
 
Existing studies into the success of risk-based regulation indicate the breadth of application 
that it has enjoyed across varied policy domains, from banking to flooding, health care to 
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education. But what these studies show is that risk is not the universal organizing concept that 
it is trumpeted to be (Rothstein et al. 2013). Rothstein et al show that risk-based regulation 
does not only differ in application inter and intra policy domains but also across different 
countries. Preliminary investigation into risk-based regimes by other authors appears to 
corroborate this view.  
 
Black (Black 2004) compared risk-based regulation in financial services in Canada, Australia 
and the UK. The core motivations for adopting risk-based regulation were similar across all 
three countries, each expecting risk-based regulation to provide efficient regulation that 
instigated effective allocation of limited resources available and set out the remit of 
regulatory action and risk management of failures. However, there were clear differences 
across each country when it came to the enforcement of risk-based regulation. Differing 
statutory objectives of national regulators led to varying levels of complexity in the risk 
frameworks produced. The risk scoring system also varied, with risk assessment playing a 
central role in the final scores produced in one regulator (UK Financial Services Authority), 
and the final score dependent upon expert judgement in another (Canadian Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions – OFSA). Thirdly, the role that risk assessment plays 
in allocating regulatory resources to regulated financial institutions differs across the three 
countries. Whereas the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and UK 
Financial Services Authority rely on risk assessment to determine their relationship with 
regulated organisations, this goes against OFSA’s legal mandate that all consumers should 
expect a similar level of regulatory oversight of their financial services. Finally, Black 
discovered that whereas the UK Financial Services Authority has a legal mandate that 
includes extensive rule making powers, OFSA and APRA do not. This in turn affects the risk 
framework they utilise as both OFSA and APRA use it to allocate supervisory resources. The 
FSA also uses it to set the strategic direction of the regulator.  
 
Krieger (Krieger 2012) investigated the risk-based approach to flooding in Germany and the 
UK and found a number of institutional differences, defining them as “political culture and 
norms; style of public administration; and state culture”. With regard to political culture and 
norms, Krieger’s research indicates that Germany has a “protective state” culture, which 
demands of the state a significant responsibility for the well-being of its citizenry. There is a 
need to provide a high level of protection to all citizens no matter the situation of the risk 
(e.g. flood in a secluded farm vs. a busy city centre). This appears to conflict with a risk-
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based approach that prioritises regulatory action based upon the size of the risk posed. 
Understanding the normative foundations of England’s risk-based approach to flood defence 
proved prohibitive due to the lack of a written constitution. However, the Power’s audit 
society appears to be clearly evident and risk-based tools are utilised in order to provide 
economically grounded objectives when targeting flood risks. As Krieger concludes, “the 
normative foundations of England’s polity promote an economic and defensive rationale for 
the use of risk in flood management” (Krieger 2012).  
 
Krieger (2012) defines Germany’s style of public administration as “juridified”: “Any 
administrative intervention must be based on formal law and is subject to judicial review 
through a specialised court system”. As administrative decisions are open to judicial review, 
introducing the concept of uncertainty into policymaking opens up the decision to legal 
challenge. Germany therefore appears to have a split-level approach to risks, that of “danger” 
or “no danger” – any risks that are deemed tolerable but have a certain degree of uncertainty 
will most likely be challenged as the state is failing to provide necessary levels of protection. 
In the UK, there are not the same constitutional or judicial constraints, allowing for greater 
acceptance of uncertainty within policymaking. Indeed, as the UK implements managerial, 
administrative doctrines (such as NPM) in its review process for flood management, risk-
based approaches are actively endorsed and implemented. 
 
Finally, the structural characteristics of flood risk management in England and Germany 
show a significant amount of fragmentation. Within Germany, the federal system of the 
country leads to multiple layers of governance between semi-autonomous Länder and the 
federal government. This complex regulatory arrangement between national and local levels 
reduces the need for blame-deflection, “In complex polities like Germany’s, responsibilities 
are shared and accountability opaque. This can be argued to reduce blame attribution to 
specific state actors, and attenuates public scrutiny” (Krieger 2012). Structural fragmentation 
of flood management in England also exists but with a different outcome. With 
responsibilities split between Defra (policymaking) and the Environment Agency 
(operational responsibility), as well as economic oversight by Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
fragmentation is evident. However, unlike in Germany, responsibilities in England are clearly 
distinct, leading to regulators having to understand the institutional logics of other 
stakeholders involved in flood management, whilst also being exposed to blame attribution.  
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These studies show that the application of risk-based regulation is not as simple as it first 
appears. Although the policy domains investigated above claim to be risk-based in their 
approach to regulation, country-specific and agency-specific factors contribute to diversity in 
application. There appears to be a plethora of drivers that contribute to this perspective, from 
constitutional norms to regulatory structure; legal mandates to risk scoring systems. This 
presents problems for supranational bodies (such as the OECD or WTO) that hope to 
implement risk-based regulation as a universally applied concept and is especially 
problematic in regard to the federalised nature of the EU, which has put risk-based 
approaches at the heart of many of its regulatory drives towards harmonisation across 
Member States. Food safety is one area where the EU seeks to implement high levels of 
harmonisation with risk-based approaches, and the doctoral research linked to this thesis will 
aim to show the successes and challenges faced in such an endeavour. 2.9	Conclusion	
 
In conclusion, it is clear to see that risk-based approaches are being applied to a diverse range 
of regulatory issues. In framing governance from a risk perspective, it is possible to target 
regulatory action in a more considered and effective manner. The “command and control” 
methods of regulation have been replaced by a more nuanced palette of controls based 
subjectively on the risk at hand. Risk-based approaches appeal in the current economic 
climate especially, as it is hoped that such targeted approaches not only reduce burdens on 
business but more effectively organises regulatory action, essentially providing more bang for 
one’s buck. 
 
However, there is a range of problems that risk-based regulation has not solved, implying that 
it cannot be seen as a sole mode of governance but more as a strategy to apply within a larger 
regulatory toolkit. Furthermore, risk-based regulation has inherent problems. Key issues here 
include the need to rate risks, the effect of public perception on risk regulation, issues of 
entrainment, regulating risk in uncertainty and squaring the objective nature of risk 
assessment with the subjective nature of risk management. These issues demonstrate that risk 
regulation is still a relatively nascent field. More extensive research needs to be conducted in 
order to further explore, and possibly find solutions, to these issues. 
 
Despite the flaws mentioned, risk-based regulation is a growing field. It is hoped that through 
the practical applications of risk-based approaches, some of the issues presented here can be 
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addressed. Risk-based regulation does offer an attractive new paradigm for regulators, but 







Risk-based regulation within the European Union is becoming more widespread as the tools 
of risk analysis continue to provide regulators with a means to direct their resources and 
establish priorities of action. Food safety in the EU is indicative of this, with risk-based 
approaches increasingly being applied, as regulators seek to highlight and mitigate risks 
along the food chain. This evolution in food safety regulation raises some important research 
questions. Although policy documents within EU food safety point to a greater reliance on 
regulating through risk, to what extent is the EU food safety regime risk-based? Furthermore, 
how are the risk-based approaches championed by the EU being implemented by regulators 
tasked with ensuring the safety of our food in the UK and Germany? Finally, do risk-based 
approaches support the harmonisation of food safety regulation across Member States? As 
such, three aspects of European food safety are to be investigated: EU implementation of 
risk-based approaches as indicated by the control of food imports; national and local risk 
appetites as shown through the control of food hygiene in food businesses in the UK and 
Germany; and the application of food hygiene barometers in the UK and Germany as local 
level initiatives that reflect the extent to which local enforcement is risk-based. The research 
for this thesis was based upon documentary analysis of both contemporary and historical 
documents, as well as qualitative in-depth interviews with 70 respondents involved in 
providing or overseeing food safety within the UK, Germany and across EU institutions. 
 
This thesis is concerned with understanding the application of risk-based approaches to 
enforcement activities in the EU, the UK and Germany in relation to food safety. As has been 
described in the previous chapter, the language of risk has been increasingly utilised within 
the EU regulatory sphere across a range of policy domains, including food safety. The 
explicit drive for more risk-based approaches to enforcement practices is a clear 
manifestation of the role of risk in regulation. This thesis posits that such a clamour for risk-
based approaches to food safety regulation is predicated upon three main pathways. The first 
concerns previous food safety incidents and the damaging effect on regulators they have had. 
Not only do regulators want to apply systems of control that ensure that risks are identified 
and reduced, but risk-based approaches offer a distinction of what can be regulated and what 
cannot. Through the clear delineation of which risks fall under their remit, regulators are 
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colonising policy domains through the language of risk, helping to better exert influence. 
Conversely, by stating which risks do not fall into their remit, regulators cannot be held 
accountable when a hazard occurs outside their predefined area of control. The second 
pathway is related to trends in governance and the current economic malaise. With limited 
resources, hazard-based approaches to enforcement are becoming increasingly infeasible. 
Hazard-based enforcement is where the presence of a hazard is sufficient reason for 
regulatory enforcement, whereas the risk must be determined in a risk-based approach to 
determine action. In theory, risk-based enforcement will diminish enforcement workloads as 
certain hazards will be characterised as posing insufficient risk to warrant any action. Risk-
based approaches should allow for better targeting of resource, prioritising efforts on risks 
determined to be larger. Finally, from a geopolitical standpoint, risk-based approaches offer a 
universal regulatory language, suited to European harmonisation. The claim here is that due 
to the rigorous scientific evidence that underpins risk-based approaches, dissent is reduced 
and the regulatory outcome of such approaches can be applied more easily across a 
socioeconomically diverse collection of Member States.  
 
However, what is less well understood is the risk appetite that Member States have for the 
EU promotion of risk-based approaches, and how the EU’s own risk appetite might transmit 
to a Member State level. Relatively specific to food safety, the EU has greater oversight of 
local enforcement matters than in other policy domains, as it tries to ensure the safety of food 
along the food chain, from farm to fork. EU regulations therefore extend from the 
Commission, through to national competent authorities, and then further to regional and local 
authorities. This extended regulatory pathway means that it is essential that any investigation 
of risk appetites in relation to food safety must occur at all three levels, and be aware of the 
effect that an EU drive for harmonisation will have on each stage of the regulatory pathway. 
 3.2	Risk	regulation	regimes	
 
To support comparative analysis of the food safety regimes across the UK and Germany, the 
risk regulation regime approach has been utilised, as introduced by Hood et al. (2004). This 
approach recognises the “complex of institutional geography, rules, practice, and animating 
ideas” (ibid) of regimes, which goes further than the traditional view of formal governmental 
action, and aids in the highlighting of other informal regulatory agents and activities.  
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Essentially, the risk regulation regime approach is concerned with the ways in which 
regulation is organised. The approach goes beyond the basic determination of rules, as it 
seeks to understand the underlying reasons for the establishment of those rules, and how they 
are reflexively shaped by practices, cultures and norms. Furthermore, formal rules are often 
complemented with informal mechanisms of control, as non-state actors play an important 
role in regulatory action and reform. These underlying mechanisms and arrangements should 
identify the variety of risk-based approaches, and how they have been manifested in different 
regulatory settings.  
 
The risk regulation regime approach ensures that for comparative analysis, aspects of 
regulatory regimes are compared like with like, as it breaks down the functional aspects of a 
regime into information gathering, standard setting, and enforcement stages. This is of benefit 
to this doctoral research, which focuses on aspects of enforcement. With enforcement 
practices, the risk regulation regime approach allows for the study of the institutional 
architectures of enforcement, its practices and cultures, and how the outcomes of enforcement 
correlate with the expectations of standard setting.  
 
The risk regulation approach is applicable to the study of food safety regulation as its system 
approach helps clearly delineate the different facets of a regulatory regime, allowing for 
greater clarity in the choice of sub-regimes. Once a selection has been made, the approach 
aids comparative analysis of food safety regimes in the UK and Germany, as it indicates how 
differing institutional architectures, norms and cultures shape the adoption of risk-based 
approaches in these regimes. 
 3.3	Case	selection	
 
For investigating the challenges of implementing risk-based enforcement, food safety offers a 
very compelling case. Fundamentally, this is because food safety is an issue that affects 
everyone. We have always had to eat, and governments have always sought to regulate the 
trade and consumption of food. This makes food safety risks, “old” risks. While a lot of the 
discourse on risk focuses on how risks have changed throughout time, from environmental 
risks attributed to “acts of God”, to technological risks attributed to “acts of man”, food 
safety risks have always been apparent. This is why it is fair to say that food safety risks have 
always been seen as a traditional public “bad”. As a result, food safety regulation today is one 
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that is characterised by a host of interest groups, from local consumer groups that come from 
a public health angle, to huge multinational corporations that seek to facilitate the global 
trade of food. Mixed in amongst these actors is a wide array of government regulators, 
providing oversight along the entire food chain, from farm to fork. And, in order to ensure the 
safety of the food that lands on our plate, governments need to understand and be aware of a 
huge range of differing risks that can potentially impact at numerous points along the food 
chain. 
 
This thesis is predominantly concerned with the enforcement of food safety regulation, to 
allow for detailed comparative analysis of an aspect of the food safety regime where 
numerous risk-based approaches have been discussed and implemented. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the standard setting expectation is clearly defined within the EU GFL that food 
must be safe. Yet the EU has also been equally clear about the role of risk analysis in 
ensuring the safety of food. Therefore, the study of enforcement practices shows the extent to 
which risk-based approaches have been implemented in achieving the EU’s overall goal of 
safe food. Such research will also show the extent to which risk-based approaches may 
contravene the stated goal of safe food. For example, simply because a standard requires or 
suggests a risk-based approach, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the outcome will be as 
anticipated by the standard-setting body. Such a situation is especially pertinent within the 
EU, where Member States are required, either directly or indirectly, to implement European 
standards.  
 
The EU provides an especially interesting subject for risk-based enforcement, as it seeks to 
deal with the vast array of food safety risks across a population of more than 500 million 
people. Today, the EU tries to achieve this by implementing a series of harmonising 
regulations, as it tries to guarantee the same level of safety across a socio-economically 
disparate set of Member States. Relatively recent food safety incidents, such as antifreeze in 
Austrian wine, dioxin in animal feed, and the BSE crisis, led to an institutional reorganisation 
of the European Food safety regime at the turn of the century. Complementing the 
harmonising dynamic, the EU has championed the use of risk-based approaches in the food 
safety domain, to help deal with emerging and re-emerging risks, and ensure that another 
international food safety crisis does not occur. 
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In a policy domain so heavily harmonised by European law, it would be reasonable to assume 
that a comparison of the UK and Germany would not show much difference in how risk-
based approaches are adapted at an enforcement level. Not only are their food safety laws 
harmonised, but both countries are wealthy industrialised nations that have been a part of the 
EU since its original inception as the European Economic Community (EEC). Unlike 
Member States that have recently joined the EU, and who must undertake a series of 
regulatory reforms in order to be consistent with European food law, the UK and Germany 
have had ample time to ensure the correct level of legal and regulatory compliance. 
Furthermore, both countries have been enthusiastic proponents of risk-based approaches, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. However, the expectation that both these countries have adopted 
similar risk-based approaches under harmonised law has provided the yardstick for analysis 
of their enforcement practices. Any substantial differences in the implementation of risk-
based enforcement help to show the drivers and challenges in implementing risk-based 
approaches. If the analysis was done on new Member States, there would be no expectation 
that enforcement practices would be harmonised and misplaced, and so it would be much 
harder to identify any variance from the norm that the EU is trying to present with regard to 
food safety. 
 
Analysis of the institutional arrangements of the two countries helps in identifying drivers 
and constraints to risk-based approaches. The two countries have different organisations 
dealing with food safety, and different traditions when it comes to guaranteeing the safety of 
food. Of particular importance to the discussion of food safety is the fact that the two 
countries have differing jurisdictional and legal traditions. Germany contains a collection of 
semi-sovereign Länder, or states, that have competency for the enforcement of food safety. 
The UK on the other hand, despite local authorities carrying out enforcement activities, is far 
more centralised. The requirement to guarantee public health in Germany is codified in its 
constitution, the Basic Law. In contrast, the UK has no written constitution, and is reliant 
upon case law to help set the level of public health required. Fundamentally, there may be 
differences in how (and how easily) it is to implement risk-based enforcement practices 
through a fragmented and constitutionally juridified country such as Germany, and a 






Despite the regulation of food safety in the EU being packaged as a harmonised set of 
legislation right along the food chain, in reality it is a highly complex matter of interrelating 
sets of supranational regulations and directives. Regulation of food sold on the EU market 
can cover multiple factors such as the storage of that food, its handling, the food’s packaging, 
its labelling, the composition of ingredients and any certification that is required to confirm 
its nature and intended use. EU food safety regulation is applied from the production of the 
food, through its processing, transport, sale and consumption. This holistic approach concerns 
not just the Member States of the EU, but also third countries that are looking to export to, or 
import from, the EU.  
 
As the farm to fork nature of EU food safety indicates, its regulation is an all-encompassing 
policy domain that takes into account the huge diversity of sub-regimes. To analyse all of 
these regimes would be far beyond the achievable scope for a PhD thesis. If the case studies 
are poorly selected, the utility of this thesis will become diminished as analysis becomes 
swamped by crisscrossing regulatory frameworks. At the same time, it is important to capture 
the dynamic between supranational, national and local regulation that has been previously 
discussed. The selection of such regimes is of great importance to representatively provide 
analysis of EU, Germany and UK food safety regimes overall. To ensure this, analysis has 
occurred along the entire regulatory pathway of the EU food safety regime. Therefore, as 
previously mentioned, the research focused on three aspects: EU approaches to risk-based 
approaches as indicated by the control of food imports; national and local risk appetites as 
shown through the control of food hygiene in food businesses in the UK and Germany; and 
the application of food hygiene barometers in the UK and Germany as local level initiatives 
that reflect the extent to which local enforcement is risk-based. 
 
First, the EU’s eagerness to implement risk-based approaches within food safety is discussed 
(Chapter 5).  Discussion centres on how the EU can guarantee, as indicated in its general food 
law, the safety of food sold on the European market, while utilising risk-based approaches. 
This includes how the EU can set acceptable levels of risk across all 28 of its Member States, 
given their own individual risk appetites. The sub-regime of food imports is used as a case 
study here, as imports show the greatest involvement of EU oversight with regard to 
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enforcement, with the need for highly harmonised set of controls to ensure the borders of the 
EU are consistently managed.  
 
The second case study is concerned with national and local enforcement practices within the 
UK and Germany (Chapter 6). This case study will help reveal how EU expectations on local 
food safety enforcement will manifest themselves within two different Member States. Even 
though such enforcement controls are harmonised, differing traditions and norms, as 
previously discussed in this chapter, will come to light and show how implementation of the 
same standards may differ. This chapter will also show how local enforcement practices may 
not only reflect or differ from EU-level expectations of food safety, but also from historical 
national preferences for food safety. This has implications for the maintenance of a highly 
harmonised EU food safety regime. 
 
Finally, the third case study will investigate the implementation of food hygiene barometers 
in local food businesses within the UK and Germany. In both countries, food hygiene 
barometers have started very much as local initiatives, and have either become a national 
initiative (the UK) or remained more fragmented and local (Germany). Here we are at the end 
of regulatory pathway, as discussion of the implementation of barometers is largely at local 
and national levels. Indeed, the implementation of food hygiene barometers is one of the few 
areas of food safety enforcement over which the EU does not yet have direct supervision, 
other than ensuring that the barometers are compatible with EU food law on the hygiene of 
food businesses. Without the harmonising influence of the EU, this case study will help 
highlight the context of food safety practices within the two countries. Finally, the barometers 
case study highlights the importance of non-state actors as defined in the risk regulation 




This section will outline how the empirical evidence for this thesis has been captured, to elicit 
the formal positions of the target organisations, as well as the practices, cultures and 
interpretations of standards in order to ascertain the extent to which risk-based approaches are 
manifested within the enforcement of food safety. To achieve this, documentary analysis has 
been complemented by a series of in-depth qualitative interviews of respondents working 
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along the regulatory pathway, from supranational standard setting, to local enforcement. Yin 
(2013) argues that the use of multiple sources of evidence allows for the analysis of 
historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues to be addressed. As such, the in-depth 
documentary analysis and interviews conducted along the EU food safety regulatory pathway 
should greatly aid the comparative analysis of the three case studies chosen.  
 
A qualitative approach was adopted to gain an in-depth knowledge of the sub-regimes 
investigated regarding risk-based decision making. Quantitative data allows for a 
representative view, as a much larger portion of a population can be targeted than is possible 
with in-depth qualitative interviews (due to time and resource constraints). However, 
qualitative data gathering can provide powerful information for the researcher. Cloke et al. 
(2004) argue that such an “intensive” form of data allows the researcher to “find the causal 
processes and mechanisms behind a particular event”. Furthermore, in-depth interviews allow 
the researcher and the respondent to work through questions together, “which begin as the 
property of the researcher but which become co-owned and co-shaped in the unfolding 
interactivity”. Therefore, the researcher is able to gauge respondents’ answers better than 
through a closed questionnaire, as open and semi-structured interviews give the respondents a 
voice in which to further elaborate upon their views and question the assumptions of the 
researcher. A face-to-face or telephone interview allows for the direct interpretation of, and 
feedback to, information provided by the respondent. Conversely, an indirect form of data 
gathering (such as an internet questionnaire) is secondary in nature and therefore does not 
allow for such direct interpretation and feedback. 
 3.4.1	Analysis	of	documentary	sources	
 
Documentary research for this thesis was conducted across a wide range of key stakeholders 
within the UK, Germany, and the EU. Such research included the study of primary sources of 
data, predominantly in the form of regulations, policy documents and reports produced by 
regulators, the food industry and consumer interest groups. In order to understand and 
analyse the historical context of food safety regulation in the UK, Germany and the EU, 
historical overviews were studied. This research helped provided the necessary context for 
the current state of food safety regulation, and combined with the documentary analysis of 
contemporary regulation, led to several advantages. The first was that the scope for this thesis 
could be clearly set. Food safety regulation is a very complex policy domain, represented by 
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a plethora of sub-regimes which are active at multiple points along the food chain. 
Documentary analysis allows for a clear overview of these sub-regimes and the levels of 
interaction between them. As a result, sub-regimes can be selected that are most applicable to 
the conceit of this thesis, namely the application of risk-based approaches to the enforcement 
of food safety. The risk regime approach provides a useful methodological framework here, 
as it helps compartmentalise the different aspects of a regulatory regime, and allows greater 
focus, in this case, on enforcement.  
 3.4.2	Interviews	
 
The use of qualitative interviews was central to the evidence compiled by this thesis. To 
capture practices, cultures and norms that may go beyond what is elicited in documentary 
analysis, semi-structured interviews were organised across the UK, Germany and EU 
institutions related to food safety regulation. Interviews allow for the elicitation of personal 
perspectives on formal rules and procedures (Weimer & Vining 2015). Such qualitative 
interviews are especially pertinent when investigating enforcement activities, as there may be 
a degree of disconnection between the formal expectations articulated at a standard setting 
level, with the “reality” of the situation when a standard is enforced. The semi-structured 
nature of the interviews allowed for a good degree of depth in the answers that respondents 
gave, while having sufficient direction to allow for comparison of respondents across the case 
studies selected for this thesis. Those interviewed were given the flexibility to explore topics 
that may not have been presented in the questioning, but were deemed by the respondent to 
be useful to the research, as was clearly set out at the beginning of each interview. This 
enabled a greater level of understanding of the policy domains explored in this thesis, as there 
was no assumption that all important avenues of research had been definitively determined in 
the documentary analysis. As such, the interviews informed further documentary analysis, 
and this helped in the identification of more people to interview.  
 
The initial selection of interview respondents was based upon documentary analysis 
conducted by the researcher. Further respondents were selected through the process of 
“snowballing”, whereby initial respondents recommend others who would be relevant to the 
research at hand. All respondents, whether initially selected or recommended, were emailed. 
The invitation email contained an information sheet outlining the overall premise of the 
research and stating what was expected at interview. With the exception of two interviews, 
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which were conducted by telephone due to the preference of the respondent, all interviews 
were conducted face to face. Interviews were recorded with the permission of the respondent, 
and detailed notes were taken throughout all the interviews. The recordings were then part-
transcribed, to allow for rapid assessment of the interviews, in order to ascertain whether 
information relevant to the thesis was being collected. This allowed for tweaks to be made to 
the research agenda as the interviews progressed, in order to ensure that the interviews were 
directed in the best way possible. The interviews were conducted from May 2013 to May 
2015. This time period allowed for sufficient reflection on the interviews conducted, and 
greater flexibility in order to match the availability of respondents. Where necessary (due to 
time constraints imposed on the interviews) or beneficial (following up on information 
provided in the initial interview), follow-up interviews were conducted with certain 
respondents. This ensured that important empirical data was not precluded from investigation 
due to the condensing of often complex discussions into one conversation. 
 
With almost all the interviews conducted, a workshop in Paris was co-organised in April 
2015, which included food safety enforcement officers from the UK, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, as well as academics working on risk-based regulation. This 
occasion served as an excellent opportunity to test hypotheses that had been formed as a 
result of both the documentary analysis and the interviews conducted. With enforcement 
officers from both the UK and Germany present, it also allowed for direct comparison of 
enforcement practices, helping to highlight key differences. The presence of enforcement 
officers from other EU Member States also put the differences between the UK and Germany 
into the perspective of an overall EU framework. 
 3.4.3	Selection	of	respondents	
 
With three sub-regimes being investigated across the UK and Germany, and more broadly 
across EU institutions, respondent selection was critical. Due to the high number of 
organisations contributing to the data gathering process, only a small number of 
representatives (~1-5) were interviewed from each organisation. These representatives were 
“champions” of the organisation, as they were charged with indicating the extent to which 
their organisation is utilising a risk-based approach, and their own personal views on the 
efficacy of such approaches. The following is a list of organisations that were interviewed 









































Due to the presence of numerous supranational and national standard setting and enforcement 
bodies, respondents needed to be carefully selected. On an EU level, it was relatively 
straightforward to select the three organisations that were principally responsible for food 
safety, namely DG SANTE, EFSA and the FVO. However, as these organisations had a 
broad range of competencies, clear interview expectations were communicated in order to 
identify the correct respondent. Discussions at DG SANTE helped reveal the European 
Commission’s overall approach to food safety and how risk-based approaches are expected to 
accommodate such an approach. DG SANTE also oversees the tightly harmonised EU food 
import regime, so that expectations specific to food imports could be solicited. The FVO 
provided a useful target for interviews, as through its auditing of Member States, it oversees 
the extent to which standard setting expectations at an EU level are implemented at a 
Member State level. The FVO therefore provided an important link to the regulatory pathway 
between EU standard setting, and national interpretation and enforcement of those standards. 
Finally, through its risk assessment competency, EFSA allowed for a general discussion on 
the extent to which risk-based approaches underpin EU food safety directives and 
regulations. 
With Germany, geopolitical fragmentation is clearly apparent in the case of food safety as 
each state (Land) has competency for the enforcement of food controls. This means that 
Germany effectively has a two-tiered system, with the federal level interpreting and 
implementing EU directives and regulations into German law, and the Länder overseeing the 
enforcement of both federal and Länder standards. The historical context of Germany also 
provides another important distinction – that of the former West and East German 
governments. In order to capture both historical and contemporary layers of fragmentation, 
Länder were carefully selected. The selection included one of the so-called Eastern “new 
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Länder” (which joined following the reunification of Germany in 1990), Saxony, and a Land 
that was segregated into West and East administrations, Berlin. The selection also took into 
account administrative differences between different Länder. Most German Länder are 
subdivided into administrative districts (Kreise), and further down into municipalities 
(Gemeinden). However, the city-states of Berlin and Hamburg do not have such subdivision. 
Finally, Länder selection took into account differences in the economic outlook of various 
Länder, with the traditionally wealthier Länder of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and 
Hamburg compared with less wealthy Länder such as Saxony and Berlin. 
Food safety regulation in the UK is far more centralised than its German equivalent. 
However, the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland means that 
the picture is somewhat more complex than first thought. While the documentary analysis of 
this research included enforcement practices in devolved administrations, interviews were 
only conducted in English local authorities. The reasons behind this decision included 
considerations of feasibility and aiding comparative research. Visiting and suitably capturing 
three devolved administrations will have reduced the overall feasibility of the thesis, and 
diluted any comparative analysis of regimes in Germany and the UK, as standard setting 
functions would need to be discussed across no fewer than five administrations (Germany, 
UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). With the majority of the UK’s population living 
in England (approximately 83.9%), England was chosen as a suitable comparator for 
Germany in terms of broadly similar populations. The selection of local authorities within 
England also reflected the difference between city authorities, such as Brighton and Norwich, 
and more rural local authorities, such as Huntingdonshire. The selection also took into 
account the differing organisation of the authorities themselves, with certain authorities 
having been joined together (whether for efficiency reasons or because of their small size 
individually), and others continuing to operate as single authorities. The joint authorities 
interviewed, such as Rother and Wealden, have a mix of institutional memories, which 
revealed different drivers and constraints to a harmonised system of food control across 
England. 
Finally, members of the food industry were interviewed, as under the GFL, the food industry 
must take responsibility for providing safe food. The way in which regulatory enforcement 
practices take such a responsibility into account, and the level to which food businesses feel 
that enforcement is risk-based, is of importance to the food safety regime. As such, food 
 62 
business associations that operate within the UK and Germany, as well as across the EU, 
were targeted for interview. 
All the research conducted was compliant with the King’s College London Social Research 
Association’s Code of Ethics, and ethical approval had been granted in advance of the 
interviews. All interviews were conducted with the respondent’s informed consent, and all 
respondents were provided with an information sheet setting out the PhD research, relevant 
contact details, and ethics guidelines.   
 3.5	Issues	with	methodology 
 
As respondents were either selected by the researcher or recommended by other respondents, 
they did not directly self-select. It is hoped therefore, that any bias associated with self-
selection will have been avoided. However, there are always bias issues with using 
“snowballing” as a means to select further interview participants, as it is conceivable that one 
respondent may recommend another who shares the same views and outlook. It is hard to 
avoid this issue. However, the majority of respondents selected for interview were identified 
by the researcher.  
 
Due to the small sample size of respondents interviewed in each organisation, interviewing 
“champions” of an organisation runs the risk of resulting in a misrepresentative picture of the 
organisation and its views. As such, there was a greater need for the researcher to be aware of 
any discrepancies between a respondent’s answers and the policy direction of his/her 
organisation and conceivable outcomes within the target area. Cloke et al. (2004) advise that 
due consideration be given to whether the respondent is acting and providing information in a 
formal capacity as the representative of an organisation, or in a personal capacity.  
 
While the researcher has working knowledge of German, and some of the documentary 
analysis was conducted in German, all interviews were conducted in English. This may lead 
to criticism that implicit meanings may have been lost in translation. However, the clear 
majority of German respondents were happy to speak in English (as were non-native English 
speakers in EU institutions) – due to the Europeanised nature of food safety regulation, 
English has become a common language spoken between regulators of different Member 
States. Translators were provided for two respondents, who felt they could not suitably 
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articulate their answers in English.  Furthermore, the argument that certain meanings are lost 
in translation, occurs whether it is the interviewer or the interviewee having to translate, 
making this an ongoing concern for any piece of comparative research conducted in more 
than one language. 
 
Recording the interviews could also prove problematic. Even when respondents agree to be 
interviewed, having a recording could affect them in several ways. This includes becoming 
self-conscious as a result of the presence of a recording device, and also providing less 
personalised answers as the respondent is aware that his/her opinions are being recorded. To 
overcome these potential difficulties, the respondents were assured of the confidentiality of 
their accounts given, told that their data would be anonymised and given the option to turn 
off the recording device at any time in the interview. The argument for having a recording of 
the interview in the first place is that full transcripts can allow for a much deeper analysis of 
the interviews, as opposed to purely analysing the researcher's notes. There were three 
respondents who asked for their interview not to be recorded, requiring the use of detailed 




This chapter has set out the methodological framework underpinning this thesis. In the 
selection of three case studies – food imports, national and local enforcement practices, and 
food hygiene barometers – the full length of the regulatory pathway in the EU food safety 
regime can be identified. By using the risk regime approach to compartmentalise regulation 
and focus on enforcement practices, the thesis has a clear focus, rather than trying to 
undertake too much, which would have resulted in vague assertions of little epistemological 
use. Both the documentary analysis and the interviews draw strongly on a qualitative 
approach, as the in-depth detail gleaned from enforcement practices, cultures and norms have 
helped highlight differences between expectations at standard setting and the “reality” of 
enforcement. 
 
This chapter has explained the methodological approach to assessing differences in the 
application of risk-based approaches in Germany and the UK, within the context of the EU 
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food safety regime. The following empirical chapters present the evidence gathered as a 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































However, as Commission President, I will also be very clear that I will not sacrifice 
Europe’s safety, health, social and data protection standards or our cultural diversity 
on the altar of free trade. Notably, the safety of the food we eat and the protection of 
Europeans' personal data will be non-negotiable for me as Commission President. 
Claude Juncker 2014 
 
Any study of a European Union Member State’s regulation of food safety must take account 
of the primary role of the EU itself, given that today nearly all Member States’ legislation in 
the domain has been set at a European level. It is perhaps no surprise that the regulation of 
food, from both an economic and a health standpoint, is of great importance to the EU, given 
that it is the world’s largest importer and exporter of food. However, whilst legislation has 
existed since the beginning of the EU to deal with the running of the internal market and the 
free movement of goods, specific food safety legislation is a much more modern addition. 
Indeed, there are claims that food safety law within the EU is little more than a decade old 
(Alemanno & Gabbi 2014). This section will present a condensed history of the role that 
food legislation played and how the combination of crises and a desire for a common 
marketplace have led to food safety becoming one of the most crucial aspects of the 
European Commission’s remit.  
 4.5.1	Food	safety	in	the	European	Economic	Community	
 
From the signing of the Treaty of Rome that ushered in the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1958, European food law was not primarily concerned with the protection of public 
health, but with facilitating the internal market, as the free movement of goods symbolised 
one of the core principles of this new economic union. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome brought 
with it no guidance for food regulation. However, food regulation fast became an issue for 
the EEC and its successor, the EU, as it sought to guarantee the free movement of goods. 
And, as in the UK and Germany, the EU food safety regime experienced fundamental change 
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at the turn of the 21st century, putting safe food at the core of its remit. A key narrative to 
explore here is what Bernd van der Meulen (2014) defines as the EU’s drive to harmonise 
food law across its Member States, from vertical directives to horizontal directives. The 
difference between these two methods of directive indicate how the role of food law moved 
from primarily guaranteeing the freedom of goods, to ensuring the safety of EU consumers. 
 
Although the EU food safety regime is highly centralised, with increasing focus on 
harmonising regulation across all of its Member States, this has only been a relatively recent 
development. Although the free movement of goods across all borders was discussed, and 
general agreement sought, during the early years of the EEC, Member States were still highly 
independent. The nascent area of European food law struggled to supersede national laws as 
each Member State “sought to protect its own markets and enterprises wherever and however 
possible, and to trust the judgments of its own institutions before those of the Union or other 
members” (van der Meulen 2014). However, in order to attain the goal of the free 
movement of goods, national standards had to be effectively harmonised.  
 
The initial approach to harmonisation, which prevailed in the 1970s, was to introduce vertical 
legislation, defined here as ensuring agreement between Member States on the composition 
of specific food products. This “recipe-legislation” set highly specific requirements for 
certain foodstuffs, such as the levels of cocoa content a product is required to have before it 
can be called chocolate (see EC Directive 2000/36). The issue here soon became very clear: 
the sheer scale of setting compositional requirements for all foodstuffs traded throughout the 
Union simply proved impossible. Added to the fact that the Treaty of Rome required that 
each new piece of legislation had to be unanimously backed by the European Council, the EU 
soon jettisoned this approach to achieving market liberalisation across the Union. 
 4.5.2	The	changing	approach	to	food	through	the	European	Court	of	Justice	
 
After the failure of vertical legislation, in 1985 the EEC decided to use labelling as a means 
of informing consumers about the differences in composition, and production methods, of 
foodstuffs (Leibovitch 2008). This had a knock-on effect, as through the principles of 
equivalence and mutual recognition, Member States had to allow the movement of food that 
had been produced to an equivalent standard of other Member States, even if there were 
compositional differences. Thus, EU food law increased in significance for Member States 
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with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) defining quantitative restrictions and equivalence, 
in part due to the outcome of the 1974 Dassonville case. Here, Mr Dassonville bought 
British-sourced Scotch Whiskey in France (as it was cheaper) and attempted to re-import it 
into Belgium. However, Belgian law required that all Scotch whiskey had a certificate of 
authentication from the relevant British authorities. As the whiskey was bought in France, 
such certification was not possible and therefore Mr Dassonville created his own certification 
and was duly charged with fraud by the Belgian authorities. The Belgians submitted 
questions of interpretation to the ECJ to determine whether such a charge of fraud was 
compatible with European Law. The EU Court of Justice rules “that all trading rules enacted 
by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra community trade are to be considered prohibited in the absence of a specific 
allowable justification.” These justifications are defined as being based upon the need to 
protect human, animal or plant health, which in this case the court had ruled had not been 
impeded. This ruling laid the foundations for Article 34 TFEU, which stated, “Quantitative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States”. This article of European Law has become essential for providing the free 
movement of goods, denying quantitative restrictions on the flow of goods between Member 
States unless due justification is given. 
 
However, van der Meulen (2014) argues that the seminal ruling that helped bring about the 
development and dominance of European food Law, was the Cassis de Dijon ruling of 1979. 
The case was brought before the ECJ because a German supermarket chain, Rewe, attempted 
to import Cassis de Dijon from France. The German authorities barred this import as German 
product standards required such liqueurs to have at least 25% alcohol, whilst Cassis de Dijon 
only contained 20%. The authorities argued that a lower alcohol content could encourage 
binge drinking, and that consumer trust in the German law setting such requirements would 
be compromised. The European Court applied the rule of reason, stating that the German 
authorities’ arguments needed to meet an urgent need. However, the Court did not see either 
of the German authorities’ objections as satisfying the rule of reason, stating that the import 
did not provide a public health concern and the German market already had a range of 
alcoholic beverages on sale that had an alcoholic content of less than 25%. The combination 
of the Dassonville ruling and the Cassis ruling meant that EU law was now superseding 
national legislation, as the principal of mutual recognition stated that products lawfully 
produced and sold in one Member State could not be barred from other Member States on the 
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grounds of national legislation. This allowed for the full implementation of an internal free 
market as national standards were subsumed under EU legislation. The EU had implemented 
a system of negative harmonisation, where products were legal irrespective of which national 
standards they acquiesced to.  
 
The implications for national Member State laws were great, as the supremacy of EU law 
took hold. For example, the German Reinheitsgebot, a purity law from 1516 determining the 
ingredients permitted under German standards, fell afoul of the principle of mutual 
recognition, as importers of beers that had additives in them (which were banned under the 
Reinheitsgebot) found that they could now import their beer into Germany, and in some 
cases, bring legal action against the German State for losses incurred due to the quantitative 
restriction created by the purity law.  
 
Although the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon rulings were important for establishing the 
internal market, they led to a fundamental issue, potentially incentivising the production of 
foodstuffs in Member States with laxer national standards and forcing countries with stricter 
or more developed standards to accept these products under mutual recognition. Issues with 
harmonisation were brought back to the fore, this time focusing on Member State national 
standards, rather than product specific legislation. As van der Meulen (2014) summarised, 
“Before Cassis, harmonisation was seen merely as a condition for the functioning of the 
internal market. Afterwards, emphasis shifted to the need to alleviate the consequences of the 
internal market”. There was a shift from product specific vertical directives, to horizontal 
directives, which sought to cover large groups of foodstuffs by covering aspects that a range 
of products might have in common. By doing this, the EU was bringing a much larger 
proportion of the food chain, across its Member States, under its supervision. 
 4.5.3	The	BSE	crisis	and	institutional	change	
 
Although the principle of mutual recognition was now being applied to quantitative 
restrictions between Member States, the key driver for facilitating such changes was still the 
facilitation of the Common Market. Food safety could be used as grounds for a Member State 
to place quantitative restrictions on the products of another, should they have demonstrable 
implications for public health, but economic forces still dictated the movement of goods. This 
was to change quite abruptly with the advent of the BSE crisis. As was the case with the UK 
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and Germany, the EU was rocked by the claims and counter-claims made about the disease, 
its fatal impact across several Member States, and the extreme levels of cattle slaughter as 
countries tried to quell further outbreaks. The BSE crisis “Caused an earthquake in the legal 
and regulatory landscape of Europe” (van der Meulen 2014) that led to food safety 
unquestionably becoming the central driver of the EU’s food chain. 
 
In the wake of the BSE crisis, the European Parliament commissioned an enquiry to look into 
how the crisis was handled (European Parliament 1997). The 1997 report was critical of the 
European Commission’s response to the crisis, citing that industry interests had been put 
ahead of public health, the scientific evidence that underpinned their action was not robust 
enough, and there had been a lack of transparency. In short, the EU’s response was 
insufficient and its institutional obligations to consumer protection were found especially 
wanting. The response was swift and further increased the European Commission’s power 
over EU food law. The Directorate General Consumer Policy was replaced by the Directorate 
General Health and Consumer Affairs (DG SANCO). A scientific Steering Committee was 
established in DG SANCO to ensure that decisions were underpinned by a scientific evidence 
base, while DG SANCO also took primary responsibility for food legislation from DG 
Agriculture. In 1997, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) was also established, whose 
primary objective was to monitor food control systems across the EU, as well as third 
countries looking to import into the EU. The economic considerations of agriculture and the 
broader food trade had been publicly trumped by issues of consumer protection and health. 
 
In further response, the European Commission published a short Green Paper on the general 
principles of food law in the EU, and argued that there needed to be better control measures 
from the Commission itself. Fundamentally, the green paper argued that a central text of 
European food law needed to be established, rather than relying on previous rulings such as 
Dassonville or Cassis de Dijon (EC 1997): 
 
For many foodstuffs of agricultural origin common quality standards have been laid 
down. However, European food law has developed piecemeal over time. 
Consequently, there is no central unifying text setting out the fundamental principles 
of food law and clearly defining the obligations of those concerned. 
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The need for this central text of European law, and associated guiding principles, led to the 
Commission’s White Paper on food safety in 1999, which delivered the most significant 
changes regarding the regulation of food safety. The opening sentences of the white paper 
make clear the important role that food safety would now play (EC 1999): 
 
Assuring that the EU has the highest standards of food safety is a key policy priority 
for the Commission. This White Paper reflects this priority. A radical new approach 
is proposed. This process is driven by the need to guarantee a high level of food 
safety. 
 
Thus, food safety was no longer subsumed under the machinations of the market. It was not 
even seen as one of many considerations in the running of the single market. Rather, food 
safety was now “key”, a “radical new approach” was proposed and there was a “need to 
guarantee a high level of food safety” (emphasis added). Food safety became the top priority 
– it needed to be guaranteed. At the centrepiece of the EC’s radical overhaul of food 
regulation was the establishment of an independent risk assessment body, the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), established in Parma in 2002. According to the White Paper, the 
principal responsibilities for EFSA would include a “number of key tasks embracing 
independent scientific advice on all aspects relating to food safety, operation of rapid alert 
systems, communication and dialogue with consumers on food safety and health issues as 
well as networking with national agencies and scientific bodies”. EFSA would ensure that the 
commission would be provided with the best available scientific evidence for their decision-
making process, one of the key criticisms of its approach to the BSE crisis. It should also be 
noted that the consumer now plays a central role in EFSA’s remit, signalling an end to the 
European food trade being dictated by the food businesses that drive market forces, and 
instead putting consumer interests at the heart of regulation.  
 4.5.4	The	General	Food	Law	
 
In addition to the institutional change, the legal framework that supported food legislation 
was also rewritten. Indeed, many point to this moment as the EU’s first specific food safety 
chapter, as opposed to the wider field of food regulation, driven predominantly by economic 
factors. Not only did the introduction of EC 178/2002 (the EU General Food Law – GFL) lay 
down the foundations for the creation of EFSA, it also introduced a set of principles that 
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direct EU action with regard to food safety to this day. These principals are the Risk Analysis 
Principal, the Precautionary Principle, and Transparency. At first glance, all of these 
principles look entirely suited to dealing with the issues that plagued the Commission and 
Member State regulators during the BSE crisis. On the face of it, transparency was aimed at 
ensuring that consumers could scrutinise decision-making, risk analysis would allow for all 
decisions to be made on a designated framework of science-based evidence, while the 
Precautionary Principle would ensure that in the event of scientific uncertainty, a “better safe 
than sorry” approach could be adopted to regulating potential hazards. The Commission 
produced a White Paper on the Precautionary Principle barely a month after the White Paper 
on food safety, and heavily referenced the earlier Green Paper on food safety to indicate the 
need for the formal implementation of the precautionary principle into EU regulation.  
 
The General Food Law was not the only major development of European food law. As part of 
the commission’s approach to increasing harmonisations levels across its Member States, 
regulation 882/2004, entitled “on official controls performed to ensure the verification of 
compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules”, was introduced. 
This regulation is all-encompassing in nature as it sets requirements for the control of food 
and feed across the food safety policy domain. Its scope, in ensuring the effective 
implementation of official controls for food and feed, covers a wide range of activities, as 
Article 1 makes clear: 
 
The official controls should be carried out using appropriate techniques developed 
for that purpose, including routine surveillance checks and more intensive controls 
such as inspections, verifications, audits, sampling and the testing of samples.  
  
As such, the reduction and elimination of risk is central to the remit and scope of the 
regulation. Under Article 1 of the regulation, the scope is defined as follow (emphasis added): 
 
 1. This Regulation lays down general rules for the performance of official controls to 
verify compliance with rules aiming, in particular, at:  
(a)  preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and 
animals, either directly or through the environment; and  
(b)  guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and protecting consumer 
interests, including feed and food labelling and other forms of consumer information.  
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Thus, in the space of a few years of the European Parliament’s Inquiry into the BSE crisis, 
the legal and institutional landscape of European food safety had completely changed. Safety 
had become the watch word for the food trade, and the Commission had sought to implement 
a range of principles to ensure that remained the case. The Commission’s increased influence 
in the running of Member State food safety regimes had led to a great deal of harmonisation, 
with regulations such as 882/2004 replacing piecemeal directives of the past. The 
Commission, through the GFL, had emphasised the need for all food sold on the market to be 
safe, underpinned by a robust approach to risk. 
 4.6	Conclusion	
 
Tracing the development of food safety regulation across Germany and the UK emphasises 
some key similarities and differences that may have an impact on the application of risk-
based regulation on the EU Member States. While both the UK and Germany share the same 
starting point for food safety regulation as 19th Century industrialising societies whose 
opening of global trade in foodstuffs led to an increasing focus on food fraud, there have been 
key differences in the ensuing century or so. Specifically, there are three main factors that 
may explain policy divergence within the current harmonised system of EU food safety 
regulation: the role of professional interest groups; the linking of health concerns to food; and 
the level of regulatory fragmentation.  
 
The role of interest groups within the German context underlies the Bismarkian corporatist 
traditions that dominate many German policy domains. The role of self-help public 
organisations at the end of the 19th Century, giving way to a string of national regulations 
underpinned by Länder governments, food businesses, the entrenched veterinary profession 
and the developing food chemist- and later food inspector- professions. This is apparent 
today, with food safety inspection not the purview of a single profession, instead supported 
by an array of state and non-state rules and associations. The UK could not be more different, 
with the development of generalist environmental health officers taking a central role3, who 
had succeeded their Victorian counterparts, the inspectors of public nuisances. The UK has 





never seen the involvement of non-state actors in the regulatory landscape to the extent of 
Germany’s public self-help organisations and industrial standards. As such, in assessing the 
implementation of risk-based approaches within the two countries, one might expect a more 
varied picture within the German context, due to the greater diversity of interest groups 
involved in the enforcement of food safety standards. 
 
With regard to the linking of health concerns to food, both countries implemented legislation 
in the 19th Century that sought to protect public health, albeit from a food adulteration, rather 
than hygiene, perspective. However, following the Second World War, there was a marked 
difference in the prioritisation of public health within the two countries. In the UK, public 
health played a relatively minor role in comparison to the promotion of agriculture, with 
accusations of imbalance plaguing MAFF until it was dissolved in 2002. In contrast, notably 
within a West Germany that had been cleaved from the agricultural heartlands of East 
Germany, food shortages led to food policy being institutionally linked to health ministries, 
as opposed to agricultural ones. While a string of food safety incidents in the 1980s and 
1990s within the UK led to health taking a more prominent role, public health had been 
ingrained within Germany for much longer. This can be seen by the reaction to the BSE crisis 
within Germany, both in the shock that such a public health epidemic could develop and in 
the sweeping language used within the subsequent agricultural turn – language that was more 
fundamental than in the UK context. Due to the long-standing association to public health in 
food safety, it might be assumed that precautionary approaches may play a greater role in 
Germany as opposed to the UK, to the detriment of risk-based approaches. 
 
The organisation of food safety enforcement within both countries may be another important 
factor in understanding differences to risk-based approaches. Food enforcement matters 
within Germany have historically been devolved to its constituent Länder, reflecting the 
myriad states that came together to form modern day Germany. Matters were further 
complicated by the division of West and East Germany, with East Germany implementing a 
centralised enforcement regime until reunification with the West brought it back under 
individual Länder responsibility. Conversely, the modern history of UK food safety 
enforcement has been one of much greater central government control, with government 
departments setting expectations for local enforcement and providing oversight. 
Fragmentation within the German context may well test the limits of risk-based approaches 
being universal, than in the centralised UK system. 
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Finally, it is important to bear in mind the importance of the development of food safety 
regulation within the EU, and how ideas of risk have translated to Member States from the 
standard setting regime of EU institutions. While early developments within the European 
Economic Community was predominantly focused on trade and later harmonising the 
application of standards across Member States to underpin the free movement of goods, high 
profile food safety incidents at the turn of the century shifted the EU regime to focus 
primarily on health (in many ways reflecting the shift to health within the UK). Since this 
radical change in regime, there has been an increasing interest in implementing risk-based 
approaches. With the primary goal of food safety so explicitly outlined within the current 
General Food Law, how are risk-based approaches intended to help underpin this? The 
answer to this question lies in the approaches and language of risk that the EU food safety 
regime utilises within standard setting, and will have consequences for how risk-based 






The EU regulation of food safety entails a highly complex array of social, cultural, economic 
and legal issues throughout the regulatory pathway. At a macro level, international agreement 
is essential to the fair trade of safe food. At a micro level, there is a need for the consistent 
application of enforcement protocols to ensure that food risks are highlighted and mitigated. 
To achieve this, the European Commission makes clear that risk-based approaches are critical 
to maintaining a high level of protection, promulgating risk analysis as a core principle of the 
EU’s General Food Law regulation 178/2002 (GFL). As the Commission states in the GFL, 
“The Union has been at the forefront of the development of risk analysis principles and their 
subsequent international acceptance.” At the same time, article 14 of the GFL states that 
“Food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe” (see fig. 3); suggestive of a binary 
safe/unsafe conceptual dichotomy that could be in tension with more nuanced approaches to 
risk acceptance. As Member State food laws are so harmonised with European law, the ways 
in which the Commission and its subordinate bodies interpret ideas of risk and its application, 
could have important ramifications for Member States. So how does the Commission’s 
apparent appetite for risk square with the GFL’s insistence that all food placed on the market 
must be safe?  
 
Nowhere is the tension between hazard and risk more apparent than with food import 
controls. One of the key foundations of the EU is the free movement of goods, as originally 
laid down in the Treaty of Rome, which has required the harmonisation of food laws across 
Member States to ensure that food produced in one Member State can be sold in another. The 
rationale for harmonisation is clear; if Member States had different yardsticks to measure 
food safety and quality and to justify import controls or bans, the free movement of goods 
could be undermined. “Risk” ideas have been central to ensuring the consistent application of 
controls across the EU; not least in requiring more stringent levels of checks for “high-risk” 
than “low-risk” products. However, as this chapter will show, the EU’s classifications of 
“high” and “low” risk products have historically been relatively crudely drawn according to 
whether products are of animal or non-animal origin respectively. On the face of it, such a 
classification looks far more “hazard-based” than “risk-based”, since some food of animal 
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origin, such as a tin of sardines produced to the highest production standards, is likely to be 
far safer than raw salad ingredients contaminated with E. coli. Given the Commission’s 
promotion of risk-based enforcement strategies, that puzzle raises the question of the extent 
to which the EU’s food import regime reflects a risk-based approach in practice, and if not, 
why not. 
 
To answer the questions posed above, the author interviewed policymakers from the primary 
European institutions tasked with dealing with food safely, namely DG SANTE, EFSA and 
the FVO, to determine the appetite for risk at a European level. Interviews were also 
conducted with officials from national and local competent authorities as well as with 
officials applying and enforcing food import controls at ports of entry to the UK and 
Germany, at least insofar as it was possible to secure access. As will be discussed below, 
those interviews reveal the EU’s risk appetite and the tensions at play between hazard and 
risk within the import regime. First, however, this chapter considers some of the fundamental 
tensions between risk, hazard and safety that are present in the EU’s General Food Law.  
 
Food safety requirements 
 
1. Food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe. 
2. Food shall be deemed to be unsafe if it is considered to be: 
(a) injurious to health; 
(b) unfit for human consumption. 
3. In determining whether any food is unsafe, regard shall be had: 
(a) to the normal conditions of use of the food by the consumer and at each stage of production, processing and 
distribution, and 
(b) to the information provided to the consumer, including information on the label, or other information generally 
available to the consumer concerning the avoidance of specific adverse health effects from a particular food or 
category of foods. 
4. In determining whether any food is injurious to health, regard shall be had: 
(a) not only to the probable immediate and/or short-term and/or long-term effects of that food on the health of a 
person consuming it, but also on subsequent generations; 
(b) to the probable cumulative toxic effects; 
(c) to the particular health sensitivities of a specific category of consumers where the food is intended for that 
category of consumers. 
5. In determining whether any food is unfit for human consumption, regard shall be had to whether the food is 
unacceptable for human consumption according to its intended use, for reasons of contamination, whether by 
extraneous matter or otherwise, or through putrefaction, deterioration or decay. 
6. Where any food which is unsafe is part of a batch, lot or consignment of food of the same class or description, it 
shall be presumed that all the food in that batch, lot or consignment is also unsafe, unless following a detailed 
assessment there is no evidence that the rest of the batch, lot or consignment is unsafe. 
7. Food that complies with specific Community provisions governing food safety shall be deemed to be safe insofar 
as the aspects covered by the specific Community provisions are concerned. 
8. Conformity of a food with specific provisions applicable to that food shall not bar the competent authorities from 
taking appropriate measures to impose restrictions on it being placed on the market or to require its withdrawal from 
the market where there are reasons to suspect that, despite such conformity, the food is unsafe. 
9. Where there are no specific Community provisions, food shall be deemed to be safe when it conforms to the 
specific provisions of national food law of the Member State in whose territory the food is marketed, such provisions 







As the GFL states that all food placed on the market must not be “unsafe”, we are 
immediately hit with problems of defining what “safety” in the EU context means. Meulen 
and Szajkowska (van der Meulen & Szajkowska 2014) warn that simply discounting all 
the practices and products that make up the EU’s classification of unsafe food, does not leave 
us with a definition of safe food. What these authors do suggest is that the definition of food 
safety provided by the Codex Alimentarius – an “assurance that food will not cause harm to 
the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use” (Codex 1999) – 
would not be understood differently in EU food law and can be used as a working definition. 
However, both the GFL’s demand that food should not be unsafe and the Codex’s definition 
explicitly stating that no harm should come to the consumer could be interpreted as zero 
tolerance of risk. The general objectives of the GFL do not talk in such absolutist terms, 
stating a need to “guarantee a high level of protection of human life and health and the 
protection of consumers’ interests” (178/2002). This, the Commission would no doubt argue, 
allows for the tools of risk analysis, as defined in Chapter 4, to help underpin what exactly a 
high level of protection should look like. But couldn’t a high level of protection still lend 
itself to a more hazard-based approach of safe/unsafe, and render many of the tools of risk 
analysis largely redundant? 
 
To address that question, we need to consider what the EU defines as a high level of 
protection and whether that definition creates a conflict between guaranteeing the safety of 
food and the risk-based approaches that are purported to underpin it. Defining what a high 
level of protection looks like, however, is a key difficulty facing EU regulators as they try to 
ensure a food safety system that is both accepted and feasible to implement across 28 
different Member States. As one official in DG SANTE explained: 
 
To say what is the lowest level of risk which is the border of negligence, in that below 
[that level] we don’t care, there it is very difficult. Everybody knows that if you have a 
toxic substance with high concentration in food, that is something you need to sort 
out. But when you are at the other end [with low concentrations] where maybe in 
some very specific conditions, some people may have some unease, should you look 
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on that or not? Where is the border? And what is difficult in the food safety area is 
that this is an issue for every citizen of the European Union. (DG SANTE_2014d) 
 
This statement suggests that there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the statement that 
all food should be safe. Does the statement hold as true for the Dutch as it does the Italians? 
Or does the statement hold true for vulnerable groups in society who may be more 
predisposed to certain risks inherent in food? Trying to set acceptable levels that consider a 
wealth of variation in different Member States can prove futile, with a respondent from EFSA 
using animal welfare issues as a case in point: 
 
We have very little border conflicts when it comes to animal welfare, where there 
could be. In the risk analysis framework, one thing that you do is define the 
acceptable level of risk and appropriate level of protection. And when we assess 
welfare of animals, comparing different ways of doing different things, we end up 
ranking them, but it’s very difficult for the manager to come with a real figure for 
what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. (EFSA_2014f) 
 
This example suggests that there has been a large degree of reticence to setting the acceptable 
level, for fear of sparking issues across Member State borders. On a fundamental level, the 
Commission appears to face problems in setting the acceptable level of risk regarding public 
health: 
 
Politically speaking, where is the acceptable number of healthy people? How do you 
set priorities? We are discussing this every year. We have to cut down the overall 
resources because of the overall economic and political situation, so that we have 
positive and negative priorities. (DG SANTE_2014d) 
 
By positive priorities, these are the ones that DG SANTE prioritises, such as endocrine 
disruptors in food packaging materials, pesticide residue levels in food, and updating EU 
regulations on official controls (882/2204). However, the negative priorities are more 
revealing about the range of food safety concerns that cannot be easily addressed, due to 
concern for European solidarity: 
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And then you have negative priorities. Let’s say two people die somewhere in East 
Europe. Can you say, “sorry guys, we didn’t look into that because it was a negative 
priority.” It’s politically impossible. (DG SANTE_2014d) 
 
This conundrum indicates the tension between the technical determination of priorities and 
the ways in which such prioritisation will be perceived by the public. But it also suggests that 
the explicit demand that food placed on the market should not be unsafe, makes it hard to 
adopt a proportionate risk-based approach to prioritisation, especially if one’s negative 
prioritisation leads to deleterious consequences. Conversely, it could be argued that by clearly 
stating the risk-based decision-making behind such negative prioritisation, risk becomes a 
shield for the regulator as it can argue that it prioritised the hazards that posed the greatest 
potential risk. However, at the EU level, this is still problematic due to the self-avowed goal 
of ensuring safe food on the market. 
 5.2.2	Institutional	risk	
 
It would be wrong to assume that there is agreement within the EU that talk of risk is 
reserved purely for the sphere of societal risks, in this case food safety risks to consumers. 
Rather, it could be argued that the “rules of engagement” for the discussion of risk have not 
been clearly delineated, as a respondent from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
made clear: 
 
What are we talking about in terms of risk? Is it food safety risk to consumers? Is it 
risk of non-compliance, which may intersect with risk to consumers, or may not? Is it 
risk to the employment of enforcement officials, with a vested interest? Is it risk of a 
market being flooded with competitive products that may disadvantage national 
farmers? That’s why everyone is talking about risk but it’s never defined absolutely 
that we’re talking about a food safety risk to consumers, which is probably where we 
should be. (FCO_2014) 
 
The ubiquitous nature of risk, a concept that Chapters 1 and 2 argued is still ill-defined, 
makes having a shared understanding of risk difficult, especially in a supranational context 
such as the EU. The above quotation also offers a useful insight into describing how 
institutional risks might shape the EU’s risk appetite and approach to societal risks. For 
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example, the GFL’s insistence that no unsafe food should be placed on the market reflects a 
broad European risk appetite in relation to food. Across EU institutions dealing with food 
safety, there was a general feeling that Europeans are very conservative when it comes to 
food, reflecting a very low appetite for risk. Public views are, of course, somewhat tempered 
by historical and contemporary sociocultural practices that vary between different Member 
States and would affect risk perceptions. However, there was a determination at Commission 
level that such a high profile and damaging incident such as the BSE crisis should never 
happen again. But this was not purely for the societal public health impacts that the BSE 
crisis had. It was for the reputational damage to both Member States and the European Union 
and the risks to the beef market that led to the creation of an explicit GFL with a clear 
emphasis on guaranteeing food safety. As one respondent in the FVO commented, the 
Commission didn’t just take measures to ensure the safety of beef on the market that went 
beyond what was scientifically needed, but took measures that would put any issues of safety 
beyond any reasonable doubt: 
 
Look at BSE, what that has cost, and ultimately, the vast majority of the measures we 
took in relation to BSE. The problem was not so much safety; the problem was 
regaining consumer confidence. From a pure public health perspective… if you want 
to ensure that beef is safe to the consumer, all you need do is remove the specified risk 
material… scientifically it’s safe. So why then do we bother with the ban on meat in 
bone meal, the mandatory testing of all healthy bovines at 30 months? It was 
basically to restore consumer confidence. It wasn’t enough to say beef is now safe, we 
have very strict measures in place to remove the specified risk material. Consumers 
had already made their minds up; they weren’t buying beef anymore. Beef 
consumption had collapsed by 50% plus in Europe. So, it gets back to the firebreak, 
you have to go further than might scientifically even be considered necessary to re-
establish confidence. This is not a lab experiment... you’re dealing with subjective 
opinion… and occasionally you’re going to have to go to extraordinary lengths to 
restore confidence. (FVO_2013a) 
 
The need to restore public confidence is the central imperative here. That there needed to be a 
“firebreak” and “extraordinary lengths” helps illustrate why the Commission, in the aftermath 
of the BSE crisis, needed to send out a clear message to reassure consumers worried about 
the safety of their food. Dealing with consumer perceptions has led to some frustration, as the 
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way in which food industry and the regulator are viewed can sometimes mask the efficacy of 
the food safety regime overall. As an official at EFSA put it: 
 
Something being safe is pro-industry and something not being safe is consumer 
protection. [If something’s deemed safe] It’s not affirmation that the system works, 
it’s pro-industry. That’s how it’s perceived. And yet if we come out with a warning 
that something needs to be improved, it’s not “how did the system ever get to this 
stage”, instead it’s “finally someone has a tripwire under industry, and good on 
EFSA for standing up for us”. (EFSA_2014a) 
 
The idea presented here that communicating an aspect of a food business’ procedure or 
product as safe is met with suspicion that the regulator is in the pocket of industry, shows the 
delicate situation that regulators find themselves in with regard to consumer confidence. And 
fourteen years after the GFL was published, regulators at an EU level are still deeply 
concerned about the effect that a large-scale food safety incident could have on consumer 
confidence. In this sense, the EU food safety regime has to constantly manage its own 
institutional risks as much as the societal risks that are posed to consumers. An EFSA official 
stated this constant challenge by saying “Anything related to food resets everything, because 
food is central to people’s lives.” (EFSA_2014f) By “resets everything” it was meant that 
food safety incidents could have the potential for deep-set institutional reform within the 
organisations that serve the policy domain.  
 5.2.3	Unresolved	tensions	between	hazard	and	risk	
 
Fundamentally, consumers don’t expect the food they buy to be unsafe. As the EFSA official 
put it: “We assume that food is safe, that it’s a given. People don’t think about anything 
harmful when they go to the supermarket” (EFSA_2014f). So, when things do go wrong, the 
resulting shock and anger is even more palpable. But does this consumer assumption that 
food is safe indicate that the GFL has been successful, as the EU has had a period relatively 
free of food safety scandals since the BSE crisis, and subsequently focus has shifted 
elsewhere? The EFSA official quoted above did feel that the public eye has shifted away 
from the issue of food safety: 
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Right after the second world war, people were worried about food security, then came 
the food safety issue. Now we’re not worried about the security or safety, it’s now the 
acceptability of the food. So it’s about GM, it’s about carbon footprints, it’s about 
animal welfare for what is acceptable. We’re still working on safety, while maybe 
society has moved on and regards it as a given. (EFSA_2014f) 
 
This is not to say that those interviewed in EU institutions felt that food safety was not 
important, far from it. Most respondents felt that the fact that food safety was not seen as a 
going concern indicated how well the EU food safety regime was functioning but that the 
principles set out in the GFL are still relevant today. The regulation of food safety is a duty 
that requires a suitably robust regime to be able to ensure it. As an FVO official argued: 
 
Food safety is essentially seen as a public good. And in many respects so it should be. 
I think it’s a quid pro quo for the integrated food markets that we have. You can’t 
have it both ways as a regulator, standing over a system that allows trade to take 
place on a massive scale, but when it comes to the safety [say to industry], “look after 
it yourself, don’t hold us responsible”. (FVO_2013a) 
 
The above comment indicates a regulatory commitment to ensuring the safety of all food 
placed on the market, rather than passing responsibility to industry and leaving the regulator 
purely in the role of an auditor. That commitment, however, lends itself to a regulatory 
perspective on food safety that focuses on food safety hazards rather than risks. The reason is 
that that perspective directs regulators’ attention to the range of potential food safety harms 
that might arise irrespective of business behaviour – i.e. hazard – rather than the likelihood of 
those harms occurring, which is dependent on business compliance with regulatory demands 
– i.e. risk. In other words, regulators are driven to actively seek out food safety hazards, 
rather than retreat to measuring business compliance as a proxy of food safety.  
 
Even with the European Commission making overtures to risk-based policymaking, there are 
those who think it is simply not possible. The delegation of power within the EU framework 




The discussion of risk is much the same at national or EU level, but at the EU it’s 
much harder to get what I would class as a genuine risk-based system agreed, as 
there is a generally precautionary stance from many officials involved both in field 
operations, Member State policy and European Commission policy. And that’s also 
reflected in the very hazard-based approach taken by many MEPs. Post Lisbon the 
parliament is having a much greater effect when they’re having input into legislative 
instruments. (FCO_2014) 
 
The risk averse nature of politicians is nothing new; what elected officials want risks to 
impact on their watch? But the point of the FCO official’s concern is that with each layer of 
governance, from street level bureaucrat to Commission official, further blocks to risk-based 
regulatory approaches are introduced. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty’s empowerment of the 
European Parliament added the vote of MEPs as a powerful veto point in addition to the 
difficult task of balancing the interests of 28 different Member States. 
 
That is not to say that there hasn’t been a push for more risk-based approaches amongst 
Member States, for example through the use of soft compliance and earned recognition for 
industry, as Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss. But the quotations in this section perhaps suggest 
that any hazard/risk tensions present in the GFLs commitment to safe food and risk analysis 
have not needed to be addressed, as public focus has shifted away from issues of food safety. 
Perhaps the relatively calm EU food safety regime brought about by the GFL has led to the 
Commission applying the old English adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. 
 
This section has shown the difficulties of being overtly risk-based as a starting point for EU-
wide regulation, as setting acceptable levels of risk across Member States brings with it 
institutional risks for the EU food safety regime infrastructure. There still appears to be a 
large degree of sensitivity to public perception within the EU apparatus, considering the 
sweeping changes that the BSE crisis brought about. This might help explain why, despite the 
EU’s insistence on risk-based approaches, there are conflicting approaches to ideas of hazard 
and risk within the GFL.  
 
As stated in the introduction, food import controls offer an interesting case study as to 
whether the hazard/risk tensions discussed in this section manifest themselves in enforcement 
activities that are closely controlled through EU oversight. In the next section, I will provide 
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the historical precedent for EU food import controls, and then discuss whether current 




The history of EU food import regulation mirrors the staccato approach to harmonisation and 
integration that has characterised EU approaches to regulating food safety as outlined in 
Chapter 4. Such development has been largely predicated on trade concerns and the 
establishment of the single market (the functional successor to the EEC’s common market).  
It was clear that by the 1980s, the common market idyll that underpinned the creation of the 
EEC had not been realised. While a customs union between Member States was intended to 
facilitate the movement of goods and services, it was severely hampered by differing national 
standards and protectionist stances. The EEC Commission, under the stewardship of Jacques 
Delors, attempted to rectify this, seeing a common market as a remedy to the then 
international economic malaise. This drive led to the publication of a White Paper in 1985, 
entitled Completing the Internal Market, which sought the removal of physical, technical and 
fiscal barriers to the movement of people, goods and services across the community by 
combining positive and negative integration (see fig 5). The Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville 
cases described in Chapter 4 were examples of negative integration, as they corrected and 
regulated against discriminatory practices by Member States that impinged free trade. 
Positive integration was achieved through clearer definitions of the Commission’s role, as 
articulated in the Single European Act (SEA), which was a direct result of the 1985 White 
Paper. The SEA was the first major regulatory revision of the EEC since the Treaty of Rome, 
and gave a deadline of 31 December 1992 for the EEC to establish a single market. Delors 
articulated the extent of the treaty by stating: 
 
The Single Act means, in a few words, the commitment of implementing 
simultaneously the great market without frontiers, more economic and social 
cohesion, a European research and technology policy, the strengthening of the 
European Monetary System, the beginning of a European social area and significant 
actions in environment. (EEC 1986) 
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To achieve such ambitious changes, the SEA laid the foundations for the strengthening of the 
Commission’s hand in the legislative process that supported the creation of the single market. 
Central to this was an addition of a provision to Article 145 of the EEC Treaty, which read in 
part, “confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 





Focusing greater regulatory power at the centre of the EEC was not universally popular, with 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher vehemently arguing, “To try to suppress 
nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly 
damaging”. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the reunification of Germany in 
1990, drastically changed the political and economic landscape of Europe. With French and 
British concerns over an emergent Germany, further integration offered a way of tying 
Germany to the European project.  
 5.3.2	Discrepancy	between	Products	of	Animal	Origin	(POAO)	and	FNAO	(Food	of	Non-Animal	Origin)	at	import	
 
The single market was established at the beginning of 1993, and was a central pillar of the 
European Union, which was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Of the 
three pillars of the EU, laid down by the Maastricht Treaty, “Union policies and internal 
actions” ratified the free movement of goods as stipulated in the SEA4. The harmonising 
effect of the creation of the single market was quickly apparent, with the introduction of 
Commission decision 94/360/EC, which stipulated controls that needed to be carried out at 
EU BIPs, and percentage physical checks that needed to be carried out at designated points of 




Positive integration: the adjustment of existing and the establishment of new policies 
and institutions endowed with coercive powers 
 
Negative integration: removal of discriminatory and restrictive institutions and the 
introduction of freedom for economic transactions 
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import on POAO. The legislation also indicated that even towards the turn of the 21st century, 
the control of POAO at import was a much greater priority than FNAO.  
 
If the EU has largely succeeded in ensuring harmonised action across its BIPs, has it also 
succeeded in implementing a risk-based system of control that guarantees the safety of food 
imported? The answer appears to be different dependent on what category of food import is 
being discussed: products of animal origin or food of non-animal origin. Risk terminology 
reflects the historical emphasis of prioritising the control of meat, with all imports of POAO 
categorised as being “high-risk”, unlike FNAO where only a small list of products from 
specific countries is deemed high-risk. The definition of high-risk products given to port 
health authorities is, “feed or food that is either a known, or an emerging risk to public health. 
This may be due to the presence of pathogens, toxins and contaminants.” (FSA 2013) For 
FNAO placed in the high-risk list in 669/2009, one could argue that such a definition makes 
sense. Because there is a degree of specificity in the country of origin, the batch number (in 
as far as they target specific subclasses of a food product) and an articulation of the hazard 
that has explained the product’s place on the list, such logic would explain the need for 
increased controls at import. Furthermore, the list of products 669/2009 is reviewed by the 
Commission on a quarterly basis, and any updates to the list are informed by a range of data 
from a variety of sources (FSA 2013): 
 
The approach is evidence based using a number of information sources. These 
include data from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF); reports from 
the Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office on feed and food safety procedures in 
non-EU countries; reports and information received from non-EU countries and the 
European Food Safety Authority, scientific assessments. All of these sources are taken 
into account when the European Commission reviews the list to develop proposals to 
present to the Member States for their consideration. 
 
However, fundamentally there is no such delicacy in assessment when it comes to the risk 
determination of POAO, as it is all determined to be high-risk.  
 
For “high-risk” foods, controls at import include documentary checks, such as public and/or 
animal health certificates, commercial documentation and crucially a Common Veterinary 
Entry Document (CVED), which serves as a pre-notification from the importer and shows the 
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outcome of all checks against the product it is verifying. Identity checks are also required to 
ensure that the imported product and any health marks and stamps or related 
product/packaging information matches the accompanying documents. Finally, physical 
checks are required in the form of testing and sampling a percentage of products imported (as 
specified in Commission Decision 94/360/EC for POAO, see table 1). 
 
The regime for controls at import for food of non-animal origin has historically been 
markedly different insofar as there has never been any requirement to carry out full 
documentary or identity checks on FNAO consignments coming into port, irrespective of any 
risks posed by the food. However, the regime has started to change in recent years. EU 
Directive 669/2009 created a list of FNAO that are classified as “high-risk”, such as basmati 
rice imported from Pakistan and bananas imported from the Dominican Republic. Like the 
inspection frequencies in 94/360/EC, this directive stipulates percentage checks, but for 
identity checks as well as physical checks (POAO require an identity check, so percentage 
checks only apply to physical checks). However, the list in 669/2009 is more nuanced, 
indicating specific countries of origin, as well as stipulating the hazard that has led to the 
product being placed on the list (for example, aflatoxins have been designated as the hazard 
for basmati rice from Pakistan).  
 
Also, the EU Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES) risk management system, first 
mentioned by Commission decision 2003/623/CE in 2003 for POAO, has been rolled out 
across all Member States for FNAO too. This online system was designed to keep track of, 
and provide veterinary and sanitary certificates for, all animals and POAO, throughout the 
European Union, allowing for improved traceability. It also contains information about 
rejected consignments and the reason for rejection. Perhaps most importantly to enforcement 
practices, EU legislation identifies TRACES as a system that directs physical checks, as well 
as reinforced checks where required5, based upon the trade data that it has accrued. The 
introduction of the TRACES system, as well as the high-risk checklist in 669/2009, has led to 
respondents in port health authorities stating that the inspection of food products (POAO and 
FNAO) at EU BIPs has become more risk-based. As one inspector argued, “It is much more 





of a risk-based regime, with more high-risk controls, especially since 2010 with high risk of 
non-animal origin” (Felixstowe_2013). 
 
The terminology of risk for food imports, however, is distinctively different to local food 
inspection. In local inspection of food businesses, risk is measured in terms of business 
compliance with food hygiene regulations. By contrast, at import greater emphasis is placed 
on the inherent risk that the products pose to human health, with high-risk products requiring 
the full range of documentary, identity and physical checks as described previously. 
 
The focus on checks on food of animal origin has not just been at abattoirs, but also at BIPs. 
This would explain the use of “high-risk” terminology to describe POAO at import. 
However, there appears to be some debate over the extent to which this specific regime is 
risk-based: 
 
They all talk about the need for a risk-base, but there’s a comfort in the current, fairly 
blunt system. I have to do 20% of fishery products, 50% of meat products or whatever 
it is, and I’ve got discretion within that, which is where my risk-based approach 
comes from. Rather than looking at factors like history of compliance for a supplier of 
meat... or whatever it might be. (FCO_2014) 
 
This view expressed by a respondent from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
focuses on the percentage checks that are required at BIPs. Since these checks were laid out 
in 94/360/EC, which came into force in 1994, there has been relatively little change in the 
intervening period. This is quite unusual, bearing in mind that in the intervening time, the 
institutional apparatus of the EU has been realigned following the BSE crisis, and the 
founding of EFSA has provided an expert-led organisation that would help establish levels of 
checks that are required. Indeed, from a business perspective, staff from the International 
Meat Trade Association revealed that they are unaware of the reasoning underpinning the 
percentage of checks required at BIPs, stating “they are quite arbitrary” (IMTA_2014b). 
 
The discrepancy between POAO and FNAO begs the question, why has there been a greater 
emphasis on POAO and does this reflect a difference in the risk posed to public health? One 
respondent confirmed the imbalance between the two categories by stating, “border 
inspection controls are uniquely focused on animal products” (FVO_2013a). Further 
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investigation reveals that the focus on POAO is as a result of historical practices, driven by 
major health scares in the past that have been linked to meat, such as typhoid, trichinella or 
BSE. As respondents from DG SANTE and the FVO commented: 
 
The problem is that for historical reasons, the probability of having problems in your 
health with animal-based food was much higher and has been proven by several 
crises to be the case. So, you obviously look on what you document as a problem. 
There is a different issue that some of the elements of these problems have been 
eradicated, and it’s very difficult to cut them down from the controls because of 
traditional feelings that they should be controlled, for example trichinella in meat. 
(DG SANTE_2014d) 
 
Meat inspection is historical. The major risk was associated with animal products, 
and primarily at the stage of slaughter. So, the public authorities, when food chains 
were much less short and trade less sophisticated, so problems are always in 
abattoirs… These have always been very heavily regulated, going back decades… 
Personally I think it has become somewhat outdated, because the risks have shifted. 
(FVO_2013a) 
 
A cursory check of major food safety outbreaks in the last century shows why there have 
been stringent checks on POAO, almost at the expense of FNAO. As explained in Chapter 4, 
in both case study countries – Germany and the UK – the control of abattoirs within urban 
centres, and the risk posed from effluence pouring into the street, was more than a passing 
concern well into the 20th century. Campylobacteriosis, listeriosis and salmonellosis – the 
three most common diseases related to food poisoning, are often linked to the consumption of 
contaminated animal POAO. There have also been concerns over whether certain zoonoses 
can be transmitted from infected animals to humans, through the food chain. Here, BSE is the 
most well-known example of such transmission, and more recently the possible spread of 
antimicrobial resistance from farm animals destined for the food chain has led to much 
international debate and news coverage. Finally, even when the food chain has not been 
established as a zoonotic pathway to humans, incidents such as foot and mouth, and avian flu, 
have ensured public interest in animal welfare, and implications for the food chain.  
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Not only has the historical precedence biased perception of food safety risks towards POAO, 
the veterinary profession that underpins the checking of food of animal origin is entrenched 
and this makes it difficult to balance out any checks and balances across food. This view of 
controls on food of animal origin being predicated on historical, and somewhat outdated 
practices was confirmed by a respondent from the FVO: 
 
[Through the historical controls on POAO] we created an excellent, permanent 
sustaining job opportunity, and now you are coming and saying “let’s cut it!”. And 
those who have to decide on cutting that are exactly those who have these jobs – 
veterinarians I mean. Would they say we don’t have to do it anymore?  (DG SANTE 
2014d) 
 
And also, contentiously, it’s a mainstay of the work of the veterinary profession, 
because all these controls and checks, mandatory presence in abattoirs etc. is the 
livelihood of large numbers of vets in Europe. (FVO_2013a) 
 5.3.3	Rapid	Alert	System	for	Feed	and	Food	(RASFF)	
 
The EU food import system is incredibly reactive, in that dangerous products that are flagged 
at import or at a local level will cause alerts to be triggered across EU BIPs to stop their entry 
into the EU. This reflects the need to maintain the same high level of protection across all 28 
Member States, so that food safety risks are quickly identified and communicated across the 
EU. Central to this reactive approach is the EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF), an information platform created in 1979 and described by the European 
Commission as follows (EC 2016): 
 
RASFF enables information to be shared efficiently between its members (EU-28 
national food safety authorities, Commission, EFSA, ESA, Norway, Liechtenstein, 
Iceland and Switzerland) and provides a round-the-clock service to ensure that urgent 
notifications are sent, received and responded to collectively and efficiently. Thanks 
to RASFF, many food safety risks had been averted before they could have been 
harmful to European consumers. 
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This system, which was originally a telephone system but is now online, has produced alerts 
across a range of food safety incidents, including radioactive contamination of crops because 
of the Chernobyl disaster (1986); cows infected with CJD (1995); dioxin in chicken from 
Belgium (1999). In essence, if an imported good is found to pose a risk to public health, it 
triggers a wave of alerts across all other Member States and their BIPs. One relatively recent 
example of the RASFF system in action was the 2008 melamine in milk scandal, when it was 
discovered that milk from China was being adulterated with melamine; a chemical used to 
artificially increase the level of protein in milk. The adulteration had led to over 300,000 
people in China becoming ill. Originally, it was not seen as a threat to the EU as the import of 
milk or milk products from China was banned. However, the RASFF system detected 
composite products that contained melamine adulterated milk products, as well as the illegal 
import of milk products from China. The commission decided to act and within 24 hours, a 
decision was made to ban the import of composite products from China that were intended 
for the nutrition of infants or young children (Alemanno 2010). 
 
For information systems like RASFF to operate, a set of controls must be implemented across 
all designated BIPs, which have efficient oversight across the diversity of the global food 
trade that passes through EU ports. For the controls to work effectively, and for information 
to be shared amongst BIPs, enforcement controls need to be tightly harmonised. The single 
market would be incredibly difficult to operate if a BIP in Italy had a different set of controls 
to a BIP in Ireland; the freedom of movement of goods within the EU could not be 
guaranteed without BIPs having a harmonised system of controls with the same risk appetite. 
Consequently, when Member States choose to place import restrictions outside of an EU 
mandate, this can have potentially disastrous consequences for the EU. For example, in 2006, 
following the BSE crisis and the EU’s decision to raise the moratorium on the import of 
British beef, France continued to impose an import ban. The matter was taken to the 
European Court of Justice, where it was adjudicated that France’s continued import ban was 
unsubstantiated based on the risk posed by consuming British beef. However, had the court 
ruled in favour of France, there would have been grave consequences for the implementation 
of a shared import system across the EU, as a senior official at the FVO argued: 
 
Immediately overnight, all those countries [other Member States] would have put a 
measure in place because their own consumers would have been saying, “the French 
put in this measure, which is now legally found to be correct, therefore they enjoy a 
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higher level of protection than we do, go and do something about it”. It would have 
done catastrophic damage to the European structure and approach to food safety. 
(FVO_2013a) 
 
This reaction shows the pressing need for a harmonised approach to food imports, both 
within the political sphere of negotiations between Member States and in the execution of 
controls by enforcement officials to maintain a level playing field across the EU. Here, the 
FVO plays an important role, auditing BIPs, assessing their level of harmonisation and 
closing down those who do not or cannot enforce official controls in the required manner.  
 5.3.4	The	port	health	inspector	
 
Port health officers in both the UK and Germany indicated that there was indeed a high level 
of harmonisation across both ports and these countries. The exception to this rule was when 
several respondents talked about the presence of a practice known as “BIP shopping”, which 
may point to a degree of variation in how different BIPs carry out their controls. Essentially 
BIP shopping is where BIPs will implicitly compete by stating that they can carry out their 
controls in an expedient manner. This, of course, appeals to importers, because in the 
commercial world of global trade, time is money. Importers would not wish to have 
perishable goods in a container at a port waiting to be inspected or verified. As consignments 
found to infringe EU regulation are either delayed, returned or destroyed at the importer’s 
expense, formal enforcement action is rarely needed. As one inspector with almost a decade 
of experience commented: 
 
While inland, local authorities take direct action against businesses, in the case of 
port health I can’t think of an example. This is because no prosecution is needed, the 
reason being that consignments remain in detention – all the time a container is sat in 
port, it costs the importer money. (Felixstowe_2013) 
 
So, it could be argued that the enforcement landscape compared to hygiene inspections of 
local businesses is considerably less complex, with the outcome of enforcement either being 
to let goods through, or not. Due to this dichotomy of regulatory action, one respondent from 
the International Meat Trade Association indicated that port health/veterinary inspectors act 
more like the police: 
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But they do see themselves almost as policemen, rather than, I would say, with the 
attitude of certain local authorities. (IMTA_2014a) 
 
Therefore, the need to strictly enforce a set of regulations that require the utmost 
harmonisation across BIPs in all 28 Member States brings with it specific challenges, 
different to those faced by inspectors controlling local food businesses. Central to this is the 
risk-based system that the EU claims underpins its food import regime.  
 5.3.5	Co-regulation	
 
The high-risk nature of imports of POAO means that the EU food import regime has resisted 
co-regulatory drivers, which are becoming an increasingly apparent aspect of local authority 
enforcement practices (see Chapter 6). A respondent from Felixstowe Port Health Authority 
denied that co-regulation has made any inroads at all: 
 
Co-regulation hasn’t had an impact on import – we haven’t seen third party 
certificates as opposed to EU [veterinary certificates]. The UK might want to see this 
but it is constrained by the EU. (Felixstowe_2013) 
 
This view was corroborated by a member of the food imports team at the FSA, who said “we 
have a lack of defence, if we let business regulate” (FSA_2013f). These views are interesting 
because, under the EU’s farm to fork system, it would suggest that the food chain should be 
regulated with the same goals being set for each sub-regime. However, this is where the food 
import regime differs markedly from enforcement practices conducted “inland”. Control 
systems at import are set very rigidly, with a clear delineation between what is acceptable and 




The rigidity of the system, and increasing requirements from the EU for the inspection of 
certain high-risk products, has been met with some frustration from port inspectors. For 
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example, a respondent at Heathrow airport stated that the focus on a few products on the 
669/2009 list meant there was less flexibility to look at products not on the list: 
 
There is occasional frustration, for example the high-risk list [in 669/2009] … it’s 
very specific, for example focusing on curry leaves and okra. It could be a wider 
system. (Heathrow_2013a) 
 
The increased requirements through the implementation of TRACES, on the POAO side, and 
the high-risk checklist for FNAO, has led to changes to the practices of port health offices 
tasked with inspecting consignments.  
 
We have to report back [to the EU] a certain number of high-risk checks. This is going to get 
in the way of us hitting our statutory targets… there is very little flexibility for looking at 
containers, where local experience may think they might be high-risk. (Heathrow_2013b) 
 
This would suggest a frustration with hitting more statutory targets, and having to disregard 
what could be subjective insights in relation to enforcing the regime. As another port health 
authority officer commented, “The danger with all these checks is that you switch off your 
intuition” (Tilbury_2013) – further direction from the EU will lessen the ability for inspectors 
to act on their own opinions and experience. However, a member of the FSA imports team 
did not define this simply as a case of high-risk requirements clashing with inspector intuition 
and resources, but these new systems better directing the inspector where to look. Having an 
information-based system like TRACES helps substantially with targeting. Without any such 
direction, the likelihood for high-risk consignments being missed, due to human error or 
information asymmetries, is increased, “Focusing on risk means you can forget the random 
inspection – the back door is closed” (FSA_2013f).  
 
The above quotations indicate that the development of checks for food of animal origin 
follow a historical precedent, which appears to be incompatible with the current drive to 
making enforcement practices in-line with developments of risk-based approaches. While 
there has been a drive across EU Member States to measure compliance of food businesses to 
food hygiene regulations in local authorities, as well as increasingly rely on internal business 






Groups of products Frequency of physical check 
Category I 
1. Fresh meat including offal, and products of the 
bovine, ovine, caprine, porcine and equine species 
defined in Council Directive 92/5/EEC 
2. Fish products in hermetically sealed containers 
intended to render them stable at ambient 
temperatures, fresh and frozen fish and dry and/or 
salted fishery products 
3. Whole eggs 
4. Lard and rendered fats  
5. Animal casings  




1. Poultry meat and poultry meat products  
2. Rabbit meat, game meat (wild/farmed) and 
products thereof 3. Milk and milk products for 
human consumption 
4. Egg products 
5. Processed animal protein for human consumption  
6. Other fishery products than those mentioned under 
Category I, 2, and bivalve molluscs  




1. Semen  
2. Embryos  
3. Manure  
4. Milk and milk products (not for human 
consumption) 
5. Gelatin  
6. Frog legs and snails 
7. Bones and bone products 
8. Hides and skins 
9. Bristles, wool, hair, feathers  
10. Horns, horn products, hooves and hoof products  
11. Apiculture products 
12. Hunting trophies 
Minimum of 1% 
Maximum of 10% 
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13. Processed petfood  
14. Raw material for the manufacture of petfood  
15. Raw material, blood, blood products, glands and 
organs for pharmaceutical use  
16. Blood products for technical use  
17. Pathogens 
18. Hay and straw  
 5.4	Conclusion	
 
Discussion with EU institutions reveals that there is a degree of difficulty in effectively 
setting acceptable levels of risk across its 28 Member States. However, the EU’s own GFL 
shows tensions with a risk-based approach, as by stating that all unsafe food shall not be 
placed on the market, it regulates against the hazard (the direct harm caused by the food 
product) rather than through calculating, and setting a tolerable level of risk.  
 
This tendency towards hazard rather than risk is clearly indicated in the food imports regime, 
where all POAO is labelled high-risk. This is despite the fact that current risk analysis tools 
have not been utilised to underpin POAO’s determination as high-risk. This suggests that the 
risk terminology is used for effect, and is as a result of path dependencies from historical 
practices, and the power of the veterinary interest group, ensuring that POAO is regulated to 
a high level. Even though systems such as TRACES bring risk management approaches to 







As the previous two chapters have shown, ideas of risk are at the heart of EU policymaking, 
but for a range of reasons, risk-based policymaking has been difficult to fully implement, not 
least in the case of food imports. However, ensuring the tight harmonisation of food controls 
across BIPs is not the full extent of the European Commission’s involvement in the 
promotion of risk-based enforcement practices. Regulation 882/2004 on official controls 
stipulates that all controls of food businesses should be proportional to risk. The significance 
here is that food safety is a rare example of where the Commission is involved in regulation 
that has traditionally been the purview of the Member State, namely the control of food 
businesses in local authorities. The reasoning for such close oversight stems from the number 
of high profile food safety incidents that occurred around the turn of the 21st century, 
specifically the BSE crisis. The commission, in explaining its new approach to food safety 
regulation, following the publication of the GFL, explicitly referenced the role that such 
damaging incidents played (EC 2004): 
 
Work to improve food safety is going on all the time, but there has in addition been a 
major overhaul in the last couple of years. This was a response to headline-hitting 
food safety scares in the 1990s about such things as “mad cow” disease, dioxin-
contaminated feed and adulterated olive oil. The purpose was not just to make sure 
that EU food safety laws were as up-to-date as possible, but also that consumers have 
as much information as possible about potential risks and what is being done to 
minimise them.  
  
The introduction of a “farm to fork” policy was central to this overhaul. The policy is based 
upon the presence of hazards right along the food chain, from production through to 
processing, transport, wholesale and retail, and the need to reduce and mitigate any ensuing 
risks. To achieve this, the Commission needs to have oversight of the safety of food right up 
until the point of sale, meaning the oversight of businesses within Member States. As 
discussed previously, historical developments with regard to food imports had put pressures 
on Member States to ensure the equivalent level of protection (see Chapters 4 and 5), and this 
had led to a high degree of harmonisation across BIPs before the GFL had been published. 
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However, 882/2004 ensured the need for risk-based enforcement occurred across both BIPs 
and the inspection of local food businesses.  
 
We therefore have an EU food safety system that works across national boundaries, whether 
through the steady harmonising forces of ensuring trade objectives, and most notably a single 
market, or the much quicker upheaval at the turn of the 21st century caused by food safety 
incidents. The trend in the 21st century of having directly applicable EU regulations (such as 
the GFL, 882/2004 and the hygiene package), increases the pressure on Member States to 
ensure that they are aligned with the EU food safety regime. But how does this play out?  
 
As noted in Chapter 5, it has been difficult for the European Commission to implement risk-
based approaches at point of import, and this is indicative of wider discussions across the 
Member States as to what constitutes acceptable levels of risk and approaches to 
guaranteeing safe food. So, on an individual Member State level, do the UK and Germany 
provide a fertile ground for the application of risk-based approaches to the enforcement of 
food safety? This chapter will explore this question by investigating the extent to which the 
enforcement of local food businesses is and can be risk-based, in the UK and Germany. The 
next section will look at the UK’s food safety regime. 
 6.2	Local	food	enforcement	in	the	UK	
	
As has been discussed earlier in this thesis, the UK food safety regime has embraced risk-
based approaches. The FSA has for some time explicitly indicated the desire to implement 
risk-based approaches to food safety regulation, stating in 2006, “We aim always to be risk-
based and proportionate… and aim to reduce risk to the level that would be acceptable to the 
ordinary consumer” (FSA, 2006).  Such an approach to regulation, founded upon risk, has 
been transmitted to local authorities through guidance provided by the FSA (2012). However, 
risk-based enforcement has been apparent since the 1980s when local authorities 
operationalised priority-planning systems to direct inspection frequencies (Demeritt et al. 
2015). In recent years, there has been increasing pressure to improve consistency of 
enforcement practices across local authorities (Fairman and Yapp, 2015). Increasingly 
constrained resources have further increased the pressure to make sure interventions are 
targeted upon risk. However, there are constraints to the establishment of a consistent, risk-
based system of enforcement in the UK. The following sub-sections highlight certain aspects 
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The UK’s food safety framework is highly centralised by the presence of two national 
competent authorities, the FSA and Defra. In the case of inspection of Food Business 
Operators (FBOs) by EHOs, it is predominantly the FSA that is the coordinating authority 
here. As discussed in Chapter 4, the FSA deals with the interpretation and implementation of 
European regulations and directives, produces the Food Law Guide of Practice for local 
authorities, conducts audits of local authority performance, and has the power to step in if it 
feels that a local authority is underperforming. Local authorities set best practice through 
interaction with the FSA but also through meeting with neighbouring local authorities in 
regional groups. However, the UK differs from a federalist system as local authorities aren’t 
EU mandated competent authorities, unlike in Germany where the 16 Länder are termed as 
such. Therefore, the FSA maintains hierarchical oversight.  
 
When asked to what extent local authorities felt they had flexibility in choosing and 
implementing their own enforcement strategies for food safety, there appeared to be a rather 
mixed response. Central to this was the role that the FSA’s own guidelines had on 
enforcement practices. The Food Law Code of Practice, a constantly updated document that 
sets out food safety regulations and good practices for enforcement officers, is utilised to 
differing extents by different local authorities. Some argue that the Code of Practice is the 
direct manifestation of Food Law and should be implemented in its entirety: 
 
The Food Law Code of Practice is law; I cannot understand how anybody could think 
differently – it’s in the title! (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
Other EHOs argue that it is a set of guidelines, not rules, and as long as local authorities don’t 
contravene the Food Law underpinning this document, then they are at liberty to take a step 
back from the guidelines as set out by the FSA: 
 
The code of practice is a guidance document, designed to make our lives easier. It is 
not the exact application of food law; it is only based upon it. So as long as we don’t 
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contravene the food law at all, there’s plenty of scope to improve upon the Code of 
Practice. (Brighton & Hove_2014) 
 
Finally, other EHOs see the Code of Practice as a suitable and necessary foundation that 
should be added to with original methods of enforcement practice: 
 
The Code of Practice is there for a reason. We’re not supposed to tear the rulebook 
up but that doesn't mean that we can’t contribute to it, and help improve it. (Rother 
and Wealden_2014) 
 
Despite this variance in how the Code of Practice should be interpreted, the EHOs 
interviewed largely agreed that it fundamentally provides a harmonising basis for their 
actions. The level of detail that it provides (along with supporting documents), appears to be 
more a reflection of historic EHO practices, rather than a set of guidelines that were 
superimposed on existing EHO norms and values.  
 
However, there have been examples of greater local autonomy. One such example is the 
“Systems Thinking” approach that has been implemented by Great Yarmouth local authority. 
Until recently, Great Yarmouth local authority was failing to keep up with the quota of 
inspections that were required as calculated by Annex 5 of the Code of Practice. In 2010, out 
of the 1,432 food businesses registered, 450 inspections were overdue. The problem was 
further exacerbated by seasonal increases in people visiting the borough (Great Yarmouth is 
located on the Norfolk coast, which is popular with holidaymakers), leading to more reactive 
work. The Systems Thinking approach was predicated by a comprehensive examination of 
the LA’s enforcement practice. The main outcome was a reduction in the burdens associated 
with inspecting an FBO, such as reducing the number of letters sent to businesses, reducing 
computer use, and individual EHOs taking responsibility for the entire process of enforcing 
an FBO rather than handing the file along to a colleague. However, a more fundamental 
change to the LA’s practices that came out of this root and branch review related to how 
EHOs assessed and scored the FBOs.  
 
Great Yarmouth decided to score the “Confidence in Management” section entirely 
differently from the recommended method set out in the Food Law Code of Practice. As the 
local authority took the view that the Food Law Code of Practice wasn't law, therefore they 
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weren’t breaking the law, they could adapt the scoring system to help improve compliance 
and deal with the overdue inspections. The argument here was that food safety inspections 
were far too procedural and didn’t address the underlying issue of why an FBO couldn't 
improve its compliance: 
 
If you’re just going around ticking boxes, saying “this FBO has an up-to-date 
HACCP, so we have confidence in the management, or they don’t have a HACCP, so 
we have no confidence”, you don’t actually focus anymore on the actual risks – there 
are plenty of FBOs with terrible HACCP documentation, but great hygiene controls, 
and vice versa. (Great Yarmouth_2014)  
 
FBOs can be heavily penalised if they don’t show the appropriate record keeping and 
procedural responses to potential food safety risks within their establishments. For example, a 
business that doesn’t have an up-to-date HACCP plan or SFBB (Safer Food, Better Business 
– see 6.2.2 for a description) plan might be given the second lowest score on the FHRS (1 – 
“Major Improvement Necessary”), regardless of whether the establishment has scored highly 
in other categories. The criticism is that the record keeping is just a function of an “audit 
society” approach that fails to instruct FBOs on why they need to be aware of potential food 
safety risks and their underlying causes. Great Yarmouth’s belief is that by lessening the 
impact that record-keeping scoring has on inspection frequencies, and instead spending 
intense periods of time with FBOs with low compliance in food hygiene practices, the 
potential food risks can be suitably communicated and the FBO can act accordingly. The 
envisaged outcome is that the same low scoring establishments don’t continue to score so 
low:  
 
We spend a significant amount of time with low performing FBOs, focusing on the 
risks and educating them, rather than just asking them to fill out forms and leaving. 
This way, it sticks, rather than constantly coming back to the same issues, time and 
time again. (Great Yarmouth_2014) 
 
The respondent argued that FBOs are provided with more education rather than asked to take 
part in a tick-boxing programme that fails to explain its purpose. Great Yarmouth’s differing 
approach to food safety enforcement has led to much debate within the environmental health 
community. As one respondent made clear: 
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I think we’re seen as renegades by some other local authorities, needlessly messing 
with the perceived wisdom, and sailing too close to the wind when it comes to Food 
Law. (Great Yarmouth_2014) 
 
It does serve to show that local authorities can exhibit greater autonomy, although it is 
necessary to point out that this is sanctioned autonomy, as in the case of Great Yarmouth, 
whereby the FSA has had to give its blessing to any novel approach. Additionally, the 
comments from this respondent appear to indicate that Great Yarmouth is the exception to the 
rule that local authorities have relatively harmonised and entrenched enforcement practices.  
 
It can be argued that novel approaches to local food safety enforcement have been further 
required due to the current economic climate. Instances of local authorities failing to meet 
their statutory requirement of inspections are becoming increasingly prevalent. In 2013, 
Torbay council warned that it was not able to carry out 100 percent interventions in Annex 5 
category C establishments (currently defined as requiring an inspection every 18 months), as 
is mandated (Williams 2013a). Other councils include Brent Council and Worcester 
Council, which only inspected 45% and 47% of category C FBOs in 2011/2012 respectively 
(Williams 2013b). Cuts to their funding have meant that local authorities have increasingly 
been unable to meet statutory requirements for inspection as set out by the FSA.  
 6.2.2	Implementation	of	HACCP	
 
As confidence in management is based on food businesses taking responsibility for providing 
safe food, do enforcement practitioners feel that businesses can deliver on this requirement? 
The responsibility that FBOs have for providing safe food is clearly enshrined within the EU 
General Food Law, 178/2002. However, within local authority governance, this responsibility 
can prove difficult. As stated previously in this chapter, there can be a clear difference 
between large businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The potential 
issues for SMEs, such as lack of resources, lack of expertise and language barriers, can 
manifest themselves not only in low Annex 5 and FHRS scores, but also bring into question 
whether certain food businesses have the capacity to take full responsibility for providing 
safe food. The implementation of HACCP procedures is key to businesses being able to show 
they can control food safety risks. HACCP has been designed to be utilised along the entire 
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food chain from farm to fork. Essentially, it allows businesses to identify hazards along their 
part of the food chain and take mitigating action. Once a hazard has been identified, 
businesses are required to set tolerable levels for that hazard (Critical Control Points – CCPs), 
so that public health is not impinged. Businesses are also required to monitor CCPs and 
establish action plans for when these tolerable levels are exceeded. The issue here is the food 
industry’s ability to implement what is a complex system of self-control. Other than 
understanding the exact nature of the system, how can businesses get to grips with what a 
CCP is or maintain suitable levels of control? This is especially problematic for SMEs. In 
2012, SMEs accounted for 66.5% of all European jobs, with the accommodation and food 
sector accounting for 1.7 million SMEs. Research by local authorities within the UK has 
found that the average reading age for a food business proprietor is equivalent to that of a 12-
year-old, whilst for a food business worker, the figure stands at equivalent to that of a 9-year-
old. As both EU and national regulators are highly dependent upon the food industry’s 
capacity to implement self-check systems, issues of suitable expertise and understanding will 
leave an integral part of the farm to fork policy vulnerable and open to abuse.  
 
Opinions put forward by local authorities stressed the difficulties faced by many businesses 
when it comes to interpreting and implementing HACCP procedures: 
 
HACCP is intrinsically quite a complicated system that is dependent on the user 
understanding food law and risk. Unfortunately, the vast majority of FBOs 
understand neither. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
The FSA has tried to alleviate this problem by introducing the Safer Food Better Business 
(SFBB) packs. SFBB is a checklist that focuses on cross contamination, cleaning, chilling, 
cooking, and management practices. It is a simplified list of dos and do nots for both the 
management and catering staff of an FBO, as well as a means of self-audit, designed to 
encourage staff to better understand and implement their statutory requirements under Food 
Law. However, EHO respondents felt the effect of SFBB was not sufficient to ensure that all 
food businesses were aware of their responsibilities and the statutory steps that are required in 
order to provide safe food. One respondent stated that while SFBB proved helpful beyond 
HACCP requirements, there was still plenty of room for improvement: 
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I think SFBB does help to an extent. Many businesses don’t have the time or expertise 
to understand and act upon HACCP requirements. It’s an imperfect system though, as 
it’s in many ways a diluted version of HACCP. (Horsham_2014) 
 
Other EHOs found that SFBB didn’t deliver what it set out to do: 
 
Does SFFB educate food businesses about how to deal and manage food safety risks? 
No. It’s purely a tick-boxing exercise that negates the FBO’s responsibility in 
providing safe food. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
The argument already put forward by the respondent from Great Yarmouth is that there 
should be less reliance on self-audit and more time spent explaining the food safety risks 
faced by FBOs. 
 
This issue also brings into light how businesses should be assessed. Although both central 
and local governments in the UK maintain that food safety regulation is risk-based, the 
responsibility of business (which forms a key pillar of UK food safety governance) might 
indicate that the risk basis of food safety regulation may not be as straightforward as first 
assumed. The principle that no unsafe food should appear on the market, as mandated by EU 
regulation 178/2002, is hazard-based. Couple this with the hazard-based implementation of 
HACCP, which is even more evident within SFBB, and an entire pillar of food safety within 
the UK is inevitably based around hazard rather than risk. This reveals an important 
distinction between the process of regulating food safety and the outcomes of food safety 
regulation. While the European Commission, through EU regulation 178/2002, expects the 
application of food law to be risk-based, the hazard-based nature of ensuring that no unsafe 
food is provided on the market, is a clear indicator that the outcome can be anything but 
based on risk.  
 6.2.3	Co-regulatory	dynamics		
 
Controversy over the risk-based nature of the UK’s food safety regime, coupled with issues 
surrounding the capacity and appetite of food businesses to take on and interpret statutory 
responsibility, provides a relevant backdrop for discussion within the UK about co-regulation 
between government and industry. Better regulation pressures have ensured that within 
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central government and the national competent authorities for food safety, there is a desire to 
allow businesses to take a greater role in the oversight of their food safety practices. This 
literal interpretation of businesses’ responsibility as enshrined in 178/2002, has led to greater 
calls for more co-regulation within the food safety regime. Ostensibly, co-regulation reduces 
the burden on regulatory regimes, especially in the food safety domain where there are 
complex global food chains. Instead of maintaining costly control systems, regulators can 
utilise private control and audit systems, which are already in place. Furthermore, regulators 
sometimes lack the expertise required to set up certain control systems in specific areas – the 
industry expertise that underpins their own control systems can help alleviate this problem.  
 
There have been several schemes launched by the FSA, or brought under the FSA’s remit, 
that fall under the term co-regulation. The Red Tractor logo is an example of this: a 
collaboration between the FSA and Assured Food Standards (AFS) that focuses on the 
delivery of official controls for dairy hygiene in primary production. Farms that are enrolled 
on the Red Tractor scheme have their inspection frequency reduced, to avoid duplication of 
effort between the control schemes put in place by the AFS and the statutory requirements 
laid down by the FSA. The FSA has shown an increased appetite for co-regulation and cites 
the Red Tractor logo as an example of how co-regulation can work. However, local authority 
respondents seemed a little more sceptical. First and foremost, we return to the problem of 
distribution of expertise and compliance across FBOs. Whilst large businesses such as Tesco 
and Marks & Spencer will have their own control systems in place, replete with food 
technicians, legal advisors and direct connections to government through lobbyists, set-ups 
like these cannot be expected throughout food businesses, especially at SME level. The fact 
that a large proportion of businesses within the EU are SMEs further exacerbates the issue. 
As one EHO said: 
 
How can SMEs be tasked with further responsibility? Many of them are having 
enough problems keeping up with the status-quo, never mind talking about co-
regulation. (Rother and Wealdon_2014) 
 
How can food businesses accept further responsibility when such a large proportion lack the 
ability or capacity to interpret food law? There are numerous reasons given as to why FBOs 
are compliant to different degrees. Difference in compliance can be caused by varying levels 
of expert knowledge. If the manager and staff within an FBO understand the reasons behind 
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food hygiene requirements, it could make it more straightforward to interpret the legislation, 
keep records and implement the necessary changes. Furthermore, within the UK, it is 
relatively straightforward to be registered as an FBO. There is no requirement for proof of 
any food hygiene expertise and it only requires the relevant local authority to be informed: 
 
[Given] the ease with which it's possible to start a food business within the UK, is it 
surprising that so many people struggle at the outset? In the absence of any 
prerequisite authorisation or licensing systems, you can start a food business 
obscenely easily in the United Kingdom. We were comparing the hurdles that 
someone would have to overcome to become a child minder with the hurdles that 
someone would have to overcome to start a food business. It's like comparing apples 
and pears. In order to be a food business operator, you fill in a form and send it off to 
your local council – you are then a food business operator. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
In fact, there have been many examples of FBOs starting up without even informing their 
primary authority: 
 
It happens countless times where someone sets up an FBO and doesn’t even bother 
informing his/her local authority. (Horsham_2014) 
 
Such low barriers to entry, at least from a food hygiene perspective, help to further explain 
why vendors can enter the food business with such a potentially diverse range of food 
hygiene knowledge that can, in turn, affect compliance. The question of resources also arises 
– one could assume that large multi-national food businesses have the resources to ensure 
compliant workplaces and employ experts to interpret statutory requirements and even 
oversee systems of self-audit. An SME, on the other hand, may lack the resources to ensure 
its workplace is fully compliant, and lack the expert knowledge to raise compliance.  
 
An FBO’s level of public presence and its brand might influence the extent to which it strives 
to be fully compliant, e.g. high-profile businesses will not wish to have a black mark against 
them and face potential reputational losses. Different cultures of food preparation may lead to 
FBOs falling foul of statutory requirements – the UK has seen a surge in cuisine from around 
the world, as well as street food and novel eateries, serving unconventional foods or adopting 
unconventional cooking methods. This increasing diversity in methods of food preparation 
 130 
and selection can lead to clashes with established norms of food hygiene regulation. Finally, 
EHOs have come across language barriers that impact upon an FBO achieving compliance: 
 
It makes it almost impossible when you’re trying to educate businesses when they 
don’t speak English. There are plenty of SMEs that have this problem and it certainly 
is a barrier to informing FBOs about their responsibility and how to prevent food 
hygiene risks. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
The conclusion to draw here is that there are a range of fundamental reasons as to why 
different FBOs will be able to comply with hygiene regulations, and how reputational 
pressures further reflect levels of compliance. What is clear is that EHOs are finding a 
substantial number of businesses that struggle to understand how they can be fully compliant. 
This does put into context the scale of the challenge faced by increased levels of co-
regulation, and how passing the problem from government inspectors to private auditors 
doesn’t, at face value, address the problem. Rather, it simply passes it down the line. 
 6.2.4	Consistency	across	Local	Authority	Enforcement	–	the	case	of	Primary	Authority	
 
As UK food law is approximately 98% harmonised with EU food law, and with the European 
Commission taking a greater role in Member State enforcement of official controls (as laid 
out in 882/2004 and the hygiene package), there has been pressure to ensure harmonisation of 
control mechanisms across UK local authorities under the banner of improving consistency. 
Further pressures come from the perspective of consumers and the food industry. The advent 
of publicly available food hygiene scores through the FHRS (see Chapter 7 for a detailed 
discussion) has served to highlight the fact that different EHOs within different local 
authorities could score establishments quite differently. Regarding consumers, how can 
someone visiting a restaurant in Newcastle ensure that controls have been enacted in the same 
way as in Leeds? If both the Newcastle restaurant and the Leeds restaurant both scored 3 out 
of 5 on the FHRS, have the scores been reached via the same processes? And with the food 
industry, how can one business be sure that it has been evaluated in the same way as another 
business in a neighbouring local authority? The problem further persists when businesses 
have branches across different local authorities, making it more difficult to deliver a 
centralised action plan with different authorities looking out for different things.  
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It can be argued that subjectivity is the basis for making imbalanced decisions across local 
authorities, and even within local authorities themselves. EHOs accept that a significant 
portion of an inspection is subjective, as opposed to objective: 
 
At the end of the day you have to make the call on many aspects of a food safety 
inspection. Sometimes this won’t be based on easily objectifiable data – in that 
instance, you use your experience and instincts. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
An expert judgement must be made to determine the scoring categories for each aspect of an 
inspection. While best practice is discussed with the FSA and regional coordination groups, 
variance can occur, even between EHOs within a local authority: 
 
As our food safety manager, I have to constantly work on making sure that we, as a 
local authority, are working as consistently as possible – that’s a constant endeavour. 
(Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 
The introduction of the Primary Authority Scheme (PAS), aims to alleviate issues of 
consistency in relation to food businesses that have branches across local authorities. The 
businesses can now nominate a local authority (designated the primary authority) to help 
develop and oversee its control mechanisms and auditing procedures. The idea here, is that in 
coming up with a centralised action plan approved by the primary authority, EHO inspectors 
across all the branches must follow what is laid out in the Primary Authority agreement. This 
tends to mean asking local EHO inspectors to enact paired down enforcement activities, as 
the primary authority agreement disregards the need to ascertain confidence in management 
on a local level, when it has been assessed centrally.  
 
From the perspective of the FSA’s Better Regulation Taskforce, this approach is seen as 
beneficial for three reasons. Primarily, it backs their push for greater co-regulation and 
reducing the burdens on business, through working with them to come up with a suitable 
course of action. Secondly, it reduces the burden on local authorities as it stops duplication of 
action across business branches that employ the same set of controls and auditing procedures. 
Thirdly, it also emphasises the risk-based nature of the enforcement approach, as enforcement 
resource can be directed to businesses that are not part of such a centralised scheme.  
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According to respondents from local authorities interviewed for this thesis, the Primary 
Authority Scheme has generated mixed reviews. A significant reservation was the potential 
for regulatory capture. The argument put forward here is that businesses are hardly going to 
nominate local authorities who have been giving low Annex 5 and FHRS scores and taking 
high levels of enforcement action, instead opting for local authorities with which they have a 
close relationship and have received high scores and low enforcement action from. As one 
EHO said: 
 
I suppose that can happen, yes, there are examples of where businesses have chosen 
local authorities they’ve had a long working relationship with. (Rother and 
Wealden_2014) 
 
However, this view has been refuted by other EHOs, who have argued that food businesses 
aren’t put off by local authorities who push a harder line. As many food businesses welcome 
the guidance and education provided by local authorities, they would much prefer to partner 
with authorities who actively try to drive up compliance, rather than accept what is already in 
place. 
 
It can go the other way. Maybe a business doesn’t want a local authority that is a soft 
touch. Many businesses value the input of EHOs and certainly wouldn't want to be 
saddled with a lame duck. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
It might be the case that there is a distinction here between active education and active 
intervention. While a food business may indeed appreciate further time with EHOs, it is hard 
to imagine that businesses are equally as content if they and their local branches constantly 
face enforcement action. 
 
One aspect that all the EHOs interviewed largely agreed on, was that the Primary Authority 
Scheme took away a measure of independence from EHOs inspecting a Primary Authority 
scheme's branch. This issue drew some strong criticism from EHOs, as shown here from one 
respondent: 
 
It really annoys me. I know what’s happening in my local area, how each individual 
FBO complies. Why should a local authority from the other end of the country tell me 
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what I can and can’t suddenly do, just because I happen to be inspecting a Primary 
Authority FBO chain? (Great Yarmouth_2014) 
 
How could a Primary Authority know with any certainty how a branch of a business in 
another part of the country is performing? Yes, branches may have the same control systems 
in place, but these could be interpreted differently branch to branch, or implemented with 
differing levels of effectiveness. One respondent spoke about this: 
 
At the end of the day, every chain is as strong as its weakest link. Could you say with 
absolute certainty that every branch of Tesco is managed in the same way? Of course 
not. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
EHOs build up relationships with their local businesses to the extent that they are intimately 
acquainted with their management practices and cultures, a level of detail that is difficult to 
extract from company-wide auditing or from data obtained by the Primary Authority. If an 
EHO feels that he/she should investigate or act upon a certain aspect of an FBO’s procedures, 
that EHO does not want to be constrained by Primary Authority considerations: 
 
If I know something’s wrong, I’m going to incorporate it into my inspection, even if 
[the] Primary Authority tells me otherwise. (Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 
Finally, the Primary Authority Scheme removes a substantial amount of subjectivity from 
inspections, as part of what would be covered within an inspection is now overseen by the 
auditing capacity of the primary authority. This can lead to greater harmonisation of controls, 
which benefits businesses having to deal with multiple local authorities. But is the removal of 
subjectivity seen as entirely beneficial? Some EHO respondents argued that inspections 
shouldn’t be subjective and based upon a clearly objective list of interventions: 
 
How can we achieve consistency across the UK if everyone is enforcing rules through 
rules of thumb? Objectivity is vital. (Brighton & Hove_2014) 
 
However, other EHOs argue that subjectivity forms an important part of an EHO’s inspection 
and allows for nuanced approaches to both interventions and in building a relationship with 
 134 
business owners that goes beyond the basic tick-boxing exercise associated with scoring an 
inspection. As one EHO stressed: 
 
We are required to bring our experience and expertise to FBOs who need it, 
otherwise everything would be some crazy tick-boxing exercise – it’s never as simple 
or straightforward as that. (Great Yarmouth_2014) 
 
So, whilst reducing subjectivity might improve consistency across local authorities, it may 
also lower the quality of outcome that emerges from an inspection. 
 6.2.5	Regulatory	connections	between	national	competency	and	local	enforcement	in	the	UK	
 
The relationship between the FSA and local authorities is of great importance in delivering 
harmonised food safety regulation within the UK. As the FSA produces the Food Law Code 
of Practice, as well as acting as a coordinating body across all local authorities, it has a 
profound effect on the role played by local authority inspectors. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate whether, through the eyes of its local authority partners, the FSA can be as risk-
based in its governance as it aspires to be: 
 
The FSA does go back and forth when you try to figure out exactly whether it is 
entirely risk-based. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
EHO interviews paint a fascinating picture of how institutional barriers mean that the FSA 
cannot be as risk-based as it wishes to be; indeed, it is local authorities who appear to be 
pushing for more risk-based approaches when it comes to FSA advice and guidance. 
 
One of the main differences between national food safety regulation and local food safety 
regulation in the UK is around varying levels of accountability, and expectations of 
accountability. Following the BSE crisis and the dissolution of MAFF, one of the key 
responsibilities of the newly formed FSA was to restore public trust in the UK’s food safety 
regime. This responsibility was clearly evidenced by the stock the FSA put into consumer 
reports, its own consumer confidence indicators, and the increasing importance of risk 
communication and stakeholder participation. Having asked local authorities whether they 
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needed to restore confidence in local food safety regimes, the answer was a clear “no”. As 
one EHO summarised: 
 
No – following on from the BSE crisis, we didn’t have members of our community 
come up to us and make demands or say we’d lost their trust. For us, things continued 
on as normal, which I guess was a far cry from what was happening at MAFF at the 
time. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
The centralised nature of the UK’s food safety regime means that national competent 
authorities take increased responsibility for national food safety incidents. This heightened 
level of accountability that is exhibited within the FSA, but not (at least to the same degree) 
in local authorities can have a profound impact on the regulatory regime that the FSA is 
required to underpin. It can be argued that the FSA is exposed to public accountability much 
more often than its local authority partners. As an FSA employee dealing with local liaison 
noted: 
 
We’ve become a 24/7 agency. The news now runs 24 hours a day, so do we. We have 
to be prepared to deal with incidents the very second that they occur. (FSA_2013g) 
 
Issues surrounding media amplification of risk and pressure to implement tombstoning 
regulation, as described in Chapter 2, can lead to the FSA being far removed from a risk-
based footing. One such example, according to local authority staff interviewed, of the FSA 
undermining the risk-based approach it purports to, is of the initial E. coli guidance that was 
introduced in the wake of the death of 5-year-old Mason Jones in 2005 due to the O157 strain 
of the virus. This food safety incident was the second biggest UK outbreak of E. coli, with 44 
schools affected and 150 people (mainly children) falling ill. All the schools affected were 
supplied by butcher William Tudor, and during the 2010 inquest into Mason’s death, the 
coroner concluded,  
 
I have agonised over a verdict of unlawful killing but despite substantial, some might 
say horrific, breaches of food hygiene regulations the evidence is not strong enough… 
There is little doubt Mason was owed a duty of care and a catalogue of failures to 
observe basic food hygiene breached that duty. Mason's death was a result of an E. 
coli infection due to the consumption of cooked meat which had become contaminated 
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during the course of preparation due to a lack of, or disregard of, good food hygiene 
practices. (BBC 2015) 
 
Tudor was prosecuted in 2007 for breaking food safety laws and sentenced to one year in jail. 
The FSA, Meat Hygiene Service and local authority (Bridgend County Local Authority) were 
criticised in the publication of the Pennington Report following the outbreak. The report 
found that the local authority was deficient in assessing Tudor’s management of food safety, 
and had insufficiently analysed his HACCP plan, as well as failing to assess whether the 
procedures and plans under his HACCP plan were being put into place. The FSA was 
criticised for conducting an audit only 18 months prior to the outbreak (as well as taking a 
year to send the audit report to Bridgend), and finding nothing wrong with the local 
authority’s inspection and enforcement regime (Pennington 2009). The FSA, in its response 
to the Pennington Report, as well as strengthening the audit skills of inspectors and stressing 
the importance of HACCP and SFBB, stated: 
 
[The] revision of the Food Law Code of Practice, which sets out a framework for 
enforcement interventions/approaches… re-emphasises the need for a risk-based, 
proportionate approach to inspection. (FSA 2009) 
 
The need for “re-emphasis” on a risk-based, proportionate approach is particularly 
interesting, considering the FSA’s E. coli guidance that was subsequently released. One of 
the clear breaches of good food hygiene practices enacted at Tudor’s butcher was the use of 
the same machines for cooked and uncooked meats without proper cleaning in between. This 
was picked up in the Pennington report, as well as by the press (BBC 2010). The outcome 
here was that in the FSA’s ensuing E. coli guidance, complex food preparation machinery, 
such as vacuum packaging machines, could not be used for both raw meat and ready-to-eat 
food. This was deeply problematic for two reasons: the first was that many relevant 
establishments, especially SMEs, could not afford to have one version of an expensive 
machine for raw meat and another for ready-to-eat food – FBOs simply cleaned their units in 
between. Secondly, the FSA failed to provide any substantive science-base to justify this 




Where was the scientific basis to the FSA’s decisions? They certainly didn’t provide 
us with the details. To be honest, the guidance was quite mad and got quite a few 
EHOs angry. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
It was as if the FSA had never experienced what enforcement – and the goal of 
enforcement – was all about. The guidance lost track of reality and there was not a 
chance most of it could be realistically implemented. (Great Yarmouth_2014) 
 
Therefore, the FSA produced a reactionary piece of guidance without necessarily considering 
the full costs involved or providing suitable public health reasons as to why such guidance 
was necessary. This left many to assume it was introduced purely due to reputational reasons, 
with the FSA trying to ensure the public’s confidence in food safety was not too adversely 
affected. This, one could argue, is not the “risk-based, proportionate approach” that the FSA 
was advocating so soon after the incident.  
 
As well as the institutional risks to the FSA created by media amplification, the desire to be 
entirely risk-based and based upon the best available science can also drive the agency to 
inaction. Such an example is the recent advice, or lack thereof, to local authorities on the 
intervention required for FBOs that serve mince-meat cooked to a medium-rare or rare 
standard. As an EHO explains: 
 
We’re increasingly getting more of these up-market burger joints popping up that 
want to serve burgers rare/medium-rare, despite the risk of E. coli [due to the use of 
minced meat not being cooked all the way through]. We’re waiting on guidance from 
the FSA but they’re nowhere to be seen. (Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 
Despite this practice being widespread, at the time of interview, local authorities were still 
waiting on FSA guidance. However, the FSA refused to provide such guidance until it had 
collected substantial data on the problem, leaving local authorities somewhat in the lurch as 
they did not know how to progress. This has led to EHOs accusing the FSA of being 
contradictory in its approach to its risk-based doctrine: 
 
With the FSA, it comes out with the E. coli guidance, which is anything but based on 
risk. And then we’re left waiting on the guidance on rare cooked burgers, whilst the 
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FSA conducts its assessment, despite there being clear and present danger now. The 
FSA seems to flit from being overtly hazard-based at one moment, to overtly risk-
based on the other. (Horsham_2014) 
 
In defence of the FSA, it does have a very demanding remit. Ensuring the safety of food sold 
and consumed within the UK, and restoring and maintaining public confidence in the UK’s 
food safety regime are often seen as two mutually exclusive commitments. This is especially 
the case when the agency wants to implement a scientifically evidenced risk-based strategy in 
the face of a domain that is constantly exposed to media amplification and consumer fears. 
EHOs interviewed did state that the FSA is getting better at liaising with local authorities, 
seconding EHOs into the agency and ridding itself of the ivory tower label that some ascribed 
to it during the first few years of its existence. One EHO felt that communication and 
cohesive action was improving: 
 
There’s no doubt that the communication lines are getting better. The FSA is starting 
to listen more to the needs of local authorities. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
There is still some concern exhibited that the FSA is a civil service dominated institution that 
needs staff with the necessary environmental health expertise to ensure that any guidance 
issued is given with local enforcement context in mind. As one local authority respondent 
stated, although the FSA has the power to step in and take over from an underperforming 
local authority, it most likely wouldn't: 
 
I don’t think the FSA would be able to step in – it lacks the expertise. While there are 
EHOs seconded to the organisation, the majority are still civil servants, who wouldn't 
have the first idea about local authority inspection. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
Finally, the FSA’s audit system, so heavily criticised in the Pennington report, still appears to 
receive mixed reviews. Whilst some local authorities speak of the benefits of FSA guidance 
following an audit, there appear to be missed opportunities as lessons learnt, or best practice 
stemming from these audits, are not effectively shared with other authorities: 
 
FSA audits are useful, they help identify key issues within a local authority’s capacity, 
and the FSA will then act appropriately… I suppose though, we don’t get to see the 
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audits of neighbouring authorities. I guess it would be useful with regard to setting 
best practice. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 6.2.6	Problems	of	sampling	
 
One key element of a risk-based regulatory regime is the data that informs risk assessments 
within the information gathering stage. All local authority interventions and emergency 
callouts are logged and, where appropriate, fed into the Rapid Alert System for Feed and 
Food (RASFF). Therefore, depending on the severity, local, national and European 
authorities can be made aware of any food safety emergency, and can ensure that relevant 
authorities are made immediately aware. However, on a day to day basis, an important means 
to providing risk assessors and policymakers with information, is sketchy at best. The 
sampling regime for many local authorities interviewed is far from robust. In part, due to the 
resource constraints placed upon EHOs, it would appear that enforcement actions are heavily 
prioritised over sampling procedures. There was a large degree of apathy when discussion 
turned to requests made for sampling from analysts: 
 
We sometimes get some unusual requests – you end up going to a Tesco Extra [a 
large supermarket] to find the food the sample needs to be taken from. 
(Horsham_2013) 
 
If samples are taken from large FBOs, which likely have more intricate internal audit and 
food quality systems than small businesses that may have lower levels of expertise, are such 
samples suitably indicative of microbiological or chemical risks throughout the local 
authority? The regime here is not presented as suitably connected and begs the question that 
if local authorities fail to see the importance in the sampling requirements, a key facet of the 
regulatory regime is found wanting. 	6.2.7	Constrained	resources	
 
Finally, one further area of note with regard to the risk-based regimes of local authorities, is 
the extent to which enforcement activities may be scaled back in the future. A combination of 
constrained resources, better regulation initiatives and co-regulation has indicated that, while 
central government intervention in food safety is being rolled back, it occurs, and will 
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continue to occur, at local government level too. Although EHOs accept that this trend will 
continue, of the EHOs interviewed, the argument is that it can only go so far. For comparison, 
routine inspection within the domain of health and safety has been rolled back, with more 
responsibility placed on businesses to inspect and maintain their health and safety controls. 
Such a scenario cannot occur as seamlessly within food safety as the reliance on expert 
knowledge is much greater and the reasons for maintaining many food safety controls are not 
clearly apparent to many FBOs. As one EHO made clear: 
 
In health and safety, it’s much clearer and straightforward. It’s fairly obvious that 
when you’re on a building site, you wear a hard hat. Whereas with food safety, it’s 
much harder – for many of the risks faced by FBOs and the public, you’d need a 
microbiology degree to truly understand and appreciate what’s going on. (Great 
Yarmouth_2014) 
 
This highlights the fact that food safety inspections are not only for checking that statutory 
controls are in place, but in many cases, providing the education so that FBOs are aware of 
these controls and know how to abide by them. Indeed, several EHOs stressed how many 
FBOs, especially those with limited resources and expert knowledge, welcomed EHO 
interventions, as they helped plug significant knowledge gaps: 
 
In the main, we’re welcomed with open arms. FBOs take the opportunity to learn 
from our expertise and the majority of them wish to be respectable companies that are 
compliant with our food law, so many of them welcome interaction with us. 
(Huntingdonshire_2014)  
 
In conclusion, it is very hard to see the development of interventions within food safety 
progressing in the same manner as within the health and safety domain. 
 6.3	Local	food	enforcement	in	Germany	
 
Continuing the theme from the UK section, Germany has also seen attempts at trying to 
increase consistent use of risk-based enforcement practices across its 16 Länder. In response 
to the need for risk-based controls in 882/2004, the federal German food safety regime has 
implemented these requirements in administrative proceedings. Central here is the 
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requirement for the inspection frequencies of food businesses to be risk-based, as laid out in 
the General administrative instructions on the principles governing the performance of 
official controls on the observance of food, feed, tobacco and animal legislation (AVV-Rüb). 
However, because the Länder are competent for enforcement of food safety, despite the 
presence of general administrative guidance, there can be a great deal of variance of 
enforcement practices across Germany. This section will present some of the key outputs of 
the research that indicate how consistency across Germany is difficult to attain, and how 
regional risk appetites make it difficult to realise a single German enforcement risk regime 
fully harmonised under the broader EU food safety regime. 
 6.3.1	The	evolution	of	inspection	practices	within	Germany	
 
In Germany, the evolution of food inspectors presents an insight into how risks identified at 
food businesses have been managed by local authorities. As has been discussed, Germany has 
seen a great deal of variation in who has been tasked to carry out inspections of food 
businesses, far more so than in the UK. While the veterinary and food chemist professions 
have come to play a leading role in local food safety enforcement, the role of the police has 
ebbed away, being replaced by specialist food inspectors who invariably have a background 
in the food industry. According to respondents, this development has had a significant impact 
on how inspections are carried out. 
 
The last Land to dispense with police officers as front-line inspectors was Baden-
Württemberg in 2006. As this was relatively recent, it offered an excellent opportunity to 
investigate whether enforcement practices had changed since Baden-Württemberg had fallen 
into line with other Länder by employing specialist food inspectors. While these police 
officers were given further training in food law and practices, and were part of a specialist 
section (Wirtschaftskontrolldienst – WKD), respondents in Baden-Württemberg could 
articulate differences in the approach to enforcement between the WKD and the specialist 
food inspectors that are now being employed. In particular, there appears to have been a shift 




[Police inspectors] would say, “if you don’t do this, you will get a fine or you will be 
arrested”. Now there is a different approach, “yes, I know [where you’re coming 
from], I’ve had experience, maybe you should do it differently”. (BW_2013) 
 
Another respondent tempered the statement somewhat by saying there was variation across 
police inspectors: 
 
Yes, there [were] some [police inspectors] who acted like you see in the Hollywood 
films, “put your hands up, you’re under arrest!”, who saw non-compliant managers 
as criminals… But the level of knowledge is different. Police inspectors go into a 
business and say, “you clean the walls up to this level” but wouldn’t explain why, 
now it is different… When it comes to bad tricks, for example adding weight or 
additives to food, new inspectors who have a background in the trade will spot this, 
more than the police before. (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
The respondent working for the Baden-Württemberg government stated that now, unless an 
FBO was doing something obviously wrong, the food inspector would likely only suggest 
changes, rather than explicitly saying what is right and wrong. Enforcement therefore appears 
to be more principle-based than prescriptive, which would reflect the situation in the UK. 
However, in contrast to the approach taken by UK EHOs, that is not to say that inspectors are 
an on-tap source of information for food businesses trying to understand the law, especially 
with SMEs as the following example makes clear: 
 
SMEs have a problem that owners have no idea about food laws or hygiene… they 
ask us “can you explain to me how to do it?”, that’s none of our business, there are 
private enterprises that train them. We can only say to them to go to the IHK 
[Chamber of Industry and Commerce] and we try to give the business some basic 
information. (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
The reluctance of the food inspector to engage in providing education for FBOs can perhaps 
be explained by two points. First, there may be a hangover from the command and control 
approach conducted by police forces. There, the priority was to identify and enforce clear 
violations of the relevant law. Providing education would have been somewhat challenging as 
police inspectors would not necessarily have had a background in the food trade. Modern 
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food hygiene inspection, despite having increased expertise, may have continued the tradition 
of focusing on violations. Second, the corporatist nature of German policy-making and 
administration means that the predominant source of information for food businesses lies 
with the trade bodies that represent them, especially the IHK. This points to a clear 
delineation between those inspecting and those inspected, despite the food trade background 
many German food hygiene inspectors have today. It further reinforces the separation of 
functions that underpin the German corporatist tradition, as opposed to in the UK where 
different regulatory functions are found within the generalist nature of EHOs. 
 
One would assume that the combination of the EU’s General Food Law stance that all food 
placed on the market must be safe, coupled with the German approach to precaution 
(vorsorge), would ensure that food inspectors would seek to regulate any activity deemed 
unsafe. However, there appears to be much greater freedom regarding the risks that food 
inspectors deem to be acceptable or unacceptable: 
 
According to German law, everybody who gets sick from eating my food… I have hurt 
these people, just like if I have run them over with my car. But if the operator can 
prove that he has reduced the level of risk the best he can, as long as people order the 
food, they [the consumers] decide they want it. But still, if the people who get ill and 
spend several weeks in hospital, the food operator has to pay the hospital costs and 
cover lost income during that time. And he might get fined by the [local] attorney. 
(Stuttgart_2014) 
 
While the above comment shows strict liability for the food operator under German civil law, 
it also shows that food inspectors may permit certain actions so long as the operator can show 
he/she has done whatever necessary to reduce the level of risk. This is consistent with the “As 
Low as Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) mantra that is prevalent in policy domains such as 
health and safety, but may be inconsistent with the notion of vorsorge. Continuing with a 
process or product that could lead to having to cover a customer’s loss of earnings through 
illness and potential fine, may act as a deterrent to food operators. But this approach 
explicitly accepts a level of risk that a precautionary stance may not tolerate. The practice of 
ALARP on a local enforcement level appears to be in contrast to standard setting at a national 
level, where, as Chapter 6 makes clear, federal regulators find it difficult to adopt an 




The allusion to “rigorous” audit mechanisms is indicative of the case that all 16 Länder have 
different auditing procedures in place, that can inevitably capture different types of data 
through differing methodologies, rendering the possibility for comparison and analysis across 
the federation problematic. The question here, is how can Germany harmonise European 
regulations and directives across its constituent states, when the information gathering aspect 
of its regulatory regime is so fragmented? This problem is indicative of why it takes Germany 
so long to implement changes from the European Commission, compared to non-federalised 
states. Not only does federalisation mean that messages have to be transmitted and 
successfully interpreted across 16 different competencies for food safety enforcement, but 
standardising the results of oversight across the federal Länder requires a great deal of time. 
As one respondent in BMEL commented, 
 
[With regard to] implementing EU regulations, there always seems to be one third of 
the country lagging behind. When a decision is being made at the Commission, as a 
country, we cannot give a definitive answer, we have to go back and check with all the 
Länder. This is a very slow process. 
 
This point of view has also been reflected in the European Commission itself: 
 
There is a big difference between federalised Member States, like Germany, and more 
centralised ones. You have to be much more patient. (DG SANTE_2013a) 
 
The EU’s own auditor for food safety matters, the FVO (see Chapter 4), faces similar 
problems to the German federal court of auditors. It would be unrealistic to suggest the FVO 
must inspect every Land. However, because each Land is competent for the enforcement of 
food safety controls, as opposed to the UK where a centralised agency still holds such 
competency, and therefore liability, the capability for a Land to differ from those Länder that 
have been audited can be greater, according to a Länder authority respondent 
(Saxony_2013b): 
 
Yes, I think there will be inevitably more variance across the federal states. 
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Germany’s position as a federal state acting within the federal system of the European Union 
not only has implications for how the German federal level implements European law, but 
also for enforcement of regulations and directives at a local level. Several respondents across 
different Länder talked about the difficulties here, for example: 
 
There is a big difference [in enforcement practices between now and before the EU 
hygiene package of regulations], as the law is so much harder to read. 852, 853, 854 
have complicated things, as well as the gaps that need to be filled by national 
regulation. (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
The introduction of direct European regulations through the hygiene package (which has been 
discussed in Chapter 4), has added a further level of complexity to the distribution of 
competencies between federal, Länder and local levels. The highly juridified nature of 
German food safety regulation means that any enforcement actions taken on a local level 
must sit with the letter of the law as implemented on both a national and state level. 
Therefore, implementing EU regulations can lead to periodic difficulties for enforcement 
actions. Referring to the hygiene packages, the same respondent described such a situation: 
 
There was this legal gap between 2006 and 2008, as there was no German regulation 
that showed how to find non-compliant food business under EU law. We can only go 
[to a business] and say “you have to improve” and that was it, we couldn’t [impose] 
fines on many things. (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
This was clearly an unwanted state of affairs and highlights the difficulty that Germany as a 
whole has in implementing regulations across its 16 states. A respondent working for the 
Bavarian Land emphasised the difficulty of implementation, but stated that it was not just 
down to the interpretation of law but also the active role that the Länder play: 
 
It might be that Germany is slow in implementing the law, because all the Länder 
want to be involved in the discussion. (Bavaria_2013a) 
 
Länder are not only involved in federal policymaking through the Bundesrat and less 
formally through coordination committees, they can also send delegations to the European 
Commission. This means that Germany does not just experience political fragmentation on a 
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national level, but also on a supranational level as well – further highlighting the important 
role that Länder play in standard setting, and underlying the caution with which supranational 
law is converted into national and local law. 
 
This is not to say that fragmentation within Germany should be interpreted as Länder 
stubbornly working entirely for self-interest, and stifling the passage of European and 
German law. In the case of food safety, there have been clear attempts to increase dialogue 
across the Länder. As previously discussed within this chapter, one of the core competencies 
of the BVL is to facilitate discussion and best practice across the Länder. Also, following on 
from German reforms at the start of the century, specialist food safety committees known as 
LAV have been set up. These involve relevant civil servants from each Länder, as well as 
representatives from the federal government, and meet on a regular basis and during times of 
emergency. This more robust form of organisation has increased levels of consistency, as was 
made clear by a European Commission respondent (JR): 
 
Germany is now much better at setting best practice across its states. The 
introduction of Länder committees [the LAV] has really helped in this. (DG 
SANTE_2013a) 
 
Such consistency has seen the Länder uniformly adopt the same risk assessment system for 
scoring food businesses, as well as working towards a means of comparing Länder systems 
and implementing change across the Länder following recommendations received from an 
FVO audit. 
 
However, there are substantive differences between the Länder, and according to a 
respondent from BMEL, these differences explain the reticence of Länder to engage in much 
transparency with regard to their food safety regimes, despite their claims of greater 
harmonisation through best practice committees: 
 
The official version is that they’re trying to harmonise, that they’re trying to compare 
each other, that they’re trying to define criteria on how they do official controls to 
unify it much more, to harmonise it much more… This is why they have started some 
activity in auditing, and [compare the auditing systems]. On the other hand, there is 
also some tendency that the Länder are too afraid of transparency. It is a fact that 
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some people tend to look at others and compare themselves, for example Bavaria will 
say they have the best system, and they’ve got quite a good system, and they’re also 
financially better equipped than other Länder. [But] as the quality of the control 
systems is not the same in all the Länder, that’s why they’re a bit hesitant and a bit 
restrictive with too much transparency. They’ve noticed the need for some 
transparency and harmonisation. On the other hand, every Land is independent and 
has different leaders and a different financial situation. (BMEL_2014a) 
 
Even though there have been strides made to ensure that food safety authorities across the 
Länder work closer together, further efforts might be needed to achieve a higher level of 
harmonisation. On the other hand, there are fundamental differences that the Länder may not 
wish to present through greater transparency. One opinion offered by the BVL was that the 
more local the level in Germany, the more freedoms should be realised: 
 
When you really want to have a good control, this control must not be standardised at 
a 100% level, there must be something free to do unusual things. You can standardise 
the upper level, no problem. But the further down you go, you need more freedom, 
more freedom, more freedom. (BVL_2013) 
 
Such local freedoms are protected to a certain degree in how the federal level has delivered 
its guidance for enforcement approaches through the AVV Rüb, as it is deliberately vague. 
The AVV Rüb’s only real detail, allowing it to be enacted in administrative law, is the need 
to take 5 samples per 1000 members of the population. Otherwise, the AVV Rüb states that 
the Länder should work together and ensure that enforcement practices are based upon risk. 
However, the lack of a clear steer from the federal level does not appear to be at its behest: 
 
It would be probably impossible that [what] we put down in the AVV Rüb [we put] in 
a real law. Because all these matters we deal with in the AVV Rüb are controversial 
with the Länder. We have many ideas that we would like to practice, but we would 




Discussions over who should have competency between the federal government and the 
Länder has clearly created a constant point of tension. These tensions come to the fore when 
a national incident occurs, as was the case in the wake of the 2011 E. coli crisis. 
 6.3.3	Constraints	of	institutional	architectures	on	risk-based	enforcement	
 
The 2011 STEC E. coli outbreak in Germany, which had the vast majority of the 3,935 
reported cases and 50 deaths in Europe (EFSA 2012), was a clear indicator of the lack of 
consistent action across Germany, despite the organisational reforms that were supposed to 
present a clear approach to food safety risks. From the federal level response, down to the 
disparate reaction from the Länder, the E. coli outbreak served to highlight that reforms made 
in the wake of the BSE crisis did not sufficiently tackle the structural deficits of Germany’s 
food safety regime. To begin with, there was no apparent central leadership when the first 
cases of E. coli were discovered. BMEL might have taken this role, but it must be noted that 
with the autonomy afforded to the Länder within the federal system, federal oversight and 
control has weakened as a result: 
 
We have always asked for more responsibility. But this is difficult as the Länder 
would need to agree to a change in federal law to accommodate this and why would 
they want to do that? (BMEL_2014b) 
 
And BMEL was not the only federal level institution that was caught out. Although the BVL 
had been assigned coordinating responsibility during a large-scale food safety incident, there 
was confusion as to whether a crisis response team should be formed within BVL or other 
federal agencies. As for the BfR, which had (and still has) a clearly defined risk 
communication remit (though strictly risk assessment as opposed to management decisions), 
its role during the E. coli crisis was equally confounding: 
 
We had members of the public calling us up asking what should we do? Who should 
we talk to? And we realised that we hadn't formalised any response. We ourselves 
didn’t know what responses we should give to the public or even what our role during 
such a crisis is. (BFR_2013) 
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A lack of co-ordination across the Länder was clearly evident. Hamburg, one of the first 
states to experience the outbreak, immediately communicated the first cases of the outbreak 
before consulting other Länder or the federal authorities. In trying to indicate the cause of the 
outbreak as soon as possible, erroneous sources were indicated, culminating in the accusation 
that Spanish cucumbers were responsible. The situation developed so quickly that federal 
authorities didn’t have time to react and individual Länder were taking responsibility for 
communicating the risk for what was a major national incident. Even in the aftermath, Länder 
and federal authorities still did not appear to be acting cohesively, as a Hamburg civil servant 
argued against the findings by the federal government: 
 
We still haven’t been shown the evidence that Egyptian beansprouts were responsible 
for the E. coli crisis. I believe we [the Hamburg government, in pointing the finger at 
Spanish cucumbers] did nothing wrong and the truth is still out there. 
(Hamburg_2013b) 
 
Since the E. coli crisis, it has been a priority of subsequent Merkel-led governments to further 
strengthen cooperation between the German Länder and the federal government, stressing the 
need for a co-ordinated approach to food safety incidents, establishing a crisis response team 
within the BVL and running a national exercise to test co-ordination and response 
mechanisms to crises, known as LÜKEX6. The LÜKEX exercise focused on food-borne 
biological outbreaks, with a simulated outbreak of pneumonia in Berlin, and gastroenteritis 
nation-wide. Respondents from both the federal government and Länder authorities claimed 
the exercise a success, clearly showing that a coordinated response to a food safety crisis has 
become more apparent. The creation of the BVL crisis taskforce is a relatively rare example 
of the federal level taking greater responsibility within an aspect of food safety regulation. 
Unlike the regular day-to-day role that the BVL plays in facilitating coordination amongst the 
Länder (though not influencing the decisions the Länder make), the BVL takes a much more 
active role here. The logic for such a centralised taskforce reflects the fragmented status of 
food safety regulation in Germany, with concerns that, previously in a large crisis, Länder 







authorities were pushing out their own crisis communication, which may have contradicted 
each other or the federal government. The taskforce also shows the desire from the federal 
government to take a more prominent role in crises, not simply in relation to the Länder, but 
also in coordinating federal ministries and their agencies.  
 6.3.4	Variance	across	the	German	Länder	
 
Due to the high level of autonomy for the Länder, Germany faces a great challenge in dealing 
with national food safety risks. Because different Länder have competency for the 
enforcement of EU-derived food safety controls, different methods of control have developed 
across the country. Expectations about what constitutes a protective level of food safety have 
therefore differed. One avenue of inquiry was to ask if there are fundamental differences 
between these expectations in the Länder that were formerly part of West Germany (the 
Federal Republic of Germany), and those of East Germany (The Democratic Republic of 
Germany). On the one hand, there was consensus that a whole range of policy domains, 
including food safety, needed to be considered following the reunification of Germany, 
indicating historical differences: 
 
It was a process of some years, that in every field of policy-making, on every field of 
administration that had been in the past of two separate republics, they had taken 
different developments. But after three or five or six years after reunification, I think it 
has got into relatively the same level. (Hamburg_2013b) 
 
However, the response from respondents who operate in Länder that were part of West 
Germany indicated that there is now no difference as a result of the former separation, as was 
expressed in Hamburg: 
 
No, I don’t see any major social or cultural difference between the former East and 
West that could account for a difference in expectation. (Hamburg_2013b) 
 
And also expressed in Baden-Württemberg: 
 
I can’t think of any cultural differences between the West and East. The makeup of 
food businesses might lead to different enforcement actions. (BW_2013) 
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However, when speaking to respondents in the former GDR, they clearly expressed the 
continuing effects of such historical differences, as explained by a government official in 
Saxony: 
 
Yes, there is a big difference. When the GDR [the Democratic Republic of Germany] 
was in power, we had many more food inspectors than we do now. The Soviet 
government wanted to contain any crises and present a calm picture to the rest of the 
world, so that’s why we had so much inspection. There is still a drive to have a high 
level of food safety inspection here. (Saxony_2013a) 
 
Another Saxony official further emphasised this point by stating the differences in food law 
between the GDR era and today: 
 
GDR law was possibly even more specific than it is now… food hygiene was very 
important. (Saxony_2013b) 
 
The level of food safety coverage offered by central government appears to have been 
different before and after reunification. However, local expectation of food safety – the need 
for a high level reflective of one present during GDR times – is still apparent. 
 
Variance across the Länder is not just restricted to historical differences between the former 
East and West of the country. Respondents from different Länder identified a series of 
normative, cultural and economic differences across Länder, irrespective of their status 
during the period of the segregation of Germany following the Second World War. Economic 
variances were quite straightforward, as there is an uneven distribution of wealth across 
Germany, with the traditionally wealthy Southern Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria 
having more economic clout than the “new” Länder, formerly of East Germany. This will 
have implications for the resources available for inspection, and would explain why wealthy 
Länder such as Bavaria and North Rhine Westphalia have specialist interdisciplinary 
organisations dealing with food/consumer safety. However, economic considerations have 
also been linked to the relative power that Länder have in standard setting and establishing 
best practice across Germany, as a respondent in Saxony made clear: 
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Standards are set by the western Länder, because they have more money and so have 
more power. (Saxony_2013a) 
 
Cultural and historical differences between the Länder may also have an effect on the type of 
food safety expertise present in each Land. Some Länder may have certain food production 
operators which others don’t. This can affect how food businesses are inspected and what 
types of food businesses a given Länder may prioritise. For example, in Saxony, the Länder 
authorities have a special focus on the consumer end of the food chain, such as restaurants, 
hospitals and kindergartens. One explanation returns to the distinction between east and west, 
as in the case of kindergartens, they offer lunch and dinner as opposed to in western Länder, 
according to a Saxony government official (Saxony_2013b). Another explanation is because 
Saxony does not have many large food producers or any significant large agricultural 
holdings. This is not something that is confined to differences between the east and west of 
the country, as a respondent from the Baden-Württemberg government made clear: 
 
The large animal industry is in northern Germany, whereas in Baden-Württemberg 
you only have small animal holdings. There is a big difference to how you would 
approach a holding with maybe 30 to 40 animals, and one where you have thousands 
of animals. (BW_2013) 
 
Local practices and the landscape of food businesses cause regulators in different Länder to 
prioritise in different ways. This suggests less uniformity across Germany as the makeup of 
food businesses, and the enforcement expertise required to regulate them, varies. However, 
far from compromising consistency, it was argued that this allowed for a useful range of 
expertise during Länder discussions: 
 
The advantage of a federalised system is that we have 16 very competent people 
debating the issues. This will lead to more arguments, but they are important for 
coming to the right opinion. (Saxony_2013b) 
 
An official from the BVL offered a further advantage of the federalised system: 
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Even though more time is needed to reach a decision across the Länder, the system 
does have the advantage that competent authorities are closer to the consumer. 
(BVL_2013) 
 
So even though a federalised system makes the decision-making process more drawn-out and 
complex, it allows for a diverse range of expertise that is more directly accountable to the 
regions represented than a centralised system can possibly claim to be. However, while the 
variation of expertise between the Länder support a fragmented system, how does 
competency across the Länder work? As discussed, the differing food business makeup 
across Germany can lead to different modes of enforcement. The AVV Rüb is deliberately 
vague in defining the level of expertise that is required within food safety inspection of 
FBOs, allowing for more specialist inspectors should an FBO warrant it. It does not clearly 
distinguish between a high-street grocery and a huge food processing factory that exports all 
over Germany and around the world. This has become a source of worry for the federal 
government: 
 
Who should be in charge of inspection of a premises that is exporting not just to other 
Länder, but also outside of Germany? It should be the federal government. But the 
Länder would not agree to this as it reduces their power. (BMEL_2014b) 
 
The federalist balance of power within Germany has, rather ironically, once again made it 
difficult for federal oversight to increase its purview over what could be classed as federal 
issues. However, although the Länder would reject such an increase in centralisation, 
depending on the makeup of FBOs within their authority, there has been a range of differing 
approaches to dealing with potential diversity within FBO size/specialisation. One Länder, 
North Rhine Westphalia, which has a range of large food businesses that do export 
internationally, has altered its approach to enforcement: 
 
In North Rhine Westphalia, they have started organising multidisciplinary inspection 
teams for large food operators, so that they have the required expertise to properly 
inspect the establishment. It also deals with the difference in scale… where no longer 




However, this system is not centrally organised, so each Länder can implement such an 
approach as it sees fit. Therefore, although there are multidisciplinary institutions in other 
Länder providing support (e.g. in Bavaria and Lower Saxony), such support can be to a 
differing extent or not present at all. This has implications for food moving across, as well as 
outside of, Germany, and explains the federal level’s preference to bring inspection of large 
and complex food businesses under the auspices of a centralised unit or taskforce. A common 
retort from the Länder is that a rare and large-scale inspection conducted by a federal 
authority would not expose any shortcomings compared to more frequent local inspections, 
where the inspectors are aware of the makeup of the food business and the staff that run it. 
Regardless, in order for the responsibility for such types of inspection to be moved from the 
Länder to federal level, there would need to be constitutional change approved by the Länder 
themselves, and this would be highly unlikely. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there appears to be variation across Länder with 
regard to setting the level of food safety in each state. When a federal law exists that bans a 
food group, or process, then all Länder enforce the measure. However, when a federal law 
does not exist, variations between Länder begin to appear. Such a situation with nicotine in 
eggs was recounted by a respondent working for the Bavarian government:  
 
We had some years ago nicotine in eggs in Lower Saxony. Here in Bavaria, you don’t 
have that many egg producers. It’s not allowed in eggs, so as soon as there is 
nicotine, we have the opinion that the eggs have to be withdrawn from the market. In 
Lower Saxony, they had millions of eggs with nicotine, and they did toxicology – they 
said [the levels of nicotine present are] not toxic, so they left the eggs on the market – 
because it was millions of Euros. Each Land takes the decision for their food 
operators. (Bavaria_2013a) 
 
Here, differences in risk appetite, underpinned by competing scientific and political opinions, 
led to markedly different approaches in two Länder. This situation also underlines the great 
level of autonomy that exists at a Länder level, where no federal regulation dictates an 
outcome. The simple conclusion here is that, in the case of nicotine in eggs at the very least, 
there is a different expectation of safety.  
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A system like this, where the level of safety can be set differently in different parts of the 
country, will surely create difficulties in providing rationale behind enforcement actions. One 
observed outcome is for food businesses to play authorities off against one another (HR). One 
business might complain that it has been treated more harshly than another business that may 
be in a neighbouring town or village. Respondents from district authorities across Germany 
agreed that this was not an uncommon situation. The arbiter of such disputes, other than local 
authorities coordinating with one another, are the administrative courts. Different local 
authorities may have different forms to fill in, and different quality management systems in 
place, but they all must have clearly articulated legal arguments that take into account 
administrative law: 
 
The logic must be the same because of the administrative court. So we close a 
premise, the owner of the premise can go to court and say “it wasn’t necessary to 
close, I would have done it [made the necessary changes] while I’m still operating”. 
Then the judge has to decide whether we did right or not. The legal explanation why 
we couldn’t do it in another way, must be on this form. (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
With the high degree of autonomy of food safety enforcement throughout Germany, added 
weight is put on how an inspector’s actions are legally interpreted. Ensuring the legality of an 
inspector’s actions is of course nothing specific to Germany. However, legal considerations 
have a greater than expected harmonising influence across inspectors throughout a Land, and 
across the Länder. 
 
However, it is not simply the enforcement action taken by an inspector, and the process by 
which he or she may reach a decision that shows a degree of variation. Different district 
authorities within the same Land can give different product information warnings from one 
another, much to the frustration of one respondent in the Bavarian government: 
 
[It is] difficult as it can happen that one authority says, “yes, I want to inform the public 
about this product”, and another says, “no for me, it’s not dangerous enough, it’s only being 
sold some five times and I can prove that”. So, you have different opinions. (Bavaria_2013b) 
 
Unless there is a specific federal law or Land law, district authorities have the autonomy to 
do as they see fit. The notion that in Germany, there is a clear distinction between safe and 
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not safe, may hold sway, but is entirely dependent on how one represents Germany. For if 
someone were to define Germany as a collection of autonomous regions, whether they be 
states or districts, they may all be practicing this clear distinction, but with the level of safety 
potentially set at different levels.  
 6.3.5	Information	asymmetries	
 
While respondents from different Länder accept that there is variation across the Länder, 
albeit to different extents, generating a formal picture of such variance is very difficult. For 
example, from the perspective of federal auditors, achieving this overall picture is dependent 
on each Länder agreeing to participate in an audit. The Länder aren’t legally compelled to 
participate and there are numerous instances where federal audits have either decided, or have 
resigned themselves to, collect information from fewer than the full complement of Länder 
authorities. As the federal auditor for agriculture and food safety made clear: 
 
We do not have the authority to force Länder to contribute to our audits, it’s entirely 
voluntary. German Basic Law ensures this autonomy of action. 
(Bundesrechnungshof_2014) 
 
It is not just the federal auditors who have to deal with informational deficiencies – federal 
level authorities also suffer with information asymmetries. At the most fundamental level, 
BMEL is quite unaware of the number of food inspectors working within Germany. As one 
BMEL director put it:  
 
I have no idea how many food inspectors are working for Länder authorities; I doubt 
even each individual Länder knows [how many inspectors work within its 
jurisdiction]. (BMEL_2014b) 
 
Indeed, respondents from nearly all the Länder interviewed stated that there were other 
Länder who were not aware of such basic information (although none of the respondents 




I’m aware of at least three other Länder authorities that lack rigorous audit 
mechanisms. Clearly, they are unable to accurately reflect the number of inspectors 
throughout their local districts and what exactly those inspectors are doing. 
(Bavaria_2013a) 
 
Such a state of affairs was reflected in Baden-Württemberg: 
 
There are Länder where they do not know how many people are working in the local 
controls. (BW_2013) 
 
So, not only is it challenging to compare food safety systems between different Länder, it 
may be just as difficult at a district level to assess differences in enforcement practices. For 
example, in Baden-Württemberg, local authorities have their own Quality Management 
Systems (QMS), and different procedural forms: 
 
Local authorities implement their own [Quality Management System], so it is difficult 
to audit across districts. When it comes to closing a premise, because it’s dirty and 
needs to be repaired, we have a different form that we fill in than our neighbours. 
(Stuttgart_2014) 
 
Not only can the systems be different within a single Land, inspector approaches to food 
safety can vary quite substantially as an inspector from Stuttgart recounts: 
 
When I go to the Black Forest, they are more relaxed about the level of food hygiene. 
Perhaps because it is close to the French border, they inspect more like French 
inspectors! (Stuttgart_2014) 
 
Producing an overall picture of a Land can prove problematic, as variation right down at a 
local level, and the autonomy that allows it, could lead to differing levels of food safety 







This chapter concludes that, in the main, the UK offers a relatively consistent risk-based 
approach to food safety enforcement. The German approach by contrast is significantly 
different to that of the UK, as its enforcement regime is signified by the presence of multiple 
risk regimes loosely tied together by federal facilitation of best practices, and the 











Regional variation in food 
safety expectations 
Low High 
Juridification of food 
safety regime 
Low High 
Levels of corporatism Low High 
 
 
Comparison of local food safety enforcement within the two countries show significant 
variance in enforcement regimes. Food safety inspectors in both countries talked about the 
issue of constrained resources, and the appeal of risk-based approaches as an organisational 
logic for distributing these resources. However, as table 2 indicates, there are some 
fundamental differences in the organisation of enforcement practices, as well as variance in 
national and regional contexts.  
While the experience of Great Yarmouth is the exception that proves the rule, there is a 
relatively high degree of harmonisation across the enforcement of standards in the UK. The 
Food Law Code of Practice, coupled with supporting documents provides a detailed manual 
for enforcement actions. The FSA, which is responsible for producing the Code of Practice, 
maintains oversight of local authorities through a series of audits. A high degree of 
centralisation is evidenced by empirical evidence gathered on the subject of accountability – 
reputational risk tends to be of much greater concern to the FSA than local authorities, with 
many claiming that they did not lose any reputational cache following the BSE crisis.  
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The situation in Germany is, however, quite the reverse, with significant informational 
asymmetries that exist between national competent authorities and regional inspectors. Such 
asymmetries are compounded by Länder autonomy in applying enforcement standards and 
pronounced regional variance in food safety expectations. While Germany has made 
significant progress in harmonising enforcement approaches by organising Länder 
committees, as well as the coordinating work of the BVL, interviews with respondents 
revealed that there are significant differences between, and even within, the Länder. One 
major difference concerned setting the acceptable level of risk that should be pursued by 
regulatory action, with evidence indicating historical path dependencies, as well as varying 
economic and geopolitical makeups of the different Länder. This has implications for the 
application of a unified EU risk regime across Germany, as there are different expectations of 
safety, but the ability to measure those differences is challenging. FVO audits of specific 
Länder will not necessarily reveal a representative sample of enforcement practices across 
Germany. In fact, even federal auditing of local enforcement practices is difficult, as there 
exists substantial informational asymmetries between the two levels 
Lower levels of central harmonisation within Germany has led to the increased importance of 
the legal system within the country, as administrative and constitutional courts act as the final 
arbiter of what constitutes as permissible within the varied regulatory landscape. The 
overriding role that EU regulations is absolutely crucial here, as the EU regime imposes 
harmonisation that has not been achieved through national regulation alone (whether wilfully 
or not). Examples cited within the interviews with food safety respondents illustrate this, as 
the implementation of EU official controls and hygiene packages almost ground enforcement 
to a halt until clear clarification of the new rules was provided. Within the UK, EHO 
experience of the need to revert to the courts is quite different. Indeed, there has been a 
developing mentality within local authorities that the fewer cases that need to go to court, the 
better, albeit largely due to monetary considerations. Here, juridification is less of a 
phenomenon as the courts aren’t required to provide harmonising impetus due to the presence 
of strong central regulatory oversight. 
Finally, as was identified in chapter 4, the organisation of interest groups within the operation 
of enforcement has important consequences as consensus within Germany has to be drawn 
from a range of important professional interest groups. In the UK, this is not as clearly 
evident, leading to EHOs giving mixed messages with regard to the extent to which they feel 
their profession has a bearing on food safety regulation. However, it is the role of industry 
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within the corporatist organisation of German food safety regulation, which is of special note 
here. As industry associations must train and insure food businesses within Germany, 
evidence gathered for this thesis indicates that German food safety inspectors place far more 
emphasis on assessing and scoring the establishment, than their UK counterparts. For in the 
UK, without the same corporatist framework, inspectors told this author that their most 
important function is not the scoring of businesses, but providing education. The UK 
experience would ally more with a risk-based approach as the  use discussion and education 
is symptomatic of soft compliance, whereas in Germany there is more of a tendency towards 
command and control, especially reflected in the case of Baden-Wurttemberg, where until 
recently a specialist branch of the police force was involved in inspection. 
The evidence gathered in this chapter would suggest that the UK has been able to more easily 
role out a universal risk-based standard of food safety enforcement. This has been aided by a 
more hierarchical implementation of the regulatory landscape leading to less fragmentation, 
signified by less dependence on juridification or corporatist solutions to regulatory problems, 
and the role of soft compliance in dealing with food businesses.  
 
However, it should be noted that in the UK, the rollout of risk-based approaches is not 
without difficulty. Disagreement over the role that confidence in management plays in an 
inspection shows the discomfort that some EHOs feel in focusing on businesses checks and 
balances as a proxy to risk, rather than focusing on the hazardous activities themselves. The 
Primary Authority scheme had revealed further tensions, as part of an EHOs inspection had 
been absolved to a central authority, despite the variations in management practices between 
different chains of the same business. Furthermore, Primary Authority emphasised the 
importance of allocating enforcement resource based upon the level of compliance of internal 






Food hygiene barometers are symptomatic of an evolution in many countries, focusing on 
increasing citizen participation within regulatory apparatus that was once only the domain of 
the State. The narrative that has been provided to elucidate this shift has spoken of the move 
from subjects (how can you serve your country) to citizens and consumers (how can your 
country serve you). “The public”, despite its singular taxonomy, does not relay one 
homogenous mass, but a highly intricate and complex web of demographics. Its changing 
status, coupled with attempts by state and non-state actors to engage with it, has led to the 
creation of sound bites that are political gold dust, such as “empowered citizens”, “engaged 
voters” and “informed consumers”. 
 
But how exactly can food hygiene barometers inform, engage and empower consumers? 
Consumers are informed as they are exposed to the results of food hygiene inspections. They 
become more engaged as food safety inspectors convey their assessments in a way that the 
public can utilise, informing their choice of food business. Finally, consumers are empowered 
as they can exert pressure on food businesses by “voting with their feet”. Food businesses 
will not want to have negative assessments of their food hygiene practices published for fear 
of their customers deserting them and choosing a more hygienic alternative.  
 
In theory, food hygiene barometers offer benefits beyond consumer engagement. If 
consumers choose establishments with high hygiene ratings, and vote with their feet, lower 
scoring establishments should be incentivised to improve their hygiene. The outcome should 
be a decrease in the incidence of foodborne infections. 
 
However, when trying to assess the efficacy of these barometers, whether that be through 
measuring food borne infection, greater public understanding or behaviour modification in 
businesses, the evidence has been inconclusive. This chapter will argue that even though 
these barometers do indeed increase both public and business participation, they can divert 
attention from one of the main reasons they have come to exist – to reduce the inherent level 




The use of food hygiene barometers in the UK is the product of a move away from 
conventional regulatory enforcement norms. Such conventional wisdom is characterised by 
inspectors using their statutory power to impose legal sanctions on establishments that have 
broken the law. Only a couple of decades or so previously, this would have been conducted in 
private with food businesses, with the public only aware of inspection outcomes if severe 
enforcement actions were taken, such as taking an FBO to court, or closing the business 
down. Indeed, since the first government hygiene inspectors were appointed at the turn of the 
20th century, public knowledge of their inspections was greatly limited, if not non-existent. 
This level of public opacity endured throughout the 20th century, with what appeared to be an 
inalienable right to commercial sensitivity trumping any allowances for public scrutiny. 
There was some movement towards increasing public oversight, such as the MAFF 
surveillance of British supermarkets, beginning in the 1980s, but examples such as this were 
viewed as exceptions to the rule. Towards the end of the 20th century, local authorities were 
beginning to think about how hazard scores generated for food business inspections might be 
conveyed to the public. For example, in 1997 Norwich City Council piloted a public display 
of food hygiene ratings: the first example of linking an inspection’s hazard scores with a 
“Scores on the Doors” approach. However, the pilot fell afoul of the council’s legal 
department, with one of the pilot’s authors suggesting a lack of appetite to start publishing 
previously private information: 
 
It was clear that the objection was more indicative of a widely-held suspicion 
afforded to award schemes at the time and in particular the voluntary disclosure of 
previously hidden council information in the express hope of changing attitudes. 






It was not until the seismic shift created as a result of the BSE crisis, coupled with the passing 
into law of the Freedom of Information Act, that things began to change. The Labour 
government at the beginning of the 21st century urgently sought to repair the UK food safety 
regime’s reputation, after it lay in tatters following the BSE crisis. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
one of the recommendations put forward by the James Report was to have an independent 
government organisation that would represent consumer rights and interests. And so, the need 
to put consumers first was at the core of the statute that led to the creation of the Food 
Standards Agency. This was in stark contrast to the previous status quo, where business 
interests and commercial sensitivity were the order of the day for regulatory action and 
oversight. This new way of doing things was supported and enhanced by the introduction of 
the Freedom of Information Act in 2000, which gave the public the right to access 
information held by public offices. The citizen had been placed very much front and centre 
during this latest stage of regulatory evolution. It was not long until this new paradigm of 
explicitly protecting consumer interests and delivering freedom of information led to a 
renewed effort to test pilot studies of food hygiene barometers at a UK local level. This time, 
these pilot schemes did not cause local authority legal departments to run for cover. Norwich, 
building on its previous attempt, led the way in 2005 with the Norwich Safer Food Award – 
based upon the FSA’s risk-scoring protocols found in the Food Hygiene Inspection Rating 
Scheme. As other local authorities became involved, the pilots were loosely brought together 
under a previously maintained “Scores on the Doors” scheme. Following evaluation of 
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Scores on the Doors by the FSA in 2008, the government department opted to take central 
responsibility for a coordinated national barometer, and this paved the way for the Food 
Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS), introduced in 2011. 
 
Now that the FHRS is universally used throughout local authorities in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, it has marked a paradigmatic shift in how regulatory enforcement is carried 
out. While the inspections themselves are still conducted in private, the outcomes are much 
more transparent, with FBOs publicly scored on their level of compliance. This is significant, 
as we move from a context where the public was largely unaware of the outcome of FBO 




The way in which the FHRS reports findings by an Environmental Health Officer has 
implications for the enforcement action an officer might take, as well as behaviour change in 
the business and the consumer. To summarise, an EHO’s report is distilled into three main 
categories: structural soundness, food handling knowledge and confidence in management –  
that combine to determine the overall hygiene score awarded. The scheme is intended to 
reflect the risk-based approach to enforcement, utilised by principle authorities, as per the 
European Commission’s regulation on official controls (882/2004). However, the report is 
not a complete reflection of an EHO’s overall inspection and categorisation under Annex 5 of 
the Food Law Code of Practice. The key difference here is that the Code of Practice factors in 
the intended use of the FBO and the population it serves (e.g. hospital canteens have a higher 
risk ranking because patients are categorised as a vulnerable group), as well as categorising 
FBOs from high-risk category A, through to low risk category E. The FHRS categorises 
FBOs with numbers 0 through to 5, reflecting the level of compliance. Therefore, there can 
be significant discrepancy between the two different scoring schemes – a hospital canteen 
could be found to be fully compliant under the FHRS (scoring a 5), yet could be classified as 
being at greater risk (due to the higher vulnerability of patient groups) and therefore score 
lower on the Annex 5 calculation. 
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So, on a fundamental level, there are some clear differences between the FHRS and the 
Annex 5 calculation it is based upon. The question here is to what extent does the FHRS fit 
smoothly into a regulatory approach signified by the Annex 5 risk rating? Clearly, the FHRS 
serves a much wider audience, as public oversight is brought to bear on inspection outcomes. 
To what extent does such oversight affect the work of EHOs, whose work is now thrust into 
the limelight? Can such an instance of “opening up” at least part of a regulatory regime to 
public scrutiny have important implications for the core aspects of enforcement? Specifically, 




The premise of the FHRS, and the Scores on the Doors schemes that preceded it, is a 
relatively straightforward one. It is designed to ensure that FBOs maintain a high level of 
food hygiene. The assumption here is that, with scores publicly available, a member of the 
public will take her business elsewhere if she sees that an establishment has a poor score. Not 
wishing to lose the trust and business of the consumer, FBOs are incentivised to ensure that 
they are fully compliant with the food hygiene regulations set. At the same time, the 
consumer can make a more informed decision on which FBO to visit based upon the hygiene 
information released. This could be viewed as a form of libertarian paternalism, as it leaves 
the decision of which establishment to choose in the hands of the consumer, whilst at the 
same time influencing the consumer’s decision-making process. The consumer is 
“empowered” by making a more informed decision without the need for overt regulation 







The FHRS should therefore help consumers reduce the level of food hygiene risks they are 
exposed to whilst incentivising FBOs to manage and mitigate those risks. However, there is 
relatively little data to suggest the efficacy of such a scheme and whether it does improve 
levels of food safety. Indeed, there is some debate as to what the primary aim of the FHRS is 
–  to incentivise businesses, empower the public, or both. As the FHRS has only been running 
since 2012, it is hard to judge whether the scheme has been seen as a success by any of the 
yardsticks set. As mentioned, there have been previous pilot schemes in the UK, as well as 
established schemes outside of the UK. High profile overseas examples include the Smiley 
scheme in Denmark, the traffic light scheme in Toronto and the letter grading in California. 
There have been a few studies that have measured the performance of these schemes. But 
with differing views on what constitutes good performance and the use of different 
barometers in different regulatory environments, comparison proves difficult. One common 
measure of success has been trying to infer whether food hygiene barometers have reduced 
the level of food borne illness, or more specifically, incidents of campylobacter. Drawing 
across these findings, the outcomes are inconclusive, with some suggesting real impact of 
such a scheme (Food Standards Agency 2015), while others state that there is very little, if 
any, impact (Simon et al. 2005). Despite having conducted studies on the Scores on the 
Doors schemes, the FSA still readily admits that it is difficult to currently measure the 
efficacy of the FHRS: 
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The FHRS has only been running since 2012, so it’s hard to measure its exact impact. 
We’re waiting until there’s full uptake of the scheme across all local authorities 
before we can get a truly representative view. (FSA_2013e) 
 
Primary authorities themselves appear to be divided on the current and future impact of the 
scheme. Some EHOs are of the belief that the FHRS will have a substantial impact once the 
scheme has properly embedded across all local authorities: 
 
When there is complete national coverage, they can, and are starting to, produce 
education, adverts, billboards to educate the public about the scheme. (Brighton & 
Hove_2014) 
 
Whereas other EHOs have claimed that the scheme drew more interest when it was first 
introduced, due to its novelty factor, but its impact has been slowly dwindling since:  
 
Once the initial introduction died down, it’s not as effective as it was. 
 (Horsham_2014) 
 
Finally, some EHOs are not convinced either way, and point to the possible impact on 
businesses as well as the public: 
 
Another huge debate is what people in the street think about them [FHRS scores]. Are 
they really influenced by the stickers they see in the windows and the information 
they’ve seen on the websites? The FSA would argue very passionately that the public 
are interested in this stuff… You could argue that the public are motivated – whether 
businesses are motivated is another matter (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
This is key to the effectiveness of the FHRS, as both the public and food businesses need to 
be engaged with the process. Should businesses not show any motivation, clearly there would 
be no upsurge in compliance to be expected from a functioning scheme. Likewise, should the 
public not be influenced by the stickers they see on the street, this could also disincentive 





Whilst there is limited data indicating the effectiveness of the FHRS and its effects on FBO 
compliance and public awareness, there is even less data pointing to the effect such a scheme 
has on the EHOs and the inspections they conduct. The outcomes of such food barometers 
may be directed at the consumer and FBOs, but do they affect the risk-based enforcement 
regime? Interviews with EHOs across the UK indicate that the FHRS could have a profound 
effect on their work.  
 7.6.1	Changing	the	approach	to	objectivity	
 
The objective calculation of an establishment’s score through an inspection that is, in many 
ways, subjective, can significantly affect inspection frequencies and enforcement outcomes, 
dependent upon the individual EHO. While the scoring criteria is quite robust (e.g. checking 
that refrigerators are operating at the correct temperature), other aspects of the assessment 
made by an EHO can be open to interpretation (e.g. does the inspector have confidence in the 
management of the FBO?).  
 
However, the introduction of the FHRS may have taken a little subjectivity away from an 
EHO’s inspection. As one EHO put it: 
 
Previously, I’ve known inspectors who have slightly amended their Annex 5 score to 
move the business to a different category [of inspection frequency]. This is because 
they know that a new owner is coming in, or the chef is leaving soon, or that the 
inspection fell on a particularly good or bad day for the business. (Rother and 
Wealden_2014) 
 
With the FHRS, a suitable bump in direction for the Annex 5 score would have a 
corresponding effect on the FHRS value. Whereas businesses might not have minded a 
change in inspection frequencies before public scoring, it is much harder to defend a score 






However, the FHRS may have had a somewhat unintended consequence in terms of driving 
up consistency of scoring. Consistency appears to have been an ongoing issue for EHO 
inspections: 
 
There’s a lot of consistency issues over scoring, with interpretation, and despite every 
effort made by the FSA and local county liaison groups, there are still managers who 
have quite differing views on how to score… I think a lot of EHOs are too black and 
white. (Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 
As the respondent states, the role of food safety managers within EHO inspection teams is to 
ensure consistency across inspectors. However, individual EHOs may have different methods 
of forming working relationships with FBOs and this has had repercussions on how 
individual EHOs apply both Annex 5 scoring criteria. 
 
As FHRS scores are publicly available, this has led to more discussion amongst inspectors on 
scoring: 
 
Yes, I suppose [the FHRS] has led to more discussion about the scoring. EHOs 
wouldn’t want to look out of place with their colleagues. (Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
The very public nature of the FHRS seems to have led to some EHOs worrying about being 
seen as the odd one out when it comes to assessing businesses. This may contribute to 
increasing levels of consistency not only in the FHRS scoring, but in overall food hygiene 
inspection practices due to the close links between the Annex 5 calculation and the FHRS. 
 7.6.3	Changing	the	approach	to	risk-based	enforcement	
 
The FHRS may well already be having an unintended impact on the risk-based nature of 
EHO inspections. As the comment below indicates, every single EHO respondent 
interviewed for this thesis stressed the importance of proportionality and prioritisation with 
regard to risk-based approaches: 
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I think it’s about prioritising things rather than making decisions based on risk … 
We’ve [EHOs] had it drummed into us that our actions must be proportionate to risk. 
That even begins with the premises we go to and how often we go to them. 
(Huntingdonshire_2014) 
 
Indeed, some EHOs saw proportionality as an essential pillar to the enforcement activity they 
carry out: 
 
We pride ourselves on being proportionate and having scientific evidence that is risk-
based. (Horsham_2014) 
 
Common sense dictates that EHOs dedicate more of their time inspecting and educating 
FBOs that consistently fall below hygiene requirements, as opposed to those that are broadly 
or entirely compliant. However, it can be argued that the transparency drive that has led to the 
creation of the FHRS could affect this basic tenant of proportionality.  
 
With the range of underlying impediments to food businesses being able to achieve 
compliance with food hygiene standards (see Chapter 6), it is easy to see why EHOs argue 
that a proportional approach is needed, as part of a risk-based system. Therefore, one might 
assume that an enforcement system would be set up to ensure that EHOs were spending more 
time with the less compliant FBOs. However, the FHRS could lead to quite a different 
outcome. Due to the publication of food hygiene scores, certain FBOs will be eager to show 
their customers they are at full compliance (5 out of 5 on the FHRS scoring scheme). 
Traditionally, these will be companies who have consistently tried to achieve full compliance 
previously, and who would have been broadly compliant (3 out of 5) or better. As the FBOs 
have the right to appeal or request a revisit under the FHRS scheme, this can prove to be 
problematic for EHO inspectors and their attempt to provide proportional enforcement.  
 
Take, for example, an establishment that scores 4 out of 5. Under the terminology of the 
FHRS, this establishment is rated as “Good”, which equates to a good level of compliance, 
with only minor infringements of food hygiene regulations. Under Annex 5 of the Food Law 
Code of Practice, such a compliant business could come under category E, requiring “A 
programme of alternative enforcement strategies or interventions every three years” (FSA 
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2014). This could lead to a situation whereby an establishment that should be inspected no 
more than once every three years, is in fact reinspected just three months after its initial 
inspection, due to a revisit request.  
 
With the added burden of re-inspections, it can be argued that the pressures placed upon local 
authorities have been increased. And if it transpires that local authorities are having to 
dedicate more time and resources to FBOs that are largely compliant, does this not affect the 
proportionality of a risk-based enforcement regime?  
 
The full extent of this issue is difficult to gauge. Some EHOs have suggested that the impact 
of revisits is relatively small as there haven’t been many requests following the introduction 
of the FHRS scheme: 
 
Currently, maybe because the FHRS is yet to take off, the number of requests for 
revisit is low. (Brighton & Hove_2014) 
 
However, the FHRS could be the victim of its own success, should it become an increasingly 
popular tool. One EHO stated that with the FHRS having been fully rolled out, coupled with 
the FSA’s intention to increase its advertising, FBOs will show more interest in getting high 
hygiene scores:  
 
I think if the FHRS gets more popular, business will increasingly take the system more 
seriously and there will be more and more requests for revisits. If the public takes 
note of these scores, then there will be plenty of businesses who will suddenly want a 
5. (Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 
Therefore, it appears that the popularity of the FHRS could be proportional to the number of 
revisits required. If businesses are worried that the public may start to actively and 
consistently use the FHRS scores as a means of choosing their establishments, it could be 
assumed that there would be increased pressure on FBOs to make sure they score as highly as 
possible, increasing the demand for revisits. This presents the problem of inspectors spending 
an inordinate amount of time in low risk establishments. Could the FHRS, as a transparency 
measure, serve as an example of how increased transparency could be inversely proportional 
to risk-based dynamics? The FSA is currently working towards measures to reduce the 
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increased workload brought about by FHRS revisits, with emphasis put on the fact that a 
revisit does not need to be as thorough as the original inspection, especially if there were only 
minor infringements. However, this does not sit well with some EHOs as it amounts to an 
inspection “lite”, no matter if it is a revisit, and runs contrary to the possibility that the 
situation in an FBO might have substantially changed, or that the EHO feels greater 
accountability with a far less thorough inspection. As one EHO put it: 
 
I wouldn’t want to feel responsible for making a visit, whether it be an initial 
inspection or a revisit, and cutting corners. The situation in FBOs can quickly 
change, so an inspection is an inspection. (Rother and Wealden_2014) 
 7.6.4	Constrained	resources	
 
One of the key concerns for EHOs interviewed was constrained resources. It does not appear 
unusual for a local authority to fail to meet its inspection quota as set out by Annex 5: 
 
It only happened recently, when another local authority, I think it was Torbay, came 
out and said “really sorry, but we don’t have enough EHOs to meet our Annex 5 
requirements.” As a result, the local authority stated that any FBO that had already 
attained a 5 out of 5 FHRS score would not be reinspected for the next year. 
(Horsham_2014) 
 
The public scrutiny this brings, which wouldn’t have existed prior to a transparency scheme, 
adds pressure to the local authority. With the potential increase in revisits, brought about by 
FHRS reinspections, local authorities are increasingly stating that they cannot fulfil their 
allocated quota of inspections. As local authorities divert their resources to businesses that 
aren’t fully compliant, more instances like the one alluded to above will occur, with FHRS 
rated 5 businesses waiting increasingly long periods of time to be reinspected. While there 
has understandably been a lot of debate around establishments that rate poorly but then wish 
to quickly improve for a quick reinspection, what about FHRS rated 5 premises that know 






Whilst there has been a lot of discussion about the efficacy of the FHRS, there has been very 
little analysis of its effect on the pre-existing regulatory regime. Discussion with EHOs has 
revealed some important areas where the FHRS has had such an impact. It may be 
responsible for making inspections more consistent and objective (or at least less subjective). 
However, the public nature of the FHRS likely places further pressure on the increasingly 
constrained resources of local authorities, leaving some FHRS highly rated establishments 
being inspected less frequently than the risk scoring of Annex 5, to focus on poorer 
performers. However, it is the fundamental effect that the FHRS has on the risk-based nature 
of inspections that could have the most profound impact, as EHOs try to balance out 
reinspections of aspiring businesses that have fallen a little below the mark of full 




Food hygiene barometers within the German context, despite the introduction of promising 
local systems, have largely failed. As introduced in Chapter 2, Germany’s experience of 
attempting to introduce these systems has been fraught with problems, which include a 
complex mix of political, judicial and normative aspects. As the development of food safety 
enforcement in Germany has largely been one of local led, Länder responsibility, the 
introduction of barometers has brought the fragmented nature of Germany’s political system 
into sharp focus.  
 7.8	A	false	dawn	for	German	barometers?	
 
Following on from Ilse Aigner’s (the then minister for Agriculture, Nutrition and Consumer 
protection) refusal to write the public availability of food hygiene scores into law, due to a 
lack of unanimous support from Germany’s Länder (Bavaria rejected the proposal), there 
have been a few instances of pilot projects occurring in various German cities. Perhaps the 
most established pilot project was in the Pankow district of Berlin (the “Smiley Projekt”), 
where a range of smiley faces were posted online (and voluntarily in store) that reflected the 
number of assigned minus points that an FBO accrued during a food safety inspection (for an 
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example, see figure 7). The cities of Duisburg and Bielefeld (both in North Rhine 
Westphalia) also implemented similar pilot projects, making food hygiene inspections 
publicly available (for an example, see figure 8).  
 
Measuring the efficacy of the German pilot projects has proved difficult. As Pankow and the 
pilots in North Rhine Westphalia use different systems, exact comparison isn’t possible. 
Furthermore, the systems in North Rhine Westphalia have gone through several different 
iterations (and at last count settled on a traffic light system, Gastro Ampel), in order to 
appease businesses and their Länder administrations. In Pankow, the initiative appears to 
have increased business compliance: 
 
Before the smiley system, no matter how many times you visited a business, you would 
constantly be giving the same instructions. The business would agree to them and 
might possibly implement changes, albeit briefly. As soon as you came back round, 
everything would return to its original state. With the barometer, businesses are now 
implementing changes permanently, as they want to score highly on the smiley system. 
(Pankow_2013) 
 
Pankow also benefited from the fact that it was one of the first pilot projects testing 
publicising food ratings. Surveys showing that the public was predominantly in favour of 
publicising these scores led to political capital for Pankow and increased media attention: 
 
Before we introduced the smiley scheme, we conducted a survey that stated 95% of 
Pankow’s population would like to see our inspections made public. Because this was 
an original idea in Germany, there was plenty of press attention and our local 
politicians wanted to be seen as being on board. As a result, our budget was raised 
for food inspection and we were able to recruit more food inspectors. (Pankow_2013) 
 
So, not only was the smiley system improving rates of compliance, with an assumption that 
consumers were being exposed to fewer food risks, the system was also able to focus public 




At this point, it could be argued that the Pankow project was a great success story, 
championing food hygiene barometers to the rest of Germany, which no doubt would follow 
suit. However, by April 2014, the constitutional court ruled that it was illegal to publish the 
hygiene scores of businesses within the Federal Republic of Germany. The scheme in 
Pankow was shut down, and the schemes in Duisberg and Bielefeld are under serious threat. 
The sudden, or imminent, cessation of such schemes is an indicator of the challenges 
Germany faces not only in producing harmonised control mechanisms across the 16 Länder, 
but also the legal minefield that is a direct result of federal constitutional arrangements. 
 
The next section will provide a brief historical background to the adoption of food hygiene 





The political narrative in the former West Germany, as well as the reunified Germany after 
1990, placed consumer interests on a higher pedestal. Historically, there has been a long 
tradition in protecting consumer interests. As described in Chapter 2, Germany has become 
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synonymous with a system of corporatism that goes beyond, but is signified by, Bismarck’s 
social security legislation of the 1880s. Consumer groups have therefore long enjoyed an 
important role in many sectors of public administration. Germany’s consensus driven politics, 
in order to historically appease a union of influential city states, and then Länder, has 
facilitated the rise of citizen associations and NGOs. Consumer interests have been 
represented in fields from health to insurance, banking to workplace health and safety. John F 
Kennedy’s proclamation of the four fundamental rights for the consumer, as well as the rise 
of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, further bolstered consumer organisations in 
Europe, and notably Germany. In 1971, the government of Willy Brandt published 
Germany’s first paper on consumer policy, as well as establishing a standing committee for 
consumer affairs. Developments in the European Economic Community reflected Kennedy’s 
earlier attestation, when in 1975 the European Commission proclaimed its own five 
fundamental rights for consumer protection. Consumer protection and rights were apparent 
when, in 2001, the then Ministry for Consumer Affairs, Food and Agriculture was 
established. Consumer interests have become so important to the German state that the very 













This begs the question that if consumers have been richly represented at both a non-
governmental and governmental level, surely a public information system such as a food 
hygiene barometer would be welcomed? Surely a tool that empowers consumer decision-
making, and allows the public to peer into the apparatus of enforcement would work within a 
German context? Here we have the first significant roadblock to the use of barometers in 
Germany – the classification of the German consumer.  Based on German case law, it has 
been argued that German consumers are, for the purposes of consumer protection rather naïve 
and unaware of the dangers that face them. Dauses (1998) makes this clear when he states, 
“German consumers are not really like the image that the German courts present. The portrait 
of a helpless, debilitated, immature creature who is in need of protection so as not to be led 
astray by advertising is not accurate.” Emmerich echoed this view (ibid.) and mockingly 
writes, “Basically the helpless consumer on the verge of debility, who is immature and needs 
extensive care, who has to be protected against the slightest danger”. Finally, Möllering 
(ibid.) defined the legal conception of the German consumer as a “pitiful being at the lower 
end of the intelligence spectrum”. Dauses compares this image with one that has been 
presented in the European Court of Justice, where the consumer is perceived to be bright, 
attentive, and capable of understanding and learning. This contrast would suggest a more 
hierarchical approach to consumer protection in Germany, as opposed to the individualistic 
one presented in the European Court of Justice. It is not for the German consumer to make an 




Not only are consumers historically seen as the appropriate actors to assess risks, but 
barometers that seek to convey a range of risk integers may also fall foul of the German 
normative approach to precaution. Enshrined within the German constitution is the right to 
safety for all German citizens as well as the freedom to trade for German businesses. The 
right to safety is what underpins Germany’s principle of Vorsorge and has historically been 
critical to debates surrounding the dichotomy of safe/unsafe. The argument here is that food 
hygiene barometers will fail because they point consumers to the grey area between safe and 
unsafe. The difficulty, according to the German courts, is that measuring the compliance of a 
food business doesn’t necessarily correlate with impact on public health. While the German 
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constitution protects against koerperliche Unversehrtheit (injurious to health), compliance 
scores cannot be used as a suitable indicator. Instead, only concrete offences can be 
communicated, and this would appear to correlate with the German reliance on safe/unsafe, 
showing that the courts still rely on the presence of certainty when ruling against food 
business owners. 
 
From a German perspective, these ratings are interesting because they show a range of 
possible outcomes of inspection. In the case of Pankow, this range includes “not sufficient”, 
“sufficient”, “satisfactory”, “good” and “very good” as explanatory descriptors of the hygiene 
inspection. At first glance, this runs against the German precautionary principle of Vorsorge. 
Either the food business is safe for a consumer to purchase and/or consume food in or it is 
not. Such intolerance to risks means that either the FBO complies with German food law and 
can remain open, or does not and should be closed. Such barometers seemed to indicate the 
potential shift in German attitudes to the tolerability of risk. As one civil servant for the 
Pankow government commented: 
 
If anything the public has shown great support for such a scheme. By having different 
levels of compliance, we are only reflecting what already occurs [with inspection 
frequencies]. Considering before we introduced the scheme a third of food businesses 
in Pankow were rated as not satisfactory, this public scheme drives them up the 
compliance table… I think the public sees that. (Pankow_2013) 
 
The private consultancy behind the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme in the UK, which has also 
worked with German pilot projects, feels that the German safe/unsafe dichotomy is an 
artificial one: 
 
It’s certainly not a reason for why these control schemes haven’t been rolled out in 
Germany. All they’re supposed to do is reflect what already goes on within 
inspection; there’s always been an acceptance that different FBOs have different 
levels of compliance.  
 
Indeed, these food barometers might be an indicator of Germany’s softening stance to the 
tolerability of risk. The BfR, for example, have rolled out a “Risk Profile” (see below), a 
publicly available risk matrix that indicates to the consumer the level of concern and caution 
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that the consumer might want to take following a risk assessment released by the agency. 
Amongst other factors, it explicitly states the probability and severity of health impairment 
along an integer scale. With regard to probability of health impairment, the scale consists of 
“practically non-existent", “unlikely”, “possible”, “likely” and “certain”, whereas severity of 
health impairment includes “no impairment”, “slight impairment”, “moderately severe 
impairment” and “severe impairment”. Where would a contaminant sit on a tolerability scale 
if the probability was deemed to be “possible”, the severity health “slight impairment” and 
the informative value of the available data “medium”? The uncertainty over the level of risk 
would surely run afoul of Germany’s entrenched view of safe/unsafe. However, a director at 
the BfR refuted this: 
 
It’s a matter of providing enough information to the public. It took us two years to 
construct this risk profile and we have found that as long as you provide the public 
with all the information that is required to make an informed decision, then there isn’t 





Each risk profile that the BfR releases is accompanied by its full scientific opinion. However, 
it could be argued that the Risk Profile is not measuring outcomes. After all, it is not the 
responsibility of the BfR to make management decisions. This falls to the BVL and BMELV, 
the Risk Profile is simply advisory in capacity. If, for example, a contaminant is not proven to 
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be entirely safe, no matter if it scores low on the Risk Profile, it could still be expected to be 
regulated. Indeed, this has caused a certain degree of frustration within federal risk 
management institutions, as a director in BMELV made clear: 
 
Germany is the most precautionary country in Europe. It is very hard to be risk-based 
because if anything is found wrong, we are expected to regulate it. (BMEL_2014b) 
 
However, the food hygiene barometers go one step further than the BfR’s Risk Profile. While 
the public are left to make their own call on whether to visit the FBO in question, the 
barometer has already reflected the outcome of the food safety inspector’s visit. Within 
Pankow, an FBO could score “not sufficient”, indicating that it has major compliance issues, 
but it is still open – the inspection frequency will have been increased accordingly and a 
warning may have been issued, but customers could still frequent the establishment, at least 
for the time being. This is clearly an example of an establishment that has found to be unsafe, 
yet the risks posed by a relatively low level of compliance can be tolerated, at least until the 
business has had time to prove that it can correct the deficiencies found during inspection.  
 
The Pankow pilot project did follow the perceived wisdom present in the BfR’s risk profile, 
by making as much information available to the consumer, so that the decisions taken could 
be suitably defended: 
 
We want to give the consumer as much information as possible. We felt it was 
important to show our inspection frequency and show the individual aspects of 
inspection, such as how a businesses’ scoring went for its internal auditing or 
personal levels of hygiene… We even used to put photos up on our website to visually 
indicate this further but realised this was too time consuming. (Pankow_2013) 
 
The German pilot studies became as much a measure of how compliant a business was, as 
they were about indicating and defending the actions taken by food safety inspectors.  
 Legal	constraints	to	transparency	
 
So, even though the representatives from the BfR and Pankow argued the importance of 
sharing as much information as possible to empower consumers, sharing any information has 
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proven to be an administrative maze. German local authorities are finding it difficult to even 
publish information (let alone barometers) that show concrete findings in relation to 
koerperliche Unversehrtheit. Under changes to the LFGB, made possible by the 
implementation of the Federal Consumer Information Law (Verbraucherinformationsgesetz – 
VIG), Länder authorities should publicly provide a list of such offences. The VIG, passed 
into federal law in 2008, allows for citizens to request government held health-related 
information or data. The law applies to products within the jurisdiction of the LFGB, as well 
as consumer products, as outlined in the Product Safety Act. The law should also enable 
authorities to actively communicate information to the public when there have been 
infringements of the regulations within the purview of the VIG. Specific to the LFGB, the 
Stuttgart Administrative Court further clarified the VIG by stating that a citizen’s right to 
information is not dependent on a breach of the LFGB due to health grounds. In other words, 
the release of information should not be dependent on a clear health risk being identified. 
However, there has been plenty of criticism of the VIG, from both business interests 
concerned about the effect of such transparency, and consumer interest groups advocating a 
greater opening-up and ease of use in implementation. On a practical level, there have been 
concerns about the fees that are levied in order to process information requests (though these 
have since been reduced or abolished), as well as the time burden placed on completing 
requests due to administrative and legal hurdles that need to be overcome. However, it is the 
concern that such a law may impede the constitutional right of businesses to trade freely, 
which has had a fundamental bearing on the implementation of food hygiene barometers.  
 
Debate over the extent to which business rights were being impinged, as well as the practical 
issues briefly discussed, ensured the VIG got off to a rough start. In 2012, the federal 
government, intending to inject some impetus, modified the LFGB so that authorities were 
obliged to publish lists of businesses that were responsible for serious violations of hygiene 
rules. Certain local authorities, with varying degrees of support from their Länder 
governments, saw this as a springboard to launch food hygiene barometers. As authorities 
began to publish serious violations on their websites, they were immediately subjected to 









To date, German administrative courts have sided with any challenge to the publication of 
these lists. This has left blank lists on Länder websites, or no list at all. For example, the 
Niedersachsen page has cited the Higher Administrative Court of Lower Saxony’s ruling that 
brought the constitutionality of the amendment to the LFGB into doubt. As there has yet been 
no review by the Federal Constitutional Court, the list is blank.  
 
In 2015, the then Federal Agriculture Minister Christian Schmidt suggested a solution, 
hoping to circumvent the impasse. Schmidt argued the need for a hardship clause, which 
would give authorities the discretion to assess the impact of publicly naming a business and 
ensure that the business would not be unduly affected far beyond the outcome of the public 
being informed. Furthermore, any entry would have to be deleted the moment the business 
improves accordingly, and any record would have to be deleted after six months. However, 
there has been no subsequent movement and the Länder are still awaiting a clarification in the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s legal position. 
 
This precedent has clearly had, and continues to have, a knock-on effect for food hygiene 
barometers. This is because barometers go beyond simply identifying serious violations, and 
give an overall picture of the levels of hygiene within a business. The rulings in 
administrative courts have made it very difficult for local authorities to run barometers, as it 
has been relatively straightforward for businesses to challenge the barometer system. In 
November 2013 alone, the City of Duisburg had 8 lawsuits with regard to their gastroampel 
barometer, with one councillor lamenting: 
 
The situation is currently unfair and unbalanced. It is too easy for businesses to sue 
and all they need to do is quote paragraph 40 [of the LFGB]. (Duisburg_2013) 
 
A similar sense of frustration was clearly apparent within Pankow: 
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In September 2012, there was supposed to be a big change where German 
transparency laws were being revised with the creation of a new Consumer 
Information Law. However, there are still many loopholes and the Information Law is 
so vague. There has been no legal precedent set and because the law is so vague, 
there is a significant amount of successful legal action against local authorities. 
(Pankow_2013) 
 
Indeed, since then, Pankow’s smiley system (and a similar scheme in neighbouring 
Lichtenberg) has been suspended. In March 2014, the Berlin Higher Administrative Court 
made such a ruling after two companies, who had been rated badly by these barometers, 
complained. The court ruled that only information on “identified breaches” should be 
released (in line with the 2012 amendment of the LFGB). Further, the court stated that these 
barometers were akin to reviews that would lead to consumers making a comparison of 
businesses, and that it is not for authorities to unduly influence a consumer’s decision-
making. Such a ‘review’ based system may also unduly negatively impact upon businesses. 
Finally, it is difficult for consumers to understand what underlies a barometer’s simple 
integer score, whether it be to do with deficiencies in the products sold, or the organisational 
practice of the business, for example.  
 
The gastroampel system in Duisburg, however, is still operational. Due to the high levels of 
uncertainty over the implementation of the VIG and amendments to the LFGB, the Duisburg 
government has decided to continue publishing its barometer until legal clarification is 
achieved. This was in reaction to a ruling in the Düsseldorf Administrative Court, where four 
catering businesses had objected to the City of Duisburg publishing inspection outcomes 
through its barometer (specifically through a mobile phone app that it had produced). The 










The court recognised the importance of the ruling, and given the uncertainty over the VIG, 
recommended the ruling be assessed by a higher administrative court – such clarification, at 
time of writing, is still to be given. This in part reflects the highly complex nature regarding 
implementation of the VIG at Länder level, and the interplay between Länder administrative 
courts, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court. However, 
following the ruling in the Düsseldorf Administrative Court, the North Rhine Westphalia 
Consumer Board (which oversees barometers in Duisburg and Bielefeld), assuming there 
would be an appeal to a higher administrative court, stated: 
 
Individual questions on official control of foodstuffs, as prescribed in the Consumer 
Information Act, involve far too many administrative hurdles that take too long. With 
our control barometer app, we offer fast and easy access to official results. 
 
These administrative hurdles exist because both the VIG, and amended LFGB, do not provide 
clear indications of the extent to which public authorities can publish information about 
businesses, and how the needs of the consumer should be measured against the concerns of 
the business that is about to be exposed. 
 7.8.3	Political	appetite	for	barometers	
 
This legal indeterminacy has meant other local authorities have been discouraged from 
implementing pilot schemes of their own, fearing the time and costs that such exercises 
would involve. One civil servant in Duisburg argued that other local authorities have been 
complaining that a barometer would add further commitments to a food inspector’s time. He 
claims this is an excuse and is simply a cover for local authorities not wishing to take on legal 
proceedings, perhaps a less altruistic motive in the eyes of the consumer: 
 
Our barometer can be done on the spot during an inspection. It does not involve more 
food safety inspectors and the software is already there. It can easily be done; it is 
just a convenient excuse from other local authorities for why they do not wish to 
investigate such schemes. (Duisburg 2013) 
 
 185 
A lack of political will in the face of Germany’s poorly developed transparency laws has 
been felt within Pankow as well. Even though political support was gained when the scheme 
was first introduced, plans to extend the scheme from Pankow to the rest of Berlin led 
nowhere: 
 
Berlin wanted to implement our system and came up with the Sicher Essen scheme. 
However, it didn’t inform the public properly and had many legal problems. It needed 
the Berlin senate to step in and take charge as it was a Berlin-wide scheme, but they 
didn’t want to be responsible for it, so the scheme fell away. (Pankow_2013) 
 
This lack of central coordination is evident across other Länder. Bavaria, who voted against a 
national barometer scheme in 2011, argued that it wasn’t because they weren’t in favour of 
such public disclosure in principle, but because there was a whole raft of different schemes 
being proposed: 
 
We had traffic light schemes, smiley schemes, stars and numbers being proposed 
without actually explaining how they explain to the consumer the risks involved. What 
does a happy face mean? What does a three out of five mean? (Duisburg_2013) 
 
This comment helps explain how hard it is to achieve consistency across all the Länder - 
there were different local authorities proposing different schemes, with different 
interpretations.  
 
However, according to a consultant who helped introduce the FHRS into the UK, the German 
pilot studies fell afoul of trying to report too much information to the consumers, leaving 
businesses to put forward the fairly simple case that these barometers weren’t neutrally 
conveying scoring data, but were actively judging the businesses they scored: 
 
The problem when you start throwing in photos, individual breakdowns etc. is that 
you are no longer passing on a score. You are actively saying to the consumer, “look 
at these photos and see how grubby this business is”, you’re actively drawing the 
consumer’s attention to the worst aspects of the business. It’s hardly a surprise that 
businesses are reacting. When they rolled out these schemes, at least at the beginning, 
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local authorities should have figured out that less is more; keeping it simple will ruffle 
fewer feathers. (Pankow_2013) 
 
A lack of central guidance, according to this respondent, has cost these schemes any chance 
of success. This brings the discussion back to the delegation of responsibilities and 
competencies between the federal level and Länder. The BVL, with the competency to 
facilitate and guide cross-Länder discussion of best practice, is seen by many Länder civil 
servants as somewhat of a lame duck. For example, in Bavaria: 
 
What does the BVL do? I really don’t know to be honest. They come to our LAV 
meetings but just sit there. What more can be said about them? (Bavaria_2013b) 
 
A similar view was expressed in Saxony: 
 
The BVL has no real authority and no real power. Beyond organising meetings, its 
role in Länder dialogue is very limited. (Saxony_2013a) 
 
However, as previously discussed, federal food safety institutions are actively trying to 
increase their responsibility. But the Länder do not wish to concede further competencies to 
them – a prime example being federal authorities taking over responsibility for inspecting 
food businesses that export out of Germany. 
 
Germany is therefore left almost bereft of any of these food hygiene barometers. Even though 
it has had in many ways the same historical precedent to that of the UK, a combination of 
normative, legal and political issues has impacted on barometer rollouts. The normative 
description of German consumers in case law, casting doubts on whether consumers should 
be the final arbiters of judging a food business, has blunted one of the main tenants of these 
barometers – that consumer action would lead to behaviour modification of businesses and 
drive compliance up. The precautionary nature of German regulation has provided an 
inhospitable climate for risk integers that stray into the domain of uncertainty. The 
implementation of the VIG and amended LFGB have not clarified the situation, but instead 
served to create a legal quagmire from which there has been insufficient federal clarification. 
And finally, most likely because of all the preceding issues, the political will to push these 
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barometers on has weakened as most Länder take note of the uncertain and troubling times 
the few pilot projects have been through.  
 7.9	Conclusion	
 
Comparison of food hygiene barometers within the UK and Germany reveal completely 
opposing experiences. Within the UK, due to the centralising food safety regime, coupled 
with a robust legal underpinning for transparency and a political zeal for the principles of 
nudge, food hygiene barometers have become established in the UK regulatory landscape. In 
Germany however, geopolitical fragmentation, competing constitutional rights and issues 
over interpretation of the empowered consumer have led to food hygiene barometers being 




It must be noted that in the UK, the development of food hygiene barometers has not been 
seamless. While the FHRS has been completely rolled out in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, it still presents several issues regarding approaches to risk. The first is that the FHRS 
could undermine the proportional inspection frequencies if EHOs are required to re-visit 
generally compliant businesses that are seeking full marks, at the expense of spending time 
with businesses that have achieved a low level of compliance.  
 
Second, public pressure has caused certain local authorities to build their inspection 
frequencies around FHRS scores, which do not take into account the hazard section of a full 
inspection. This means that inspection frequencies would not take account of differences in 
the handling of higher or lower risk food or approaches, leaving frequencies based purely on 
levels of business compliance.  
 
Finally, While the FHRS has now been implemented across all local authorities in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, variation in whether scores have to be displayed by food 
businesses across the three nations reflect some of the difficulties of implementing the 
scheme. Thus, while Wales has had mandatory display since 2013, and Northern Ireland 
since 2016, the display of scores is still optional in England, leaving English consumers to 
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consult a dedicated FSA webpage. One reason for this variation is that the British Hospitality 
Association has opposed mandatory display in England because it claims that there are 
discrepancies in the way that local authorities are awarding scores. Nonetheless, there is still 
some impetus for the introduction of mandatory display in England, not least because the 
media has made frequent use of FHRS scores to investigate restaurants. The basic premise of 
the FHRS, however – that it is both right and helpful to inform the public about the hygiene 
performance of food businesses – has gone relatively unchallenged.   
 7.9.2	An	“unestablished”	German	system	
 
In contrast, the German system of food hygiene barometers has been constantly challenged, 
and the empirical evidence gathered points to three main reasons for this. The first problem 
has been German federalism, which has prevented national implementation of food hygiene 
barometers in the absence of agreement amongst the 16 German states. Despite efforts in 
2011 to have a requirement for barometers written into federal law, the then federal minister 
for Agriculture, Nutrition and Consumer Protection, Ilse Aigner, conceded defeat after 
Bavaria objected. This veto left individual states to consider whether they wanted to 
introduce their own pilot schemes. 
 
A second, and perhaps more significant problem, however, has proved to be the German 
constitution. Despite new laws aimed at improving consumer access to food safety 
information, constitutional challenges to the legality of the few pilot schemes that have been 
introduced have forced them to be abandoned. Thus the 2008 Federal Consumer Information 
Law (Verbraucherinformationsgesetz – VIG) and changes to Germany’s underlying Food, 
Feed and Consumer Goods Code (Lebensmittel, Bedarfsgegenstände und 
Futtermittelgesetzbuch – LFGB) required local authorities to disclose serious violations of 
hygiene regulations by food businesses. The problem, however, has been that consumer 
rights to information have to balance two important pillars of the German constitution; i.e. the 
rights of businesses to trade freely against the rights of the public to protection against bodily 
harm (koerperliche Unversehrtheit). Proposals to introduce a food hygiene barometer system 
consequently prompted a debate between politicians, caterers and public interest groups as 
well as legal challenges over whether barometers disclosed violations of sufficient severity 
for rights to protection against bodily harm to trump rights of businesses to trade freely.  To 
date, all administrative courts have found in favour of businesses that have filed against 
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locally run barometers on the basis that the VIG does not offer sufficient legal basis for 
publicising data from individual businesses. 
 
A third problem has been a conflict between the basic conceit of leveraging the agency of 
empowered consumers to shape business behaviour that lies at the heart of hygiene 
barometers and a German legal view of consumer sovereignty. Consumer sovereignty – the 
idea that consumers are the best judge of what products benefit them the most- is an 
unexceptional idea in the UK insofar as regulation is seen as correcting market failures that 
obstruct effective consumer choice.  German legal commentators have argued, however, that 
the German courts view a consumer as someone who is incapable of taking informed 
decisions, and who requires the paternalistic oversight of the state. In that German context, 
the basic conceit underlying food hygiene barometers will struggle to make sense. 
 7.9.3	Implications	
 
Currently, both Germany and the UK have food safety regimes that are almost entirely 
harmonised under the same EU food law. One might therefore assume that the 
implementation of food hygiene barometers would follow broadly a similar course and, 
indeed, in Germany, that there might be stronger reasons to expect them than the UK. 
However, that assumption has not proved to be the case. 
 
The case of food hygiene barometers shows how issues of consumer sovereignty and its 
empowerment through the application of new forms of regulation, such as nudge, can be 
shaped by a country’s constitutional context. Whereas the legal and political context of the 
UK provided fertile ground for the introduction of barometers- albeit with minor variation-, 
the conceit of liberal paternalism that underlies them failed in Germany because of 
federalism, constitutional protections for businesses to trade freely and a paternalistic legal 
construct of the consumer. The lesson for the transferability of other new regulatory ideas 
across Europe is that we need to think more carefully about how such ideas interact with 








As the previous empirical chapters have indicated, despite the enthusiasm of both UK and 
German national administrations to implement risk-based approaches to enforcement as the 
EU intends, the outcome of such implementation can be substantively different. This is not 
simply down to differing interpretations of EU regulation by Member States, but also because 
of a myriad of reasons such as historical practices, institutional arrangements and 
constitutional barriers. Chapter 4 served to provide the historical context for food safety 
regimes in the EU, UK and Germany. This chapter indicated that historical practices continue 
to shape regulatory practices differently in both the UK and Germany, despite the emergence 
of a highly harmonised EU food safety regime at the turn of the 21st century. 
 
The drivers and constraints to the application of risk-based approaches occur along the 
regulatory pathway from supranational standard setting, to national interpretation and 
dissemination of rules, through to local enforcement of those rules. This chapter will further 
tease out the main findings from the three case studies assessed, and explore how these 
findings may relate to future food safety regulation, as well as the broader academic literature 




Chapter 5 showed that even though the European commission has been eager to apply risk-
based approaches in policy-making, in particular food safety, there are numerous roadblocks 
to such an aspiration. Of issue here is the wording of the GFL, which states that no unsafe 
food shall be placed on the European market. This makes the standard of the EU food safety 
regime very simple to understand – the standard is safety. The expectation here is that if any 
food is found to be injurious to human health, or is not fit for consumption, then that food 
should not be sold. There is no sliding scale of proportionality that is indicative of a risk-
based approach; instead there appears to be the dichotomy of choice that benefits a hazard-
based approach to regulation. Either food is found to be unsafe and is banned, or it is not and 
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is permitted. Discussion with respondents working within EU institutions revealed that there 
is an underlying assumption amongst consumers that the food they buy in the supermarket 
shelves is safe. And even though the public debate in recent years appears to have moved 
away from issues of safety to issues of food security, this was seen by EU regulators as an 
endorsement of the high level of food safety that has been achieved. This high level has to be 
maintained, with regulators showing commitment to regulate harms, before the likelihood of 
those harms occurring has been calculated. This commitment lends itself to focusing on 
hazards, rather than relying on business compliance of regulatory standards, which would 
indicate the likelihood of those harms occurring and be risk-based in nature.  
 
At an EU level, however, the definition of risk is contested. Even if interpretation of the GFL 
is not intended to be taken quite so literally, and the goal of safety is to be achieved through 
risk-based approaches, discussions with respondents revealed difficulties over how to set 
acceptable levels of risk across 28 Member States. This is an understandable state of affairs 
that is symptomatic of a federal structure, where all states must come to an agreement. 
However, further research revealed that at an EU level there is not just discussion about 
setting an acceptable level of risk, there is a more fundamental debate over the different types 
of risk that should inform regulation. As risk appears to be rarely defined within these 
discussions, different actors involved in the standard-setting could be talking about different 
risks surrounding the same problem, whether that be societal risks, institutional risks or 
economic risks. 
 
The EU food import regime offered a very interesting insight into how the EU determines 
risk. The terminology of risk is deeply embedded within this regime, as entire categories of 
food are labelled “high-risk” – requiring 100% physical checks (as well as documentary and 
identity checks), unless these checks are reduced as outlined under directive 94/360/EC. 
However, there was uncertainty over how the various levels of checks in 94/360/EC were 
determined, and why they have not been updated since the directive was introduced in 1994. 
Despite the founding of EFSA in the intervening period, which could provide risk 
assessments to underpin the levels set, there has been no fundamental change. Further 
research indicated that labelling of all POAO as high-risk is systematic of path dependency 
resulting from historical practices which were almost exclusively focused on the safety of 
meat supplies, and were underpinned by the professional interests of the veterinary 
profession. In the past decade, the risks posed by FNAO have become more salient, leading 
 192 
to the high-risk checklist in regulation 669/2009, which determines percentage identity and 
physical checks for certain FNAO. This development would indicate that the regime for 
FNAO is being brought into line with the one for POAO – and that the food import regime 
overall is heavily reliant upon the determination of high-risk products. However, the term 
“high-risk”, especially in the case of POAO, does not appear to be supported by scientific 
determination of the risk posed, and once again lends itself more to a hazard classification in 
stating all POAO to be high-risk. While there have been important technological advances, 
such as the TRACES risk management system for POAO, which identifies higher risk 
imports through constantly updated trade data and RASFF notifications, it does not override 
the checks as laid out in 94/360/EC.  It would therefore appear that the terminology of risk is 
becoming conflated with that of hazard, as the food import regime seeks to reassure 
consumers by referring to the control of high-risk products, without necessarily providing the 
underlying evidence to qualify the determination of high-risk. 
 
The food import regime also showed that enforcement approaches that have become 
synonymous with risk-based approaches are not apparent in this case. It can be argued that 
food import inspection regimes are based upon command and control approaches to ensure 
specific rules are followed, as opposed to soft compliance approaches characterised by a 
broader focus on the compliance of businesses, and systems of self-regulation, as a proxy to 
regulating risks. Should an importer not follow the rules as set by the food import regime, 
their consignments will be either rejected or destroyed. Furthermore, co-regulatory dynamics 
that are apparent in other parts of the EU’s food safety regime (such as earned recognition for 
inspections of food businesses) are not at all apparent at food import. 
 8.2.2	Chapter	6	
 
Chapter 6 compared national and local practices relating to food safety enforcement of food 
businesses within the UK and Germany. The research found that even though there is appetite 
for risk-based enforcement approaches in both countries, institutional organisation, 
fragmentation and historical enforcement practices reveal significant contrasts in enforcement 
cultures, leading to ramifications for the application of risk-based approaches. 
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In the UK, there is a high degree of centralisation, with local authority enforcement directed 
by the Food Law Code of Practice, a detailed document that outlines the risk scoring of food 
businesses to determine inspection frequencies. The FSA also plays a central role as it 
provides oversight principally through the audit of local authorities. In Germany, the situation 
is quite different. As the Länder have individual competency for the enforcement of food 
safety regulation, the federal level is relegated to a largely coordinating role, facilitating 
contact between the 16 Länder. The AVV-Rüb provides general administrative principles for 
the control of food and feed, but isn’t as detailed as the UK’s Food Law Code of Practice, 
owing to greater level of fragmentation within German food safety enforcement. While the 
BVL and Länder working groups such as the LAV have increased harmonisation through the 
sharing of best practice, implementing new regulatory approaches across Germany remains 
difficult. This has consequences for the implementation of national-level risk-based 
approaches, unlike in the UK where national schemes are far more easily implemented. 
Examples in the UK include the introduction of the Primary Authority Scheme, which claims 
better risk-based targeting of regulatory resources, and the FHRS, which communicates the 
level of compliance to food hygiene standards as a proxy measure of foodborne illness risk 
(this case study is discussed in detail in Chapter 7). In Germany, informational asymmetries 
between the federal level and local authorities provide an immediate obstacle to 
implementing national schemes. 
 
Despite the establishment of enforcement practices that were viewed as more risk-based in 
the UK, important issues were highlighted in their implementation. In particular, the role in 
measuring confidence in management of food businesses, with questions asked over the 
extent to which confidence in management was a suitable proxy measure of food hygiene 
risks within the business. This revealed a tension where some local authority inspectors are 
much more comfortable focusing on the actual hazards in food businesses, rather than trying 
to determine the likelihood of harm through assessing internal systems of business checks 
and balances, as signified in the confidence in management part of an EHO inspection. This 
concern spilled over into discussions on HACCP, as HACCP is the primary system for 
businesses to implement their own checks and balances. Concerns over business self-audit 
were raised less by enforcement officers in Germany. The reason for this is most likely due to 
the core responsibilities enforcement officers argued were a part of their jobs. In the UK, 
while risk-ranking establishments for inspection, and the subsequent inspection were seen as 
key parts of the job, providing education and support to food businesses was viewed as 
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equally important. A majority of food businesses within the UK do not need any 
preauthorisation or qualifications, leaving a multitude of SMEs that simply lack the expertise 
to understand or comply with food hygiene legislation, never mind understand the risks that 
such legislation seeks to mitigate. In Germany, whilst the same pressures exist for SMEs, all 
food businesses are required to be a member of an industry association – specifically the 
IHK. German inspectors therefore place more reliance on the supporting role of these 
associations, and while this does not mean that German inspectors don’t provide education to 
food businesses, it is not seen as such a core function of the inspector’s responsibility, in 
contrast to their UK counterparts. 
 
Concerns over measuring business compliance were brought out further in discussion of the 
UK’s implementation of the Primary Authority scheme. As the primary authority selected to 
partner with a business takes charge of assessing confidence in management across that 
business, it absolves EHOs of assessing confidence in management in any branches of the 
business in their local authority. Risk-based selection is one of the primary drivers behind the 
Primary Authority scheme, as leaving a single authority to oversee and certify a single 
business’ audit and management systems, diminishes the need for EHOs to inspect those 
aspects across branches of the business, allowing enforcement resources to be focused 
elsewhere. However, concern was raised over whether this risk-based approach did indeed 
help target resources to the greater risks, if companies with multiple entities were effectively 
being homogenised into one operational unit. Essentially risks were being assessed based 
upon a central plan, and the assumption that there is consistent application of that plan 
throughout all branches.  
 
Co-regulatory dynamics are present both within the UK and Germany, with ‘earned 
recognition’ examples in both countries indicating that business systems of auditing 
compliance are being taken into account when inspection frequencies are calculated by 
government inspectors. Examples include the Red Tractor scheme in the UK, and the QS 
scheme in Germany. The increase in co-regulation is important for two reasons: first, that 
competent authorities are taking a more literal approach to the GFL’s stance – business is 
responsible for the safety of food on the market and so business should be responsible for 
more checks and balances; second, that authorities would argue this is risk-based, in that 
restricted regulatory resources can be designated to food businesses that aren’t certified 
compliant under these business schemes. However, these schemes have greater significance 
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for Germany, in that they offer a means of circumventing constraints on harmonisation 
caused by fragmentation. This further emphasises the role of professional interest groups in 
Germany, as they not only have a central role in reaching standard-setting consensus with 
government institutions, but they can also overcome the fragmentations that divide state 
institutions.  
 
Comparison of the two countries’ local enforcement systems reveals quite differing 
approaches to the acceptability of risk and the enforcement arrangements supporting the 
regulation of risk. While Chapter 4 showed that the evolution of food safety regulation in the 
UK and in Germany was broadly similar, professional groups underpinning enforcement 
show significant difference. Within the UK there has been a generalist approach to food 
hygiene inspection, with inspectors of public nuisances and then environmental health 
officers represented by what is now the Chartered Institute for Environmental Health, and 
falling under the auspices of a government department (currently the FSA). In Germany, 
however, responsibility for inspection and sampling of food businesses at first relied on 
public self-help associations and the police, but became increasingly characterised by the 
veterinary profession and a new profession of food chemists. This has historically led to 
differing composition of inspection personnel across the Länder, with varying enforcement 
practices. The autonomy of the Länder is underlined by differing expectations of food safety 
regulation. Current expectations can be based upon historical practices, such as in the case of 
the former GDR’s blanket approach to food safety enforcement, having many food safety 
inspectors to mitigate any politically damaging food safety incident. This has led to 
discomfort from inspectors in the East German Länder having a rolled back inspection 
regime, reliant on risk-based targeting, as this differs from the “catchall” approach of the 
GDR.  There also appear to be fundamental differences in expectation in the regulation of 
specific food products, such as in the example cited – the regulation of nicotine in eggs in 
Saxony and Bavaria. This case is an example of the power of private industry groups to set 
the level of risk appetite (as the risk appetite was set much higher in Saxony, where there is a 
large egg industry). While there are differences of expectation across the UK, and in 
countries where responsibility for food safety regulation has been devolved, it is not on the 
same fundamental level as in Germany, as legal subsidiarity (as indicated in Germany by the 
presence of administrative courts in different Länder) does not exist between different local 
authorities or regions of the UK. While the presence of different risk regulation regimes 
within German is not a problem in and of itself, it is difficult to see how such regime 
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proliferation fits into an increasingly harmonised system of EU food safety. And with 
differences in practice between, and even within Länder, how EU audits of two or three 
Länder at a time, will give an overall picture of the German food safety system.  
 
The role that national competent authorities play in the enforcement of food safety regulation 
shows a further important contrast between the UK and Germany.  
The difference reveals at what level, national or regional/local, risk appetite is set. In the UK, 
the FSA sets the risk appetite, through the guidance it provides to local authorities. This was 
shown for example, in response to the E. coli incident in 2007. Conversely, in Germany, the 
Länder have far more autonomy when it comes to setting acceptable levels of risk, unless 
there is a federal administrative law that regulates a specific product or approach. The 
German E. coli incident of 2011 initially showed Länder authorities responding to the crisis 
through their own channels, rather than relying on any central federal channel of risk 
communication or crisis management. The outcome of that E. coli crisis was that it served as 
one of the few occasions where the German federal level could claw back some 
responsibilities from the Länder level, with the recommendation that central crisis 
management should be strengthened with the creation of a crisis task force within the BVL. 
Indeed, other examples of the federal level trying to gain more competency from the Länder 
have failed. The relative power of the Länder, and crises such as the E. coli incident, does 
show that accountability is shared between the federal level and Länder. In the UK on the 
other hand, discussion with local authorities about the impact of major crises (such as the 
BSE crisis) shows that accountability lies very much with national authorities. This would 
suggest a much more hierarchical food safety regime in the UK, as opposed to a relatively 
organisationally flat food safety regime in Germany. This provides further evidence as to why 
it may be easier for the EU to implement harmonised risk-based approaches in the UK, as 
opposed to in Germany. 
 8.2.3	Chapter	7	
 
Chapter 7 provided an important insight into national and local approaches to risk in food 
safety, as it focused on an area where the EU does not have direct oversight, namely the 
implementation of food hygiene barometers. This chapter also revealed the greatest contrast 
in food safety regulation between the two countries, with the UK having fully implemented 
 197 
(bar Scotland) a barometer system in the shape of the FHRS, whilst in Germany there is 
barely a single local pilot project still running. The findings from the two countries leave two 
narratives: how the FHRS can be the victim of its own success in the UK; and Germany’s 
difficulty in managing and communicating uncertainty in the regulation of risk. 
 
With the UK, in principle the FHRS indicates the successful implementation of a system that 
leans heavily on the principles of nudge to ensure that informed consumers make a choice of 
food business based on communication of risk integer scores. This system has an added 
benefit in that consumer choices inform businesses to improve their hygiene, ensuring they 
keep their customers. A business that scores a low FHRS can expect that informed consumers 
will look elsewhere. Although the research on the efficacy of food hygiene barometers is still 
contested in terms of measuring the ultimate indicator of success – a reduction in foodborne 
illness because of these barometers – the implementation of the FHRS across all local 
authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland shows comprehensive implementation of 
the scheme by the FSA and local authorities. However, the lack of mandatory display of 
FHRS scores in England and Northern Ireland, shows the role played by private interest 
groups, in this case lobbying done by food business associations.  
 
However, very little research has been conducted on the effect that the FHRS has, and may 
have, on the enforcement practices of EHOs. Discussion with respondents revealed three 
important constraints. The first is centred on the appreciation that the FHRS is not a complete 
reflection of an EHOs inspection, as outlined in the Food Law Code of Practice. The FHRS 
scoring is only based upon business compliance with food hygiene standards. The hazard part 
of an inspection, such as assessment of the types of products that the business is handling, or 
the vulnerability of the consumer, is not included in the FHRS scoring. Pressures placed upon 
EHOs have caused some local authorities to pay more heed to the FHRS in setting their 
inspection frequency, rather than the full inspection that includes the hazard. This means that 
the FHRS has evolved from a risk communication tool to a risk management tool, without 
sufficient regard for the very hazards that food safety regulation should seek to cover. A 
hypothetical example to illustrate this point could be that of two food businesses, inspected 
on the same frequency due to both scoring 5 out of 5 on the FHRS. However, if one business 
was dealing with high-risk products, say raw meat, whilst the other was handling low risk 
products, say tinned baked beans, the first business could have greater potential for causing 
harm and this would not be picked out in a measure of compliance alone. 
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The second issue concerns unintended consequences, due to the statutory right of businesses 
to request a revisit within three months from an EHO, following an FHRS award. The 
concern here is that businesses that are at least generally compliant with food hygiene 
standards, and score 3 or 4, request revisits to attain a 5 status as soon as possible. This would 
draw EHO resource away from the less compliant businesses that score 0, 1 and 2, 
undermining a proportional risk-based approach to enforcement. While there is currently little 
evidence to support this hypothesis, EHOs are concerned that if the popularity of the FHRS 
continues to rise, this will incentivise near full compliant businesses to achieve full marks 
from the FHRS, requiring more EHO resource. 
 
Finally, the FHRS has put enforcement activities into the public limelight. This should help 
drive up harmonisation within and across local authorities, as EHOs will be keen not to look 
out of sync with the general level of scoring across food businesses. However, the public 
display of scores prevents EHOs from tweaking their scores in order to alter inspection 
frequency to better match the inspector’s subjective interpretation of a businesses’ level of 
hygiene. While this has the benefit of preventing inspectors from ‘fiddling the system’, it 
means that a degree of subjectivity is lost in the pursuit of objectivity.  
 
The largely failed experience in Germany regarding food hygiene barometers has reinforced 
the view that it is difficult to communicate uncertainty in Germany. Considering that one 
cannot have risk without uncertainty, this has profound implications for the application of 
risk-based approaches.  
 
The weakness of the country’s consumer information law was central to food hygiene 
barometers failing in Germany. Despite the law allowing consumers to ask local authorities 
about findings from food business inspections, which would provide the backbone to a 
transparency system like food hygiene barometers, food businesses were quick to challenge 
such a system in the administrative courts. This resulted in administrative rulings which 
stated that authorities could only publish concrete findings. Within Germany’s heavily 
juridified system, trying to prove that a finding is suitably concrete has proven very difficult, 
and has led many authorities to abandon the publication of any lists outlining failings found 
in the inspection of food businesses. This in turn has led to more intricate food hygiene 
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barometer pilot projects either being abandoned or awaiting further clarification from higher 
administrative courts.  
 
This state of affairs reveals competing constitutional provisions within German basic law. 
While on the one hand, the German constitution guarantees the protection of all German 
citizens, it also guarantees the freedom to trade.  While the publication of food hygiene 
compliance lists and barometers would be seen as a move to protecting consumer health, 
business would argue that such publication would put a black mark against listed companies 
– even if it turns out that such a mark was given in error, or the business subsequently 
improves. The outcome of the administrative court cases outlined in Chapter 7 is that 
business interests appear to have trumped interests for public protection. Furthermore, the 
simplistic legal depiction of a consumer within German law (the German courts present the 
consumer as someone who cannot take care of himself, and requires support from the state) 
appears to be someone who cannot make the required informed decisions that would make a 
barometer system useful.  
 
Couple constitutional roadblocks with Germany’s incredibly tight data protection laws and 
the lack of an agreed barometer system for use across Germany, and the infeasibility of food 
hygiene barometers in Germany is only increased.  However, what the experience of food 
hygiene barometers in Germany shows, is the difficulty with communicating uncertainty. The 
German administrative courts operate in a dichotomy of safe/unsafe, and any pronouncement 
that falls in between those fixed poles will find itself under pressure from competing 
constitutional arrangements. Risk-based systems that report uncertainty in relation to business 
activities will soon find themselves in hot water. 
 8.3	Adequacy	of	the	research	
 
When reflecting on the research contained in this thesis, some comments need to be made 
about the limits of the methodology employed.  First, in order to draw conclusions on the 
food safety regime in the UK, Germany and the EU, only three sub-regimes were selected for 
research. Though I have argued that these were the critical case studies to provide significant 
comparative insights along the regulatory pathway of the EU food safety regime, other food 
sub-regimes could have been investigated that might have yielded different findings. That can 
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only be tested by further research. Second, in selecting enforcement officials to interview 
within Germany and the UK, a comparatively small selection of Länder authorities and local 
authorities were unavoidably chosen for reasons of feasibility as well as practicability. 
Although selection of these authorities was based upon important criteria, as set out in 
Chapter 3, respondents from other authorities might have been able to provide further 
contributions to the research.  Third, as German is not the native language of the researcher, 
due consideration needs to be given to the inevitable interpretative problems of using 
translations of German texts for documentary analysis; a significant issue which had to be 
carefully handled when it came to understanding subtle linguistic differences over the use of 
risk terminology. Finally, a more surprising finding was the paucity of English or even 
German texts on the evolution of food safety enforcement practices across Germany, which 
consequently demanded considerable unanticipated efforts to anchor the analysis within the 
historical contexts of the food safety regimes of the UK and Germany. 
 8.4	Linking	the	research	to	the	literature	on	comparative	approaches	to	risk-based	regulation	
 
The outcomes of research from this thesis contribute to the comparative literature that looks 
at the roll-out of risk-based regulatory instruments as universal tools of regulatory reform. 
There is a growing corpus of research that seeks to document risk-based regulation as a 
harmonising mode of regulation across national boundaries. However, much of this effort has 
either been undertaken at a rather macro-level, such as Vogel’s comparison of North America 
and the EU (Vogel 2012); or has principally focused on Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Black 
2010). This research, however, adds to more fine grained analysis in European settings, such 
as that of Krieger (2012) and Rothstein, Borraz and Huber (2013), by providing an in-depth 
comparison of how risk concepts and tools have shaped, or are shaping, regulatory practices 
and cultures in the UK’s Anglo-Saxon liberal policymaking traditions, and Germany’s federal 
corporatist traditions. 
  
In so doing, this research has examined the political contexts of risk-based regulation, such as 
the tension between the technocratic discourse of acceptable risk and public demands for 
safety; a tension that is inherent to the dilemmas of how to deliver the promise of safe food in 
a risk-based way. Likewise, the research has pointed to the way in which risk ideas and 
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practices have been shaped by private, public and professional interest group dynamics; one 
notable example being the role of the veterinary profession in ensuring that all POAO remain 
designated as “high-risk”. 
  
This research, however, has also pointed to the way in which the implementation of risk ideas 
and tools have been shaped by more hardwired national contexts that allow for parallels to be 
drawn with studies of risk-based approaches in other domains. For example, the research has 
identified geopolitical fragmentation as an important variable in understanding the extent to 
which risk regulation regimes are consistent within just one nation state, as both Lodge 
(2001) and Krieger (2012) found in how Germany dealt with dangerous dogs and flooding 
respectively. The research has also pointed to the importance of constitutional contexts to 
explain variation between Germany and UK. Likewise, it has pointed to the importance of 
governance traditions in shaping the implementation of risk ideas, most notably in the way 
that Germany’s proclivity for formal corporatist, sectoral governance – such as trade 
associations taking on responsibilities to educate their members on food hygiene standards – 
has had very different consequences to the UK’s tradition of government inspection 




The research conducted for this thesis revealed a high number of factors that contribute to the 
application of risk-based approaches across the UK, Germany and the UK. The three case 
studies selected ensured that research was undertaken at supranational, national and local 
level, to ascertain where in the food safety regime the constraints and drivers to risk-based 
regulation are found. Reflection on the outcomes of the findings across the case studies 
revealed three main findings that speak more generally to the efficacy of implementing risk-
based approaches, which are summarised below.  
 8.5.1	Regulating	hazard	or	regulating	risk?	
 
While there was enthusiastic discussion about risk-based approaches across the three food 
safety regimes of the EU, Germany and the UK, the three case studies revealed a 
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predisposition towards regulating hazard, rather than risk. This predisposition in many ways 
reflected the wording of the GFL, whose hazard-based assertion that no unsafe food shall be 
placed on the market, was not immediately recognisable as accommodating risk. At food 
import level, the determination of all POAO as high-risk, and requiring either a 100% 
inspection regime, or a reduced inspection regime that does not appear to be underpinned by 
the tools of risk analysis, does not suggest a robust risk-based approach.  
 
At a local enforcement level within the UK, EHOs interviewed were uneasy about focusing 
all inspection on measuring internal business checks and balances. Discussions on the role of 
confidence in management in the inspection of a business, and the role of HACCP revealed 
that EHOs preferred to focus on the hazards themselves, rather than lose sight of them by 
focusing on the degree of business compliance with regulatory standards. Their unease is 
significant because the FHRS is purely concerned with the risk of compliance, to the extent 
that the hazard part of an inspection is disregarded. This is acceptable for when the FHRS is 
used as a risk communication device, but when regulatory resources are directed based upon 
the FHRS, there is real danger that the actual harms posed to consumers, with which a food 
safety regime should concern itself with, are missed. 
 8.5.2	The	applicability	of	risk-based	approaches	
 
Despite the eagerness within both the UK and Germany to implement risk-based controls, the 
experience in the two countries has been very different. While the UK has relatively easily 
implemented risk-based approaches (through Primary Authority and FHRS), the experience 
in Germany highlights important constraints. These constraints refer to the fundamental 
implementation of risk-based approaches, as well as the implementation of a highly 
harmonised EU-wide risk-based approach within food safety. 
 
Constitutional considerations in Germany and their ensuing legal principles can easily 
undermine risk-based approaches. Unsurprisingly, the principle of precaution (vorsorge), 
which is entrenched in German regulatory decision-making, leads to a greater reliance on 
regulating hazard, rather than risk. Perhaps more surprisingly, constitutional requirements can 
clash with one another. This is apparent in the failed attempt at food hygiene barometers in 
Germany, where weak consumer information laws have been trumped by businesses’ 
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freedom to trade. As a result, only “concrete findings” can be communicated, and so 
uncertainty becomes highly problematic and deeply juridified. It also means that the 
responsibility falls on regulators to prove that a product or process is unsafe, or their findings 
cannot be published. This contrasts with regulators at a federal level, who claim that due to 
precautionary approaches, new products or processes must be found to be safe, before being 
allowed onto the German market. Either way, legal recourse in Germany requires a high 
degree of certainty in determining the safety or “unsafety” of a product. Determination of risk 
to account for levels of uncertainty appears to be less welcome in Germany, than the UK.   
 
Finally, the ideal of a harmonised risk-based EU food safety regime is difficult to picture 
when applied to a federalised country like Germany. The geopolitical fragmentation indicated 
by autonomous Länder, with embedded historical practices and norms, and differing 
approaches to risk makes it difficult to assimilate these risk regimes under one central regime. 
 8.5.3	The	vagueness	of	risk	
 
Discussion with respondents across the EU, Germany and UK revealed a fundamental 
question – exactly what risk are we talking about in the food safety regime? Although risk is 
understood in a regulatory setting to exclusively mean the prioritisation of constrained 
resources, the risks targeted are usually ill-defined, whether they be societal, institutional, or 
economic. The terminology of risk is even invoked when it is hard to ascertain where risk 
features in the ensuing regulation. For example, risk has clearly become a guiding rationale in 
the EU food safety regime, but sometimes this does not correlate to a risk-informed approach. 
Path dependency behind the designation of “high-risk” POAO shows that the terminology of 
risk is used to rationalise regulatory action that isn’t risk-based itself. This emphasises the 
salience of risk in modern regulation, when its terminology is even used for effect.  
 
On a local level, as previously mentioned, the application of risk-based approaches within the 
UK food safety regime increasingly focus on the risk of non-compliance, rather than on the 
harm itself. Beyond this, risk-based approaches can undermine the proportional system of 
enforcement they seek to promote; one example here is food businesses that have scored 3 or 
4 in the FHRS, requesting a re-visit to attain a 5. This takes EHO resource away from 
establishments that have the greater risk of non-compliance, namely those with 0, 1 or 2. 
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These examples are indicative of how the plurality of risk terminology can lead to unintended 





While this thesis has focused on food safety, the research highlights important variables that 
underpin the efficacy of risk-based approaches that are not constrained to this single policy 
domain, or indeed its geographical remit.  
 
Fundamentally, this thesis supports the warning given by Lupton (1999) that while the 
language of risk is becoming increasingly pervasive, there is an important need to identify 
and assess how the application of risk ideas play out in different contexts and across different 
populations. For even though this thesis has shown an enthusiasm at the EU level to anchor 
food safety regulation within risk governance, over 15 years after this was explicitly laid out 
in the General Food Law, there continues to be great debate over the language of risk. 
Specifically, there appears to be uncertainty over what risk is being regulated against, how 
risk analysis is constructed (as in the grey areas between risk assessment and risk 
management), and how the acceptability of risk is determined across 28 diverse Member 
States. It would therefore be interesting to see whether other supranational organisations, 
such as the OECD or World Bank, suffer from these same issues concerning the diffusion of 
risk ideas. The evidence gathered in this thesis would suggest that such issues would be 
prevalent across all supranational standard-setting bodies.  
 
This thesis has also indicated that there are legal and constitutional barriers to the extent to 
which risk-based approaches can be considered as universal. While the evidence gathered 
with relation to the UK indicates that risk-based approaches have increased harmonisation 
across local authorities, such as with Primary Authority, in Germany this is not the case. The 
juridified nature of enforcement cultures within the fragmented polity of Germany means that 
law courts, both administrative and constitutional, are the arbiters for increasing 
harmonisation. Germany is therefore affected by legal norms, some that manifest in a way 
that is restrictive to the roll-out of risk-based regulatory toolsets. A key constitutional issue 
concerns the grounds for regulatory interventions, specifically what thresholds have to be met 
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in order to justify an intervention. Friction between constructional precedents, such as the 
right of businesses to trade freely against the public right of protection against bodily harm 
shown in the case of food hygiene barometers, have a profound impact on where the bar for 
regulatory intervention is set. Other legal hurdles to risk-based approaches include Germany's 
long-standing commitment to the precautionary principle and the reluctance of German 
courts to define consumers as sufficiently informed to be able to make decisions as required 
within the context of 'nudge' approaches. The majority of legal constraints highlighted within 
the Germany are to do with constitutional interpretation, an exercise that does not explicitly 
take place within the UK case. This author would therefore suggest that the application of 
risk-based approaches may prove problematic not simply within a fragmented federal polity, 
but also within a polity with established constitutional arrangements. 
 
A third general observation that can be taken from this thesis is the role and power of 
professions. Within food safety, the German corporatist approach is clearly evident, with 
professions tasked with enforcement, such as food chemists and vets, holding influence along 
with Lander and national government, as well as industry and consumer protection NGOs. In 
the UK, this proliferation of important professional interests is not as apparent. Evidence 
provided in this thesis suggests that in the UK, Environmental Health Officers were less able 
to 'resist' changes in regulatory approaches. In Germany, food safety inspectors appeared 
better linked into the standard setting machinery, whether this was through established 
approaches to corporatism or the high level of local autonomy afforded within the policy 
domain. Such differences would support Katzenstein’s (1987) assertion that within Germany, 
power relations are carefully balanced through the need for cooperative arrangements, as 
opposed to a greater centralisation of power within the UK polity. The conclusion to draw 
here is that, with other new regulatory approaches, risk-based approaches may face more 
hurdles to overcome before they are properly implemented in a consensus-seeking Germany 
rather than the hierarchical context of the UK. 
 
The two countries provide differing patterns with regard to the universality of risk-based 
approaches. Within the UK, risk-based approaches are actively used as a means of increasing 
harmonisation across local authority enforcement, whether that be through the Primary 
Authority Scheme or through FHRS. It could therefore be argued that risk reduces diversity 
of regulatory enforcement practices here. In Germany, and despite requirements in AVV Rüb 
for inspections to be risk-based, there is no indication that such approaches have had a 
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substantive harmonising effect on German enforcement practices. With significant variation 
shown between Länder in (politically) setting acceptable levels of risk, differing historical 
cultures of enforcement, and variance in the institutional makeup of enforcement services and 
professions, this makes the effective implementation of any harmonising federal regulatory 
tool difficult if not impossible. This would suggest that, with any policy domain, there needs 
to be a sufficient political and legal context for risk-based approaches to thrive. A 
geopolitically fragmented country that has organisationally flat institutional arrangements for 
regulation and strong corporatist traditions and constitutional norms, such as Germany, has 




This thesis has been chiefly concerned with the study of risk-based approaches to the 
regulation of food safety within the UK and Germany. Two wealthy, industrialised countries, 
which in relation to food safety are harmonised under the same EU regulations, both publicly 
welcoming the increased regulatory efficiencies that risk-based approaches offer – surely risk 
will be implemented in the same way? Through the selection of the three case studies for this 
thesis, the simple answer is “no”. However, the differences that the three case studies tease 
out are of relevance not only to the policy domain of food safety, but also to broader research 
on risk-based regulation.  
 
At the forefront of EU food safety regulation, there is a tension between hazard and risk. 
While the regulation on official controls, 882/2004, requires the enforcement of food safety 
to be risk-based, the underlying GFL, as outlined in 178/2002, stipulates that no unsafe food 
shall be placed on the market. At once, we have an ontological debate about what an 
acceptable level of risk is, and how it correlates to a standard of safety. Risk is seen as an 
organising rationale within regulatory discourse, but its terminology can be employed without 
the tools of risk analysis being brought to bear – as evidenced by the use of “high-risk” to 
refer to all POAO within the EU food import regime. Indeed, the clamour for implementing 
risk-based approaches must first be tempered by a fundamental question – what risk are we 
trying to regulate? In food safety, is this the health risk to consumers? The institutional risk to 
business? Or regulators? The economic risk to trade? 
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Having a tempered approach to introducing risk-based approaches applies to national 
settings, as well as supranational ones. The experience of Germany across the case studies 
within this thesis, has shown that through a mixture of geopolitical fragmentation, competing 
constitutional arrangements, and historical practices, risk-based approaches can either falter 
(such as with food hygiene barometers), or splinter into a myriad of different risk regimes 
that reflect the fragmentation of a federal state. This fragmentation poses questions for the 
highly harmonised nature of the EU food safety regime, and how the EU can suitably capture 
the multiplicity of risk regime within one country. 
 
The experience of the UK across the case studies selected shows a more hospitable political 
and legal environment for the application of risk-based approaches. However, this does not 
mean that the application of these approaches did not reveal some searching questions about 
the role of risk in regulation. For example, the FHRS, though ostensibly a tool of risk 
communication, has become a risk management tool as EHOs look to regulate their 
frequency of inspections on the FHRS’s publicly available scores. This would preclude the 
EHO’s full inspection of a business, which also includes assessment of hazards. This is 
omitted from the scoring matrix of the FHRS, which is exclusively concerned with business 
compliance of regulation. A constant question underpinning discussion with UK regulators 
was whether the calculation of the risk of non-compliance acts as a suitable proxy of 
assessment for the risk of foodborne illness?  
 
This brings the issue full-circle round to what is the risk we wish to regulate? Part of the 
reason as to why this question is posed, is due to the ill-defined terminology of risk. It is now 
more than 37 years since the watershed US Supreme Court rulings on OSHA’s regulation of 
benzene, that put risk-based regulation firmly on the regulatory map. However, there is still a 
great deal of indeterminacy regarding the types of risk that a regulator should regulate. So, 
this is an appeal for greater collaboration between the academic world of risk, and the 
regulatory world of risk, to clearly define the different types of risk, and how they fit into 
regulatory dynamics and societal contexts. In the meantime, the fallacy that a risk-based 
approach can act as the unifying principle across and within nation states will continue to 
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